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Executive Summary

Executive Summary
This report seeks to perform a comparative analysis of compliance mechanisms
under selected multilateral environment agreements (MEAs). Nineteen MEAs
were selected on the basis of their being global in scope, widely ratified and
representative of treaty arrangements across environmental management
sectors. In order to proceed further, it was first necessary to define compliance
mechanisms.
Definition of compliance mechanisms is less straight-forward than might be
expected as there is no existing authoritative set of definitions. Fine distinctions
need to be drawn between implementation and compliance, between
international and domestic compliance mechanisms, between performance
information and environmental baseline data, between verification and monitoring
missions, between primary implementation assistance and non-compliance
response assistance, and between penalties and compensation liabilities.
Compliance mechanisms are defined in this report under four headings:
1. a requirement for information reviewing national performance of MEA
obligations (‘performance review information’);
2. institutionalised multilateral procedures to consider apparent instances of
non-compliance (‘multilateral non-compliance procedures’);
3. multilateral measures adopted to respond to non-compliance (‘noncompliance response measures’); and
4. dispute settlement procedures.

Comparative Compliance Mechanisms
The 19 MEAs are analysed to identify their compliance mechanisms and to
characterise them according to the four categories above. The comparisons
between MEAs and general observations are made within each of those four
categories. Almost all MEAs contain national performance review information
provision requirements and most contain dispute resolution procedures but only
a minority embody non-compliance procedures (Table 3.1).
(A) PERFORMANCE REVIEW INFORMATION

The most common MEA compliance mechanism and the one on which the
majority of international studies and capacity building efforts focus is
performance review information. Although scientific and technical data
concerning environmental baselines and quality changes can feed into
performance review information, it does not in itself assess national responses to
international obligations. (Environmental changes may occur despite, or
irrespective of, national environmental measures.) Similarly, data concerning
operational information exchanges can be fed into performance review
8
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information, but such exchanges do not in themselves review performance
(Figure 1).
Performance review information is gathered primarily through national selfreporting but a few MEAs also provide for supplementary third-party verification
or monitoring (Table 3.2). Almost all MEAs require Parties to self-report on their
national performance. The majority of those MEAs provide guidelines or
templates for this purpose. Just less than a third of those provide for verification
of data in national reports or for third-party monitoring of national reporting
systems. Among the five MEAs surveyed that regulate international transactions,
the two most recent do not require Parties to report the details of regulated
transactions, an omission that generates gaps in the available performance
information for those treaties.
Potential interlinkages in performance review information gathering arise
between MEAs regulating closely related activities. In relation to self-reporting,
the interlinkages can be created by harmonization of reporting formats and joint
MEA reporting by a Party. For example, where MEAs regulate overlapping sites,
species, substances or emissions, there is heightened potential for coordination.
This performance review information will be most useful across MEAs when
review requires the provision of statistical, transactional or other quantifiable
data, rather than qualitative descriptive evaluations. The latter are typically more
related to descriptions of policy measures that are customised to particular MEAs
and may also be less factually objective.
Research work on harmonization of performance reporting formats across MEAs
has been undertaken by international organisations for a decade, particularly by
the World Conservation Monitoring Centre concerning biodiversity-related
treaties and by the United Nations University. The secretariats of several Rio and
biodiversity-related MEAs engage in regular meetings to examine opportunities
for coordination.
However, to date, the research effort has focused on the biodiversity-related
cluster of MEAs. It has produced proposals for harmonisation that include the
development of information system models that would explore synergies during
the various steps in the data collection and dissemination process, particularly
through modular or consolidated reporting for the biodiversity-related MEAs. Also
suggested to enhance performance review information delivery in relation to the
biodiversity-related MEAs are: harmonising document cover sheets; adopting
standard definitions; harmonising web sites; developing a meta-database to
indicate the information that is available and its location; and developing a interconvention web site and search engine, as well as a lessons-learned network to
encourage the sharing of experience.1
1

J. Harrison and M. Collins, “Harmonizing the information management infrastructure for biodiversityrelated treaties”, WCMC Website, <http://www.unepwcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf#xml=/cgi-
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In relation to monitoring and verification, potential interlinkages exist in carrying
out third-party monitoring operations and verification missions. Thus, a
verification mission might be multi-tasked to assess aspects of compliance
common to several MEAs.
(B) MULTILATERAL PROCEDURES TO CONSIDER NON-COMPLIANCE

Multilateral non-compliance procedures (NCPs) must be distinguished from
traditional dispute resolution procedures, which are invoked only once sufficient
damage has been done to the legal order for a conflict to arise. The purpose of
such NCPs is to identify Parties’ compliance difficulties and to facilitate better
compliance in a non-adversarial manner.
Most MEAs have established or are in the process of developing a formal NCP
(Table 3.3). They occur frequently under MEAs in the hazardous materials and
biodiversity sectors and are most common for those concerning the atmospheric
commons. In stark contrast, there are none in the marine sector. Although most
of NCPs established set up an elected Implementation Committee or Compliance
Committee to make recommendations, the final output is a decision by the
Conference of the Parties (COP). A suggestion that a Party is non-compliant can
usually be brought to the attention of an NCP administering body by the MEA
secretariat, by the Party itself experiencing compliance difficulties or by other
Parties, or, under a few MEAs, by a third-party body performing a monitoring
role.
Potential for interlinkages between NCPs is slight as each is specific to the
sensitive balance struck during its negotiation processes. However, closer
coordination between MEA secretariats could enhance their capacity to trigger
NCPs. Protocols for coordination of performance information between
secretariats could enable them to be more effective in triggering their respective
NCPs. Such coordination would be likely to be useful across MEAs within a
cluster but could also be useful across MEAs that regulate related activities, such
as international trade. For example, evidence of corruption of customs authorities
indicating a Party's non-compliance concerning its trade-related obligations might
implicate that Party in similar non-compliance under more than one MEA.
(C) NON-COMPLIANCE RESPONSE MEASURES

Response measures can be classified into two categories: incentives - technical
and financial assistance to support improved implementation; and disincentives penalties such as stricter requirements for performance review information.
Incentives include enhanced international cooperation with the non-compliant
bin/pdf_hl?STEMMER=en&RGB=ff00ff&WORDS=feasibility+study+&DB=unepwcmc&URL=http://www.unep-wcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf> (19/10/05).
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Party in support of implementation, such as the supply of technical or financial
assistance. This priority assistance is referred to here as 'non-compliance
response assistance' and must be distinguished from implementation assistance.
Implementation assistance under an MEA is normally available at earlier stages
in the implementation cycle, rather than as a response to non-compliance.
All of the MEAs surveyed in this paper provide some measure of basic
implementation assistance to Parties that may need it at those earlier stages,
always in the form of technical assistance and usually also as financial
assistance (Table 3.4). A minority of the MEAs specifically also set out
assistance as a non-compliance response measure. Where they do so, two
provide that it is conditional on demonstration of the Party's adopting a national
compliance action plan.
Disincentives to continued non-compliance can be imposed in less than a quarter
of the MEAs surveyed (Table 3.5). The disincentives include requirements for
additional 'non-compliance response information' or the imposition of warnings or
penalties. The latter comprise additional obligations, suspension of privileges,
trade sanctions and liabilities. Trade sanctions occur under only three of the
MEAs. Liability to undertake more onerous burdens in meeting the MEA
obligations can be imposed under the Kyoto Protocol. Such liability must be
distinguished from compensation liability that is determined between Parties
bilaterally through an arbitral process, such as a dispute resolution procedure.
Only the Basel Convention Liability Protocol defines liability to compensate and
this is not truly part of a multilateral NCP in any MEA.
Interlinkages across MEAs of considerations specific to a particular noncompliant Party in selection of response measures during NCP decision-making
processes could maximise the effect of non-compliance responses for the noncompliant Party. Thus, the coordination of implementation assistance across
MEAs to address recurrent non-compliance caused by a systemic lack of a
particular environmental management capacity would be more effective than
piecemeal or duplicative implementation assistance. Non-compliance response
assistance measures could be easier to coordinate across MEAs than general
implementation assistance measures because they are nominated as priorities
through NCPs and are fewer in number than general requests for assistance.
Similarly, the coordinated imposition of penalties against a serially non-compliant
Party would have greater deterrent impact than ad hoc penalties. Coordination
would be likely to be useful across MEAs within a cluster but could also be useful
across MEAs that regulate common activities, such as international trade in or
manufacturing of particular products.
(D) DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

MEA dispute resolution mechanisms are grouped in three clusters of compulsory
procedures: negotiation, conciliation and arbitration. They may be conceived of
as varying across a range of sophistication, from simple provisions that require
11
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Parties to voluntarily negotiate bilaterally in good faith to compulsory binding
third-party dispute resolution procedures.
All but four MEAs have provisions on settling disputes between Parties (Table
3.6). With the exception of the dispute resolution procedures of UNCLOS and the
Fish Stocks Agreement, MEA dispute resolutions procedures tend not to include
compulsory binding procedures. Instead, they comprise bilateral negotiation,
compulsory conciliation and voluntary arbitration. Compulsory conciliation is
invoked following the failure of negotiations, when one Party requests it, but it
does not culminate in a binding determination??? Disinclination to submit to the
binding decisions produced by the dispute resolution procedures of arbitral or
judicial tribunals could be the consequence of their adversarial nature and
unpredictable and potentially expensive consequences. The trend towards use of
multilateral NCPs, as opposed to adversarial dispute settlement procedures,
seems to herald a focus on managing political relationships so as maintain the
viability and integrity of MEAs.
Potential linkages are feasible in respect of common dispute resolution bodies,
particularly within clusters, which could specify within their respective conciliation
or arbitration annexes the nomination of standing panels of experts. However,
this may rarely be of utility as there appears to be widespread avoidance of
resort to third-party dispute resolution.

Compliance Interlinkages
The greatest concentration of existing interlinkages between international
compliance systems occurs between the biodiversity-related MEAs, other than
the UNCCD (Table 4.1). Their compliance system interlinkages concern
performance review information. In this connection, as noted above,
harmonisation of information requirements is being explored. Interconnectivity
between their respective websites and implementation assistance clearinghouses is gradually being introduced.
It is noteworthy that the biodiversity-related MEAs also enjoy the greatest
concentration of interlinkages for general implementation. Other areas of
concentrated MEA interlinkages concerning general implementation occur within
clusters, ie. the hazardous substances and atmosphere clusters, with the notable
exception of the marine cluster. There is also a relatively high level of
implementation interlinkage between the biodiversity-related and atmosphererelated clusters, comprising the only significant area of interlinkages that extend
across clusters.
The success of interlinkages between MEA compliance mechanisms at the
international level relies largely on the effectiveness of interlinkages in
implementation across MEAs at the national level. In relation to take-up at the
national level, capacity-building to enhance interlinkages in national
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implementation of MEAs is being delivered by some intergovernmental
organisations, such as UNDP, UNEP and WCO. Several international
organisations that are partly non-governmental also seek to build implementation
capacity. The most significant of these is the International Network for
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE), which has developed a
set of environmental compliance and enforcement (ECE) indicators for assessing
domestic program performance.
Such capacity building seeks to enhance national systems for domestic
implementation of individual MEAs and, to a lesser extent, to build domestic
interlinkages between them. However, the UNU has conducted national case
studies of institutional coordination in relation to the implementation of MEAs that
touch specifically upon interlinkages in domestic implementation. A brief survey
of national implementation data suggests that, except for countries in North
America and Europe, domestic interlinkages in implementation across MEAs are
at very early stages of development and mostly concern the establishment of
integrated environmental monitoring databases rather than integration of
performance information.
Based on the conclusions drawn from the comparative analysis of compliance
mechanisms and the synthesis of law and practice, a draft Action Plan on
Building Interlinkages and Synergies Across Global MEA Compliance Regimes is
appended (Annex I). The Action Plan recommends steps that might be taken by
UNEP and other international organisations to promote interlinkages between
MEA compliance systems. It addresses the following matters:
• Consistent Concepts and Terminology
• MEA Compliance Regime Manual
• Harmonisation of Performance Self-Reporting
• Performance Information Exchange and Integration
• Model Standards for Inter-Secretariat Cooperation
• Interlinkages Administrative Support
• Interlinked Verification and Monitoring
• Coordinated Non-Compliance Response Measures

13
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Chapter 1.
Introduction
Objectives
This report investigates compliance mechanisms under selected multilateral
environment agreements (MEAs). It seeks to contribute to UNEP’s work on
implementation mechanisms for international instruments. It does so specifically
by identifying strategic opportunities for inter-linkages and synergies in
compliance mechanisms among MEAs.
First, the report defines compliance mechanisms and the scope of those
covered. Then it analyses the components of compliance mechanisms and
compares them, with particular focus upon components involving reporting and
verification procedures. Third, law and practice in the implementation of
compliance mechanisms is analysed to identify lessons that can be learned.
Then conclusions are drawn as to the opportunities to enhance synergies in
compliance mechanisms among MEAs. Finally, a draft action plan is
recommended.

Background
The mandate for this investigation has its roots in Chapter 39 of Agenda 21,
which called upon United Nations members to undertake activities to promote the
full and prompt implementation of international agreements (Implementation
mechanisms - Activity B para. 39.7). It suggested that States could:
(a) Establish efficient and practical reporting systems on the effective, full
and prompt implementation of international legal instruments; [and]
(b) Consider appropriate ways in which relevant international bodies, such
as UNEP, might contribute towards the further development of such
mechanisms.
To this end, UNEP has undertaken activities to promote the implementation of
MEAs, focusing on strengthening the rule of environmental law. Outcomes of
particular note include:
•

The Malmo Declaration, Sweden, 29-31 May 2000, which provided that,
whilst the evolving framework of international environmental law and the
development of national law provide a sound basis for addressing the
major environmental threats of the day, they must be underpinned by a
more coherent and coordinated approach among international
environmental instruments, including in environmental compliance (para.
3);

14
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•

The Programme for the Development and Periodic Review of
Environmental Law for the First Decade of the 21st Century (Montevideo
Programme III), that was adopted by Governing Council decision 21/23 to
serve as a strategic framework for all UNEP environmental law activities in
the present decade. Inter alia, it addresses the role of the judiciary in the
context of capacity building for the implementation of environmental law;

•

The adoption of Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of
Multilateral Environmental Agreements by the Seventh Special Session of
the UNEP Governing Council, Cartagena, Colombia 13-15 February 2002;

•

The Global Judges Symposium on Sustainable Development and the Role
of Law, Johannesburg, 18-20 August 2002, that addressed building the
capacity of judges to ensure the implementation of environmental laws.
This Symposium was supported by a wide range of preparatory regional
judicial symposia. It was followed by the Judges Ad Hoc Meeting for the
Development of a Plan of Work as a Follow-Up to the Global Judges
Symposium Relating to Capacity Building of Judges, Prosecutors, and
Other Legal Stakeholders, Nairobi, 30-31 January 2003, and endorsed in
UNEP Governing Council decision 22/17 II A on the Follow-up to the
Global Judges Symposium; and

•

The Round Table Dialogue on Advancing the Millennium Development
Goals through the Rule of Law, held at UNEP Headquarters, Nairobi, on
16-17 February 2005.

Within UNEP, efforts to enhance synergies across MEAs are reflected in its
organisational structure. The Division of Environmental Conventions (DEC) was
established in 1999 at UNEP headquarters in Nairobi. Within the Division of
Environmental Conventions, the Interlinkages Unit addresses strategic
approaches to increased collaboration between MEAs. Its activities involve:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Co-ordination of all work on linkages and synergies within DEC;
Identifying and encouraging substantive synergies between MEAs;
Development and implementation of a systematic approach for coordination among MEAs;
Development of a strategic approach to track inconsistencies in the
decisions of the COPs of the MEAs;
Encouraging the harmonization of information systems, information
exchanges and access to information between MEAs;
Encouraging a coordinated approach to capacity building among MEAs;
Streamlining of national reporting on biodiversity-related conventions and
Rio conventions; and
Illegal trade and customs codes issues.
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Work related to MEAs is also undertaken by the UNEP Compliance and
Enforcement Unit in the Division Environmental Conventions (DEC). It developed
the UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements and is in the process of developing a Manual on
Compliance With And Enforcement Of Multilateral Environmental Agreements.
The Division of Policy Development and Law maintains UNEP’s Environmental
Law Programme, which has the main carriage of environmental law development
and capacity building for implementation. Major outcomes of its work include the
development of international and national environmental law databases,
provision of technical legal assistance for the preparation of national
environmental laws, environmental law and policy training for governmental
officials, and environmental law capacity building for the judiciary.

Methodology
The essential method adopted in this report is comparative. That is, it compares
compliance mechanisms across MEAs.
Initially, data is gathered, analysed and compared. The first step is to select
MEAs, analyse each compliance mechanism into its components, categorise
them and describe them by categories. The second step is to compare the
components by category across MEAs. This task includes survey of the
academic, governmental and inter-governmental literature for information
concerning the operational qualities of particular MEA compliance mechanisms.
Then qualitative studies are undertaken. This entails the third and fourth steps in
the methodology, i.e., case studies of available regional and national law to
discern the qualities of State practice in implementing MEA compliance
mechanisms and a literature survey of MEA compliance linkages and synergies.
Finally, the comparative data and qualitative information will be synthesised to
draw conclusions about the nature and location of opportunities for inter-linkages
and synergies between MEA compliance mechanisms. These will be distilled
into recommendations for an action plan to enhance inter-linkages and
synergies.

Definitions
The approach to terminology used here is consistent with the emerging standard
usage, as indicated in UNEP's Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement
of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (UNEP Guidelines).

16
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The term 'compliance' is part of a range of terminology used to describe patterns
of conformity with legal norms. It is to be distinguished from related terms, such
as 'effectiveness', 'enforcement' and 'implementation'.2
Compliance
The UNEP Guidelines are divided into two parts: Part I - Guidelines for
Enhancing Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements and Part II Guidelines for National Enforcement, and International Cooperation in Combating
Violations of Laws Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements. In
essence, Part I addresses compliance primarily from an international
perspective, concerning the design of MEA regimes, although they also consider
national legal regimes to enhance compliance. In contrast, Part II addresses the
strengthening of national enforcement capacity. Part I is the more closely related
to compliance interlinkages and synergies between MEAs because it focuses on
compliance regimes and primarily on the international process. It defines
compliance as
'the fulfilment by the contracting Parties of their obligations under a multilateral
environmental agreement and any amendments to the multilateral environmental
agreement'.3
This is the basic definition of compliance that is applied in this report. However, it
should be observed that compliance is not an ‘all or nothing’ game. The fact that
a Party is not fully compliant does not mean that it is fully non-compliant. Despite
the binary nature of the language used, compliance occurs across a scale of
shades of grey.4
Compliance Mechanisms
Compliance mechanisms are the systems adopted under MEAs to promote
compliance. The components of compliance mechanisms can be analysed into
four categories: (a) performance information; (b) multilateral institutional
procedures; (c) non-compliance response measures; and (d) dispute settlement
procedures. These are described at greater length in Chapter 2.
Effectiveness

2

Ronald Mitchell ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’in James Cameron, Werksman J. and Roderick, P.,
Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan London 1996) p. 24.
3

UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environment Agreements
(Nairobi 2002) Part I, p 2. It should be noted that the UNEP Guidelines Part II define compliance from a
domestic perspective as 'the state of conformity with obligations, imposed by a state, its competent
authorities and agencies on the regulated community, whether directly or indirectly through conditions and
requirements, licences and authorizations, in implementing multilateral environmental agreements'. (p. 8)
4

Harold K. Jacobsen and Brown Weiss, E. ‘A Framework for Analysis’ in Engaging CountriesStrenghtneing Compliance with International Environmental Accords (MIT Press 1998) p. 2.
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Concern to assess progress towards a variety of goals in international
environmental governance has resulted in a multiplicity of meanings for
'effectiveness'. Effectiveness can, for example, relate to such goals as
environmental problem solving, economic efficiency and desired changes in
political behaviour.5 At times, however, effectiveness is confused with
compliance. This occurs when what is assessed is progress to congruence with
legal norms. For the purposes of this report it is important to distinguish
compliance from effectiveness. Thus, the progress that effectiveness is taken to
assess in this report is progress towards goals that concern environmental
problem solving and changes in political behaviour. Thus, a statement of
effectiveness entails measurement of environmental or social change over time
generated by the MEA. It requires, first, proof of a causal link from the MEA to
the measured change. It also requires an assessment of the relative success of
the regime in solving the environmental problem that it was designed to address.
The latter evaluation is possible in some cases, where the aims and objectives of
the MEA are stated with precision to define quantifiable outcomes and impacts.
Nevertheless, the process can be accused of being subjective when the aims
and objectives of the MEA are not.6
Enforcement
Part II of the UNEP Guidelines define enforcement as
'the range of procedures and actions employed by a State, its competent
authorities and agencies to ensure that organisations or persons, potentially
failing to comply with environmental laws or regulations implementing multilateral
environmental agreements, can be brought or returned into compliance and/or
punished through civil administrative or criminal action’.7
Thus, the meaning of enforcement as set out in the UNEP Guidelines is the
ensuring of conformity with national laws that implement MEAs. That is the
meaning as applied in this report also.
Implementation
A State is said to implement an international norm at the domestic level when it
adopts appropriate domestic measures for the purpose of meeting its obligations
under the international treaty norm. Such measures might include enacting
legislation, formulating policies or allocating resources. The UNEP Guidelines
Part I define implementation as
5

Oran Young The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes (MIT Press Massachussetts 1998)
3-6.

6

Ronald Mitchell ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’in James Cameron, Werksman J. and Roderick, P.,
Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan London 1996) p. 24.
7

UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environment Agreements
(Nairobi 2002) Part I, p. 9.
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'inter alia, all relevant laws, regulations, policies, and other measures and
initiatives that contracting Parties take or adopt and/or take to meet their
obligations under a multilateral environmental agreement and its amendments, if
any' (sic).8
The mere fact that an implementation measure is taken does not mean that it is
adequate to meet a treaty obligation nor that the State is necessarily compliant
with its obligation. Implementation is said to occur in three phases: first, by
adopting national legal measures; second, by enforcing them; and third, by
reporting on the implementation measures.9 The latter, reporting, is an obligation
that also forms part of an MEA's compliance mechanism. It is dealt with below in
greater detail in the context of compliance mechanisms.
Interlinkages
Interlinking in the context of separate compliance mechanisms of individual
MEAs is the construction of relationships between them. The nature of these
relationships will usually take the form of coordination of inputs and outputs, such
as compliance information inputs and assistance outputs. To identify coordination
opportunities requires an analysis and understanding of the various elements of
compliance mechanisms of MEAs. The elements are identified with the objective
of generating synergies between them. Thus, identification of opportunities to
construct interlinkages is the preliminary conceptual groundwork necessary to
achieve synergies.
Monitoring
Monitoring can refer to scientific and technical monitoring of environmental
conditions or to performance monitoring of implementation of MEA obligations.
Scientific and technical monitoring is undertaken by bodies that are often
independent of but work in cooperation with the MEA Parties and secretariat.
However, the type of monitoring that is the focus of this paper is that of national
performance in implementing MEA obligations. Performance monitoring may
address a Party’s establishment of systems to implement the MEA but does not
involve review of accuracy of particular data.
Multilateral Environmental Treaties (MEAs)
MEAs are treaties that are open to universal participation by States. Often, MEAs
articulate objectives in addition to specific obligations. The objectives usually
concern an MEA’s intended broad effect on the environment or society. They are
relevant to a study of the MEA's effectiveness but less relevant to a review of

8

UNEP Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environment Agreements
(Nairobi 2002) Part I, p 2.
9

Philippe Sands Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd edn) (Cambridge University Press
2003) p. 174.
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compliance. For the purposes of clarity in a compliance review, it is helpful to
refer to obligations individually, i.e. as set out in particular treaty provisions,
rather than to compliance with a treaty overall as the latter involves an implicit
generalisation.10 The methodology for selection of particular MEAs for analysis is
set out in Chapter 2.
Synergies
Synergy is described in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘Interaction or cooperation of
two or more organisations ... to produce a combined effect that is greater than
the sum of their separate effects.’11 As applied to the study of compliance
mechanisms of MEAs, synergy refers to the production of greater effectiveness
and efficiency in effects than the MEA compliance mechanisms can achieve
separately. For example, greater effects might be achieved through
complementarity and mutual reinforcement. The complementarity and mutual
reinforcement are the products of appropriate linkages between the separate
compliance mechanisms of MEAs. Thus, synergy is the output of interlinkages
between MEAs.
Verification
Verification is a process undertaken to test the accuracy of data or information
provided by a Party to the MEA Secretariat. The process is undertaken by a third
Party, such as the Secretariat or an NGO, or by them in combination with other
Parties to the treaty.

Scope
This report studies inter-linkages and synergies in major global MEAs. The MEAs
that are surveyed here are exclusively global. There are several pragmatic
reasons for this approach.
First, conferences of Parties and secretariats to global MEAs address relatively
similar compliance regimes, resources and challenges. This creates likely
opportunities for inter-linkages between various global MEAs at the international
institutional level.
Second, there is a high degree of overlap between the Parties to global MEAs.
This is simply because they are intended to be universal and often are very
widely ratified. Consequently, there are relatively rich opportunities for interlinkages between various global MEAs at the multilateral and national levels.
Third, the circumstances to which regional environmental treaties apply are more
diverse than those for global MEAs. Many of them are unconnected with UNEP.
10

Ronald Mitchell ‘Compliance Theory: An Overview’in James Cameron, Werksman J. and Roderick, P.,
Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law (Earthscan London 1996) p. 5-6.

11

Concise Oxford Dictionary 10th edn OUP 1999
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The conferences of Parties and ecretariats that serve regional environmental
treaties sometimes serve several treaties for the same region and, therefore,
share very similar compliance regimes, resources and challenges. PParties to
regional environmental treaties are typically also Parties to other environmental
treaties for the same region. This suggests that there are very likely to be
potential inter-linkages between environmental treaties for a particular region and
that these can be conveniently examined as distinct regional groups.
Inter-linkages between regional environmental treaties and global MEAs
addressing similar subjects certainly do exist. As a separate further exercise, the
opportunities for inter-linkages between subject-related global, regional and
bilateral MEAs deserve examination. However, that task can be distinguished
from the examination of inter-linkages between global MEAs. Due to the number
and diversity of bilateral and regional MEAs (there are many more regional
environmental treaties than global MEAs), they are beyond the practical
resources available for the current exercise.
Compliance mechanisms are the subject of this report. Although compliance
mechanisms seek to achieve national implementation and enforcement of MEAs,
so as to promote the international effectiveness of MEAs, implementation
enforcement and effectiveness issues are not the subjects of examination here.
'Compliance', 'Enforcement' and 'Effectiveness' are defined and distinguished in
the 'Definitions' section above.
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Chapter 2
Compliance mechanisms of major global MEAs
This chapter first selects MEAs, in order to analyse each compliance mechanism
into its components, categorise them and describe them. It gathers and analyses
data for each MEA. The data is compared across MEAs in Chapter 3.

Major Global MEAs
The nineteen global MEAs that are examined here are those that are considered
'major'. They are so considered because they have entered into force and have a
large number of Parties.
The MEAs are organised for examination into groups that cover common,
overlapping or related subjected matter. For example, those with objectives that
concern primarily an aspect of nature conservation are clustered together. This
approach might be contested because all aspects of the natural environment are
inter-related. Further, it might be suggested that inter-linkages and synergies
between MEAs could be strongly determined by factors other than their
environmental subject matter. For example, factors such as common servicing by
the same United Nations organisation might be a sensible basis for
categorisation. Nevertheless, there is a tendency for MEAs with similar subject
matters to be serviced by the same United Nations body. For example, UNEP
services most of the hazardous substances conventions (concerning waste,
persistent organic pollutants and aspects of genetically modified organisms,
although regulated chemicals are administered jointly with FAO). Ultimately,
however, this report also undertakes a comparative analysis of the MEAs across
clusters. Therefore, the issue of clustering of MEAs according to primary subject
matter is not of central importance as it does not predicate the outcome of the
comparative analysis.
This chapter examines compliance mechanisms within four clusters of MEAs: (1)
nature conservation; (2) hazardous substances management; (3) atmospheric
emissions controls; and (4) marine environment protection. The major global
MEAs that have been selected for analysis in the four clusters are set out as
follows:
1. Nature Conservation
•
•
•

Wetlands – Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat 1971
Heritage – Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural
Heritage 1972
Endangered species – Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 1973
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•
•
•
•

Migratory species – Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of
Wild Animals 1979
Biological diversity – Convention on Biological Diversity 1992
Deserts – United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularly in
Africa 1994
Plant genetic resources – International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture 2001

2. Hazardous Materials
• Hazardous wastes – Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 1989
• Dangerous chemicals – Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade 1998
• Biosafety – Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity of 5 June 1992, 2000
• Persistent organic pollutants – Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants 2001
3. Atmospheric Emissions
• Ozone layer – Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985
• Ozone depleting substances – Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer 1987
• Climate change – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
1992
• Greenhouse gas emissions reductions – Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change 1997
4. Marine Environment
• Whaling – International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946
• Sea dumping – Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter 1972
• UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
• Fish Stocks – Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 1995

Identifying Components of Compliance Mechanisms of MEAs
To compare particular compliance mechanisms across MEAs, it is necessary to
first identify the details of what it is that we wish to compare. Therefore, each
compliance mechanism is analysed into its detailed components, which are
described and categorised.
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The components of the compliance mechanisms within each MEA are
categorised under four headings:
(a) performance review information - requirements for information reviewing
national performance of MEA obligations;
(b) multilateral non-compliance procedures - institutionalised multilateral
procedures to consider apparent instances of non-compliance;
(c) non-compliance response measures - multilateral measures adopted to
respond to non-compliance; and
(d) dispute resolution - dispute settlement procedures.
(A) PERFORMANCE REVIEW INFORMATION

Many MEAs require their Parties to exchange information as part of their primary
operational obligations. For example, they might be required to provide
information on proposed environmentally sensitive trade transactions or industrial
developments, on ambient environmental conditions or on environmental
technologies. This operational information is to be distinguished from MEA
requirements for performance review information.
In relation to their performance, Parties are often required to report on the
measures they have taken to implement a particular MEA, usually by submitting
annual reports on their relevant laws or policies. Some MEAs provide for a third
Party, such as a Secretariat, to monitor or verify the performance and require the
Parties to cooperate with such monitoring or verification of their performance.
Often, operational and performance information are inter-related, as data from
operational information exchanges are fed into performance review.
A related form of performance review is regime review, which concerns review of
the regime’s performance overall, rather than individual Party performance. For
example, statistical data processed from sources including the Parties’
operational information exchanges and their performance information can help
the Secretariat and the COP to assess whether targets have been met and to
identify future priorities.
Collection of performance review information is necessary to determine a Party’s
compliance situation. Therefore, in examining compliance, this report focuses on
performance review information.
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Figure 1: Information Cycle
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(B) MULTILATERAL NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

Most MEAs provide for the development of a formal, multilateral NCP. When
developed, this usually comes in the form of an elected committee, called an
Implementation Committee or Compliance Committee. A Party’s alleged noncompliance may be referred to the Committee for consideration and the
Committee then makes a recommendation on the matter to the COP. Usually,
the final output is a decision by the COP. The purpose of such procedures is to
identify compliance difficulties and to facilitate better compliance in a nonadversarial manner and before the convention regime is undermined. In that
respect, multilateral NCPs must be distinguished from traditional dispute
resolution procedures, which are invoked only once sufficient damage has been
done to the legal order for a conflict to arise.
Despite the simple dichotomy in the notions of compliance and non-compliance,
performance information will usually indicate a degree of compliance rather than
perfect compliance or absolute non-compliance. A Party may be compliant to a
degree, across a measure of shades of grey. The degree of compliance may in
circumstances be so poor that the Party can be determined to be substantially
non-compliant. Substantial failures to submit national performance information
can conceal national non-performance of primary operational obligations and,
therefore, is often treated as a failure to meet a primary operational obligation.
(C) NON-COMPLIANCE RESPONSE MEASURES

When an instance of substantial non-compliance is identified under a noncompliance procedure, a response is necessary at the multilateral level. The
response needs to be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case. Noncompliance usually stems from lack of human, material and financial resources
and/or lack of political will.12 The response measures available can be classified
into two categories: incentives - technical and financial assistance to support
improved implementation; and disincentives - penalties such stricter
requirements for performance review information. These are sometimes referred
to as ‘carrots and sticks’.
(i) Incentives are the usual response and include enhanced international
cooperation with the non-compliant Party in support of implementation,
such as the supply of technical or financial assistance. Thus, a COP might
direct priority financial and technical assistance to a non-compliant Party.
This assistance may be subject to conditions such as the adoption of a
national program of implementation actions. This priority or conditional
assistance is referred to here as 'non-compliance response assistance'

12

Montini, M, ‘Improving Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements through Positive
Measures: The Case of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change’ in Kiss, A, Shelton, D and Ishibashi, K
(eds.), Economic Globalization and Compliance with International Environmental Agreements (Kluwer
Law International, The Hague, 2003) p.159.
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and must be distinguished from regular cooperative assistance under the
MEA.
Technical assistance includes: capacity-building mechanisms in the form
of training and workshops, which address issues relating to lack of human
resources and know-how; technology transfers and exchange of
information mechanisms to address issues relating to the lack of
materials; and financial provisions to address resource issues.13 (It is
noteworthy that information exchange obligations arise also in the context
of technical assistance.) Financial assistance often comes in the form of a
Trust Fund or a financial mechanism from which the Parties provide
funding for relevant projects. One of the most important financial
mechanisms is the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which was
established in 1991 by the World Bank to provide funding to projects
falling within the categories of biological diversity, climate change,
international waters and ozone layer depletion.14 When invoked under a
NCP, technical and financial assistance might be made conditional on
demonstration of the Party's demonstration of bona fides in redressing the
non-compliance failure, such as by adopting domestic legislation or a
national action plan.
(ii) In some cases, disincentives to continued non-compliance can be
imposed. For example, a COP might impose additional, stringent and
customised performance review information obligations on a noncompliant Party and direct that the information provided be subject to
verification. The additional required information can be termed 'noncompliance response information'. These additional reporting
requirements must be distinguished from their regular performance review
information counterparts.
Other disincentives to non-compliance are warnings and penalties. The
latter may include additional obligations or suspension of privileges. For
example, a non-compliant Party might be warned that its rights under the
MEA regime could be suspended. The suspension of rights may involve
the imposition of limited trade sanctions, as can occur under the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention.
Penalties imposed through the multilateral process of the NCP can be
distinguished from compensation liabilities. The latter can be imposed
under the terms of the MEA or a protocol but often need to be determined
between Parties bilaterally through an arbitral process or other form of
dispute resolution procedure.
13

Ibid p.163.

14

Ibid.
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Thus, responses to non-compliance vary, from requiring additional reports (noncompliance response information as distinguished from regular performance
review information), to recommending conditional assistance measures (noncompliance response assistance, as distinguished from regular implementation
support assistance), to imposition of liabilities and the suspension of a Party’s
rights under the convention.
(D) DISPUTE RESOLUTION

MEA mechanisms to settle disputes can be grouped in three clusters of
procedures: Negotiation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
Negotiation In the event of a dispute, Parties must submit to negotiation. Thus,
there is no obligation to pursue binding arbitration.
Conciliation Generally, these provisions provide that Parties must submit to
negotiation or other peaceful means as the first port of call. If the dispute is not
resolved within a specified period of time (usually 12 months), Parties must then
submit to conciliation in accordance with a procedure that is either annexed to
the Convention or to a COP resolution. The conciliation procedure is not
automatically triggered. Thus, once the requisite period has lapsed, one of the
Parties must request it. However, Parties can bypass the conciliation procedure
in favour of arbitration before the International Court of Justice or in accordance
with an arbitration procedure, which, again, is either annexed to the Convention
or to a COP resolution. The arbitration process is not compulsory and can only
be invoked where both Parties have notified the Secretariat that they accept this
means of dispute resolution.
Arbitration Unlike conciliation, arbitration is binding. In marked contrast to the
weak dispute resolution procedures described above, which avoid imposing
compulsory, binding arbitration on Parties, UNCLOS sits in a category of its own.
It has compulsory, binding arbitration for specific disputes (i.e. disputes
concerning the sea-bed). Generally, however, the arbitration procedure is
invoked if the dispute has not been resolved through negotiation. Conciliation is
an option where negotiations fail, but is invoked only if one Party requests it and
the other accepts the invitation. Otherwise, Parties have the right to invoke to
compulsory arbitration procedures and the forum in which the proceedings are to
take place.
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1. Nature Conservation
RAMSAR CONVENTION ON WETLANDS OF INTERNATIONAL
IMPORTANCE ESPECIALLY AS WATERFOWL HABITAT 1971
OVERVIEW

The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as
Waterfowl Habitat (the Ramsar Convention) entered into force on 21 December
1975. It provides that Parties must designate at least one wetland to be included
in the ‘List of Wetlands of International Importance’, which should be selected
according to its international significance in terms of ecology, botany, zoology,
limnology or hydrology.15 Parties have a duty to promote the conservation of
listed wetlands.16 However, Parties are also obliged to promote the conservation
of wetlands and waterfowl by establishing nature reserves on wetlands
regardless of whether those wetlands are included on ‘The Ramsar List’ or not.17
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
National Reports on the implementation of the Convention were presented at
COP 1 (1980) at the invitation of the Bureau. COP 2 (1984) recommended that
all Parties submit reports to the Bureau six months before each ordinary COP.18
The Ramsar Bureau also conducts on-site monitoring to review implementation.19
Performance review information is supplemented by the wetlands inventory
program. In Resolution VII.20, the Parties recognised the importance of
developing a national inventory of wetlands.20 The resolution urged Parties to
give the highest priority to the task of completing a comprehensive wetland
inventory. The Framework for Wetland Inventory was developed in response to
Resolution VII.20 to provide guidance on developing a wetland inventory

15

World Heritage Convention, Article 2.

16

World Heritage Convention, Article 3.

17

World Heritage Convention, Article 4.

18

Ramsar Recommendations 2.1 and 4.3.

19

Vol. 11(2) Review of European Community and International Environmental Law, 2002, p.183.

20

Ramsar Website, <http://www.ramsar.org/key_guide_inventory_e.htm> (7/10/05).
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program and in conducting
implementation activities.

associated

identification,

monitoring

and

(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures
The Montreux Record was established at COP 4 (1990) and formalised at COP 5
(1993).21 The Record focuses attention on threatened Ramsar sites listed on the
‘Record of Ramsar sites where changes in ecological character have occurred,
are occurring or are likely to occur’.22 It is coupled with a Monitoring Procedure
that allows the Bureau to consult with a Party when it comes to the Bureau’s
attention that a Ramsar-listed site within that Party’s jurisdiction is likely to be
degraded due to anthropogenic interference. The Bureau can invite the Party
concerned to submit additional reports, monitor the site, negotiate a solution and
it may bring the matter to the attention of the Standing Committee, which can
bring the issue to the COP.23 Technical assistance may also be provided.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
The provisions of the Ramsar Convention related to support for implementation
can be applied by the Standing Committee to address non-compliance.
Technical Assistance
Parties must encourage research and the exchange
of information and promote training regarding wetlands.24 The Convention also
stipulates that Parties must consult with other Parties about the implementation
of the Convention, especially with regard to transfrontier wetlands, shared water
systems, shared species and development projects affecting wetlands.25
Guidelines have been produced for the implementation of the wise use of
wetlands,26 for developing and implementing National Wetland Policies,27
reviewing laws and institutions to promote the conservation and wise use of
wetlands28 and for international cooperation.29
21

Ramsar Resolution 5.4 and Recommendation 4.8.

22

Annex 1 to Recommendation 4.7.

23

Ramsar Recommendation 4.7.

24

Ramsar, Article 4.

25

Ramsar, Article 5.

26

Ramsar Recommendations 3.3 and 4.10 and Resolutions 5.6 and 5.7.

27

Ramsar Resolution 7.6.

28

Ramsar Resolution 7.7.

29

Ramsar Resolution 7.19.
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At COP-7 the Bureau was directed to establish a clearinghouse and liaise with
other international organisations for information exchange on indigenous
knowledge systems and participatory approaches.30
Financial Assistance
The Ramsar Convention was adopted before
implementation assistance funds became widespread features in international
multilateral environmental agreements. The COP adopts a core budget
administered by the Ramsar Bureau.31 Contributions to the budget come from the
Parties, who contribute in proportion to their usual percentage contribution to the
UN budget, although there is also cooperation with funding institutions such as
the World Bank and the GEF. A Ramsar Small Grants Fund was established in
1990. Funds come partly from the Convention's core budget, but largely from
donations by Parties and others. It is administered by the Bureau under the
supervision of the Standing Committee, pursuant to the Terms of Reference for
the Financial Administration of the Convention, for activities to implement wetland
conservation and wise use projects.32 Developing countries can apply for
assistance by official request from a competent national authority.
(d) Dispute Resolution
COP-1 (1980) identified the need for a dispute resolution procedure.33 A Task
Force was established to consider this and other proposed amendments.
However, the dispute resolution amendment was eventually abandoned.34

30

Ramsar Resolution 7.8.

31

Ramsar Website, <http://www.ramsar.org/brochure-e.htm> (8/9/05).

32

Ramsar Resolution 4.3.

33

Ramsar Recommendation 1.8

34

Ramsar Website, <http://www.ramsar.org/lib/lib_legal_e.htm> (8/9/05).
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CONVENTION CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF THE WORLD
CULTURAL AND NATURAL HERITAGE 1972
OVERVIEW

The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage (World Heritage Convention) entered into force on 17 December 1975.
The World Heritage Convention defines world heritage in two categories: first,
cultural heritage, which are monuments, buildings and sites of outstanding
universal value in terms of history, art, aesthetics, science or ethnology;35 and
natural heritage, being natural features, geological formations, threatened
species habitats and sites of outstanding universal value from an aesthetic,
scientific or conservation point of view.36 The World Heritage Convention leaves
it for each Party to identify World Heritage properties within its territory.37
However, it also places a general duty on each Party to actively identify and to
protect such properties.38
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Each Party must submit a periodic report every six years on the implementation
of the World Heritage Convention.39 Annex 7 to the Operational Guidelines
outlines the formatting requirements and the explanatory notes.
Operational Guideline 169 provides for a reactive monitoring system whereby
Parties must submit a report to the World Heritage Committee each time
exceptional circumstances occur or work is undertaken which may have an effect
on the state of conservation of the property. Reactive monitoring is also required
in respect of properties inscribed or about to be inscribed onto the List of World
Heritage in Danger. Where a property is being considered for inscription onto the
List of World Heritage in Danger, the Committee must develop a programme of
corrective measures. In doing so, the Committee may send third-party observers
to evaluate the threats to the property.40

35

World Heritage Convention, Article 1

36

World Heritage Convention, Article 2

37

World Heritage Convention, Article 3

38

World Heritage Convention, Article 4

39

World Heritage Convention, Article 29 and Operational Guideline 203.

40

Operational Guideline 184.
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The reactive monitoring procedures does make provision for information that may
be received from third-party sources, although the secretariat will verify the
source and the content of the information with the Party concerned and request
its comments.41 Under Operational Guideline 171, the Committee requests that
Parties cooperate with any Advisory Bodies which the Committee may have
requested to carry out monitoring and reporting on its behalf on the progress of
work undertaken to preserve properties in the World Heritage List.
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures
There are no non-compliance procedures established by the Convention or the
COP.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
Despite the absence of any formal NCP, the World Heritage Convention does
have modest measures in place to assist Parties in their implementation. These
measures can be usefully addressed to instances of likely non-compliance.
Technical Assistance
The Convention establishes a process for making
requests for international assistance to protect listed properties.42 Assistance
may involve: studies concerning the artistic, scientific and technical problems
raised by the protection; conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of the
cultural and natural heritage; technical assistance; training; supplying equipment;
low-interest or interest-free loans; and the granting of non-repayable subsidies.43
Operational Guideline 212 provides that the World Heritage Committee is to seek
to develop capacity-building opportunities among the Parties to the Convention.
One such capacity-building initiative is the Global Training Strategy, which is
linked to the Global Strategy for a Representative, Balanced and Credible World
Heritage List and Periodic Reporting.44 There are also provisions for cooperation
in awareness raising and education.45
Financial Assistance
The World Heritage Fund for the Protection of World
Cultural and Natural Heritage of Outstanding Universal Value was established
under Article 15 of the Convention. It is a Trust Fund maintained through
compulsory and voluntary contributions by Parties, as well as donations to
41

Operational Guidelines 174 and 194.

42

World Heritage Convention, Articles 19-22.

43

World Heritage Convention, Article 22

44

Operational Guideline 213.

45

Operational Guidelines 217-222.
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provide assistance to Parties. Funding is available for world heritage
identification and protection, emergency assistance, and for educational,
information and promotional activities.46 Parties contribute a set amount every
two years.47 Where the reactive monitoring procedures have been invoked, the
World Heritage Committee may authorise the provision of emergency funding
from the World Heritage Fund as well as technical assistance in order to prevent
the deletion of any property from the World Heritage List.48
In addition, the World Heritage Committee has established a Reserve Fund to
meet requests for assistance resulting from natural disasters and emergencies.49
Funds in trust are another source of funding; these are donations by specific
countries to support specific projects.50
Penalties
Failure to provide the compulsory contribution for the current year
or the preceding year excludes the non-compliant Party from membership of the
World Heritage Committee.51
(d) Dispute Resolution
There are no dispute resolution mechanisms in the Convention.

46

Operational Guideline 235.

47

World Heritage Convention, Article 16

48

Operational Guidelines 170, 176, 183 and 189.

49

UNESCO Financial Regulations, reg. 5.1.

50

http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=150 (7/10/05).

51

World Heritage Convention, Article 16.5.
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CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF
WILD FLORA AND FAUNA 1973 (CITES)
OVERVIEW

The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna (CITES) entered into force on 1 July 1975. It establishes a permit system
to control imports and exports of wild fauna and flora. CITES lists controlled flora
and fauna in three appendices.52 Appendix I covers all species threatened with
extinction that are or may be affected by trade. Commercial trade in these
species is essentially banned and can only be authorised in exceptional
circumstances. Appendix II covers species which are not currently threatened
with extinction but which may become so unless trade in such specimens is
controlled under the Convention. Appendix III covers species that any Party has
identified as being subject to national regulation for the purpose of preventing or
restricting exploitation and as requiring the cooperation of other Parties to control
trade. Parties are required to establish national Scientific Authorities, to advise on
the endangered status of native species of flora and fauna, and a Management
Authority to regulate their trade.53
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Pursuant to Article VI.6, each Party must maintain records of trade in species
listed in Appendices I, II and III, which cover: the names and addresses of
exporters and importers; the number and type of permits and certificates granted;
the States with which such trade occurs; the numbers or quantities and types of
specimens; names of species as included in Appendices I, II and III; and, where
applicable, the size and sex of the specimens in question.
In addition, Parties must prepare:
• Periodic reports on their implementation of the Convention;
• Annual reports containing a summary of the information specified in Article
VIII, which must be transmitted to the Secretariat; and
• Biennial reports on legislative, regulatory and administrative measures taken
to enforce the provisions of the Convention.54
Annual reports must be submitted by 31 October for the previous trade year,
although extensions are available on written request.55 The requirement for

52

CITES, Article II.

53

CITES Article

54

CITES, Article VIII.7
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biennial reporting has been largely unimplemented, although at COP-11 (2000)
Parties were called upon to comply.56
Resolution 11.17 consolidates all reporting resolutions and decisions. Guidelines
on reporting were introduced in 1982 following Resolution 3.10, which have
recently been revised and updated.57 Decision 13.90 directs the Secretariat to
identify ways to reduce the reporting burden on Parties and report at COP-14 on
the results of this work.
The Scientific Authority of each Party has obligations to monitor the export
permits granted by the State for Appendix II specimens and the actual exports of
such specimens.58 Additionally, the Parties, NGOs such as the TRAFFIC
Network and international bodies such as the World Customs
OrganisationOrganisation and Interpol, perform monitoring functions and report
infractions to the Secretariat.59 TRAFFIC is an international wildlife trade
monitoring network that was founded in 1976 as a joint programme between the
WWF and IUCN-The World Conservation Union.60 It works cooperatively with the
CITES Secretariat in implementing the Convention, its mission being to ensure
that wildlife trade does not threaten nature conservation.61 The Secretariat also
conducts ad hoc verification missions to assess a Party’s compliance with the
Convention.62
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
Under Article VXIII, if the Secretariat is satisfied that any species in Appendices I
or II is being adversely affected or that the Convention is not being effectively
55

CITES Resolution 11.17.

56

CITES Doc. 7.19, ‘Report on National Reports under Article III, Paragraph 7, of the Convention’,
prepared by the Secretariat for COP-7; CITES Decision 11.38 (ex-9.20); Reeves, R, Policing International
Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, Earthscan Publications, London, 2002,
p.67.

57

See SC45 Doc 13.2 ‘Guidelines for the Preparation of Annual Reports’; Reeves, R, Policing
International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, Earthscan Publications,
London, 2002, p.63.

58

CITES, Article IV.3.

59

Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance,
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.69.

60

http://www.traffic.org/about/what_is.html (3/11/05).

61

http://www.traffic.org/about/ and http://www.traffic.org/about/what_is.html (3/11/05).

62

Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance,
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.75.
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implemented it will communicate this issue to the relevant Party’s Management
Authority. The Party must propose remedial action.
COP-11 (2000) adopted a formal NCP, which can be invoked where Parties fail
to meet their reporting requirements and potentially, their financial obligations
under the Trust Fund.63 Resolution 11.3 states that if a major implementation
problem is brought to the Secretariat’s attention, the Secretariat and the noncompliant Party are to work together to resolve the problem. The Secretariat is to
offer advice on technical assistance as required. If a solution cannot be readily
achieved, the Secretariat must bring the matter to the attention of the Standing
Committee, which may pursue the matter directly with the non-compliant Party to
find a solution. The Secretariat must keep all Parties informed of such
implementation problems and any actions taken to resolve them. Resolution
11.17 provides that a failure to submit a report by 31 October for trade in the
previous year constitutes a major problem, which the Secretariat must refer to
the Standing Committee for solution in accordance with Resolution 11.3.
The COP employs non-compliance responses, which include: requiring the
Secretariat to issue security paper (i.e. watermarked and of identifiable
authenticity) for permits and certificates to reduce instances of forgery and to
confirm permits for a period of time; issuing formal warnings; the Secretariat
suspending cooperation with the non-compliant Party; the Secretariat conducting
on-site verifications; the Standing Committee recommending suspension of trade
in CITES-listed species with the non-compliant Party and specifying the
conditions to be met before the trade restrictions can be lifted.64
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
At the Standing Committee’s 46th meeting, the Secretariat presented the
Committee with a range of possible responses for non-compliance, some of
which are already in use, in an attempt to revise Resolution 11.3. The range
included: providing advice; informal warnings; additional self-reporting; public
notification of non-compliance; on-site verification; action plans; suspending legal
rights and privileges (i.e. suspension of trade in one or all CITES specimens,
voting restrictions, ineligibility of Standing Committee membership and of
participation in committees and working groups and ineligibility to receive

63

At the Standing Committee’s 46th meeting, the Secretariat considered that Article XI.3(a) and Resolution
11.2 can form the basis of formal action for dealing with fiscally non-compliant Parties: Reeves, R,
Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance, Earthscan
Publications, London, 2002, p.155.
64

Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance,
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.93.
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documents for meetings); and financial penalties.65 However, the Committee
declined to revise Resolution 11.3 and instead, directed the Secretariat to
prepare a discussion paper for COP-12 (2002).66 An open-ended intersessional
working group was established at the 50th meeting of the Standing Committee to
finalise a set of guidelines for complying with the Convention, however these
have not been completed.67
Technical Assistance
Resolution 3.4 encourages Parties to include
technical assistance in bilateral and multilateral aid programmes. In addition,
Parties receive assistance with the identification of CITES species pursuant to
Article XII.2(f), which states that the Secretariat must periodically publish and
distribute to Parties current editions of Appendices I, II and III together with any
information that would facilitate the identification of specimens included in those
Appendices. In response, the Secretariat and a Committee of Experts have
developed an Identification Manual.68
Capacity-building workshops are conducted for Management Authority staff and
enforcement officers while legal officers are trained under the National
Legislation Project. The latter aims to help Parties draft appropriate laws and
policies for the implementation of the Convention.69
Financial Assistance
CITES has no funding mechanism to facilitate
compliance. Initially, the Secretariat was funded by UNEP. However, the 1979
Bonn amendment to Article XI, which entered into force on 13 April 1987,
conferred financial powers to the COP, and funding from UNEP was gradually
phased out. A Trust Fund was established with an agreed scale of contributions
to finance, inter alia, technical assistance to the Parties. At COP-12 (2002) the
Parties adopted procedures and guidelines for the approval of externally funded
projects.70
Penalties
The failure to nominate a Scientific Authority in accordance with
Article IX of the Convention was dealt with by Resolution 10.3. It called upon
Parties to refuse export permits from Parties that have not given the Secretariat
65

CITES SC46 Doc.11.3, ‘Possible measures for Non-compliance’, CITES Secretariat (March 2002);
Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance,
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.157.
66

CITES COP 12, Doc.8, ‘Report of the Chairman’, para.40.

67

UNCCD COP 7, Items 13(b) and (c) of the provisional agenda, Executive Summary, para.s 18-20.

68

Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance,
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.238

69

CITES Resolution 8.4.

70

CITES Resolution 12.2.
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details of a Scientific Authority for more than one interval between regular
meetings of COP. At the same time, it encouraged technical assistance to
Scientific Authorities with a view to facilitating compliance.
(d) Dispute Resolution
Where there is a dispute over the interpretation or application of the provisions of
the Convention, Parties can opt for negotiation. They can proceed onto
arbitration with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, provided there is mutual
consent.71

71

CITES, Article XVIII
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CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF MIGRATORY SPECIES OF
WILD ANIMALS 1979
OVERVIEW

The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals
(CMS) entered into force on 1 November 1983. It aims to conserve and manage
migratory species of wild animals through the action of Range States, i.e. those
States exercising jurisdiction within the range of any such species. Under Article
II, Parties are encouraged to promote, cooperate in and support research relating
to migratory species and to provide immediate protection to the endangered
migratory species listed in Appendix I. Parties are also encouraged to conclude
agreements with other Range States for the conservation and management of
species having unfavourable conservation status listed in Appendix II.72

72

CMS Articles IV & V.1. These Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding include:
•

Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea 1990 (between Denmark,
Germany and The Netherlands);

•

Agreement on the Conservation of Populations of European Bats 1991;

•

Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas 1991;

•

Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds 1995

•

Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans of the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and
Contiguous Atlantic Area 1996;

•

Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles 1996;

•

International Agreement for the Conservation of Caribbean Sea Turtles 1998;

•

Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels 2001;

•

Memorandum of Understanding on Conservation Measures for the Slender-billed Curlew
1994;

•

Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Siberian
Crane 1993;

•

Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for Marine Turtles of
the Atlantic Coast of Africa 1999;

•

Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of Marine Turtles
and their Habitats of the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia 2001;

•

Memorandum of Understanding on the Conservation and Management of the MiddleEuropean Populations of the Great Bustard 2001;
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COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Parties have obligations to report on their implementation efforts to conserve
those migratory species in Appendices I and II that pass through their jurisdiction
and also must monitor such migratory species and keep the Secretariat informed
of the species’ status.73 Resolution 6.5 recommended that the format of national
reports be simplified and that the content be standardised to encourage Parties
to provide information that directly relates to the implementation of the CMS
Strategic Plan. Parties were encouraged to trial this new reporting format for
COP-7 (2002). At COP-7, Resolution 7.8 commended the new reporting format
and recommended that the final version be sent to the Standing Committee for
approval and adoption at its 26th meeting. The new reporting format requires,
inter alia, performance review information with respect to how Parties are
implementing the Strategic Plan.74
Article V sets out criteria for the substance of regional Agreements negotiated
under the auspices of Article IV. Such Agreements should establish the
appropriate machinery to monitor their effectiveness and reporting obligations.
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures
The CMS and the COP do not specify any non-compliance procedures.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
As there is no formal NCP, so there are no formal non-compliance response
mechanisms. However, a range of support measures for implementation can be
directed to assist Parties experiencing compliance difficulties.
Technical Assistance
Workshops have been held to assist Parties in
complying with their monitoring obligations. For example, in 1999 an international
workshop took place in Bonn, Germany, to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the

•

Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation and Restoration of Bukhara
Deer 2002

•

Memorandum of Understanding concerning Conservation Measures for the Aquatic
Warbler 2003.

73

CMS Article VI.

74

COP7 2002, ‘Proposed Format for National Reports’

<http://66.102.7.104/custom?q=cache:ejsd9ZdGG3QJ:www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop7/list_of_docs/pdf/en/
CP7CF7_06_2_national_report.pdf+Report+format&hl=en&ie=UTF-8> (3/11/05)
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Convention and present new research and monitoring technologies.75 Resolution
7.8 instructed the Secretariat to provide technical capacity to facilitate the
transfer of knowledge on the CMS Information System to developing countries. It
also calls for Parties to contribute to the ongoing development and maintenance
of the CMS Information System and the CMS Global Register of Migratory
Species.
Financial Assistance
UNEP-WCMC
provides
the
Secretariat
and
administers the Convention’s Trust Fund. There are plans to launch a new
fundraising strategy at COP-8 (2005), to be led by a new body called ‘Friends of
CMS’.76
(d) Dispute Resolution
Parties are to resolve disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the
Convention through negotiation and, if necessary, arbitration at the Permanent
Court of Arbitration.

75

CMS Website, <http://www.cms.int/news/PRESS/nwPR1999/nw990627.htm> (7/10/05).

76

CMS Website, <http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop8/cop8_mainpage.htm> (8/9/05).
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CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 1992
OVERVIEW

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) entered into force on 29 December
1993. Article 1 outlines the three objectives of the Convention: the ‘conservation
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic
resources.’ The CBD promotes inter-State cooperation for the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity,77 and especially of technical and scientific
cooperation.78 This has facilitated many bilateral and multilateral projects. The
Convention aims to achieve the conservation of biological diversity by: identifying
and monitoring of the components of biological diversity and of the processes
and activities that threaten those components;79 providing for in-situ and ex-situ
conservation;80 and integrating the conservation and sustainable use of biological
resources into national decision-making.81
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
The reporting provisions of the CBD are sparse. Article 26 of the CBD calls upon
Parties to report upon their measures to implement the CBD and the
effectiveness of those objectives. COP-2 (1995) decided that the first national
reports should be delivered to COP-4 in 1998 and adopted guidelines for the
preparation of reports were adopted at COP-2.82
In addition to the reporting obligations, Article 7 provides that each Party must
monitor the components of biological diversity set out in Annex I for the purposes
of in-situ and ex-situ conservation.
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures
There is no established NCP. However, Decision VII/30 established the Ad Hoc
Open-ended Working Group on Review of Implementation of the Convention. Of

77

CBD, Article 5.

78

CBD, Article 18.

79

CBD, Article 7.

80

CBD, Articles 9 and 18.

81

CBD, Article 10.

82

CBD Decision II/17.
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particular interest is the Working Group’s mandate ‘to consider progress in the
implementation of the Convention…to review the impacts and effectiveness of
existing processes under the Convention, such as meetings of the Conference of
the Parties, the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological
Advice, national focal points and the Secretariat…and to consider ways and
means of identifying and overcoming obstacles to the effective implementation of
the Convention.’83 At its first meeting, the Working Group recommended that the
COP investigate the obstacles to implementation at national level and ways to
overcome those obstacles.84 This Working Group may potentially develop into a
non-confrontational means of dealing with instances of non-compliance and
providing non-compliance response assistance.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
Technical Assistance
The CBD contains obligations on promoting and
cooperating with respect to: research and training;85 public education and
awareness;86 information exchange;87 and access to technical and scientific
cooperation.88 The Convention established a clearing-house mechanism (CHM)
to ensure that all Parties have access to the information and technologies
required to implement the Convention. The CHM was set up at COP-1 (1994)
and is funded through the Convention’s regular budget and through voluntary
contributions.89 It promotes cooperation in six key areas: tools for decisionmaking; training and capacity building; research; funding; technology transfer;
and the repatriation of information.90 The CHM provides universal access to
Convention records, case studies, national and other reports, initiatives and
programmes and technical and scientific information.91 It also seeks to increase
public awareness of the Convention’s programmes and links experts to relevant
work programmes.
At COP-4 (1998), Decision IV/2 recommended that Parties organise a CHM
steering committee or working group to build up the information contained in the
83

Decision VII/30, para 23.

84

Recommendation 5(b).

85

CBD, Article 12.

86

CBD, Article 13.

87

CBD, Article 17.

88

CBD, Article 18.

89

CBD Decisions I/3 and I/9.

90

CBD Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/chm/default.aspx> (8/9/05).

91

CBD Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/chm/default.aspx> (8/9/05).
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CHM at all levels, including country profiles, biodiversity strategies and action
plans, legislation, scientific and technological information and financial sources.
Numerous CHM regional workshops have been conducted since 1997. In 1999,
an independent review of the pilot phase of the CHM took place, culminating in
the development of a strategic plan and long-term program of work.92
An Informal Advisory Committee, which is coordinated by the Executive
Secretary, oversees the CHM.93 The continuation and mandate of the
Committee, as well as its operational procedure, were reviewed at COP-7
(2004),94 which decided to extend the Committee’s mandate and review its
continuation and operation at COP-9. A network of CHM National Focal Points
has been established to facilitate technical and scientific cooperation.
Financial Assistance
In relation to funding, Article 20 states that each Party
is to provide financial support and incentives for national projects that implement
the objectives of the Convention. Developed Parties are also expected to provide
additional funding to developing Parties to enable the latter to implement the
Convention. Developed Parties may provide funding through regional, bilateral
and multilateral channels.
Article 21 provides for a mechanism to provide financial resources on a grant or
concessional basis to help developing Parties. COP-1 (1994) decided that the
GEF would continue to serve as the institutional structure to operate the financial
mechanism under the Convention on an interim basis, in accordance with Article
39 of the Convention.95 COP-3 (1996) adopted the Memorandum of
Understanding between the COP of the CBD and the Council of the GEF. The
Memorandum of Understanding allows the GEF, in permanently operating the
financial mechanism under the Convention, to take guidance from the COP in
funding activities to implement the Convention.96 COP-3 (1996) also requested
the financial mechanism to provide funding for capacity building in developing
countries, particularly in relation to IT training and pilot projects to implement the
CHM.97 Guidance has also been provided to the financial mechanism at COPs.98
(d) Dispute Resolution
92

CBD Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/chm/default.aspx> (8/9/05).

93

CBD Decision III/4 and IV/2.

94

CBD Decision V/14.

95

CBD Decision I/2

96

CBD Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/chm/background.asp#> (8/9/05).

97

CBD Decision III/4

98

See CBD Decision III/5, Decision VI/11, Decision IV/13, Decision V/13 and Decision VII/20.
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Article 27 provides that the Parties shall seek solution by negotiation where there
is a dispute concerning the application of the Convention. If the dispute is not
resolved, they may seek mediation by a third Party.
The Convention provides that disputes can be settled through arbitration in
accordance with Part I of Annex II, conciliation in accordance with Part II of
Annex II or through the International Court of Justice. However, Parties must
firstly submit a declaration that they accept Arbitration or the International Court
of Justice as a compulsory means of dispute resolution. Otherwise, the dispute
must be submitted to conciliation in accordance with Part II of Annex II if
negotiation and mediation fail to reach a solution.
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UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION TO COMBAT DESERTIFICATION IN
THOSE COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING SERIOUS DROUGHT AND/OR
DESERTIFICATION, PARTICULARLY IN AFRICA 1994
OVERVIEW

The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa
(UNCCD) entered into force on 26 December 1996. The objective of the
Convention is to promote an integrated approach to combating desertification
and mitigating the effects of serious drought and/or desertification, through
effective actions at all levels, supported by international co-operation and
partnership arrangements.99
The Convention distinguishes between affected developing Parties and
developed Parties. Article 5 requires affected developing Parties to give due
priority to combating desertification, establish strategies within the framework of
sustainable development plans, address the underlying causes of desertification,
promote awareness of the problem and strengthen relevant existing legislation.
Article 6 requires developed Parties to actively support the efforts of affected
developing Parties to combat desertification by providing financial assistance and
mobilising funding.
There are five Annexes to the Convention dealing with the implementation of the
Convention in five regions affected by desertification: (I) Africa; (II) Asia; (III) Latin
America and the Caribbean; (IV) Northern Mediterranean; and (V) Central and
Eastern Europe. The African Annex is the most detailed and contains provisions
for financial mechanisms and resources, co-ordination, partnership and follow-up
arrangements.
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Article 9 of the UNCCD requires affected developing Parties and Parties that are
members of Regional Implementation Annexes to prepare National Action
Programmes in order to identify the factors contributing to desertification in their
countries, and to describe practical measures to combat them. The Regional
Implementation Annex for Africa and the Northern Mediterranean specify that
their national action programmes must contain provisions for monitoring the
implementation of the Convention.100

99

UNCCD, Article 2.1.

100

Annex I, Article 8.3(e) and Annex IV, Article 5(f).
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In addition, Parties must communicate to the COP at its ordinary sessions
reports on implementation measures.101 Affected developing Parties must
provide reports of strategies developed pursuant to Article 5 and their NAPs.102
Developed Parties must provide information on the measures undertaken to
assist in the preparation and implementation of Action Programmes, including
information on financial resources they have provided.103
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures
Under Article 27, the COP is empowered to consider and adopt procedures and
institutional mechanisms to resolve issues regarding implementation. At COP-6
(2003), the Parties convened an Open-Ended Ad Hoc Group of Experts to make
recommendations on such procedures and institutional mechanisms.104 A report
has been complied which summarises non-compliance mechanisms that have
been developed in other biodiversity-related as well as the cluster of chemical
Conventions. The report recommends that COP-7 (2005) may wish to consider
requesting the Group to develop a compliance model for consideration.105
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
Technical Assistance
Numerous articles provide for technical cooperation
between Parties. Article 6(e) requires developed Parties to promote and facilitate
access by affected Parties to appropriate technology, knowledge and know-how
in combating desertification. Article 16 provides that Parties agree to integrate
and coordinate the collection, analysis and exchange of short-term and long-term
data and information to ensure the systemic observation of land degradation.
Article 17 states that Parties undertake to promote technical and scientific
cooperation. Article 18 provides that Parties undertake to promote, finance
and/or facilitate the financing of the transfer, acquisition, adaptation and
development of environmentally sound, economically viable and socially
acceptable technologies relevant to combating desertification. This cooperation is
to be conducted bilaterally or multilaterally. Parties are also required to fully
utilize existing national, subregional and international information systems and
clearing houses for the dissemination of information on available technologies;
facilitate technology cooperation through financial assistance; and facilitate
access by affected developing Parties to technology on favourable terms. Finally,
Article 19 provides that Parties recognize the importance of capacity building.
101

UNCCD, Article 26.

102

UNCCD, Article 9.1.

103

UNCCD, Article 9.2.

104

UNCCD Decision 22/COP 6.

105

UNCCD COP 7, Items 13(b) and (c) of the provisional agenda, Executive Summary, para 52.
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Financial Assistance
In relation to financial assistance, Article 4.2(h)
provides that in pursuing the objectives of the Convention, the Parties will
promote the use of existing bilateral and multilateral financial mechanisms and
arrangements that mobilise and channel substantial financial resources to
affected developing Parties.106 While all Parties must make every effort to ensure
that adequate financial resources are available for programmes to combat
desertification,107 the financial burden to provide, seek out and mobilize funding
is the responsibility of the developed Parties.108
Article 21 establishes a Global Mechanism to promote the mobilisation of funds
to developing Parties. The International Fund for Agricultural Development
(IFAD) was selected at COP-1 (1997) to house the Global Mechanism, which
operates in conjunction with the World Bank and the UNDP.109 The mechanism
provides financial assistance to the Convention's national or regional Action
Programmes and seeks to promote greater coordination of funding and greater
effectiveness in the use of funds.
COP-5 (2001) enhanced the UNCCD’s financial base following strong support for
a proposal by the GEF Council to designate land degradation as another focal
area for funding.110
(d) Dispute Resolution
Disputes must be settled through negotiation or other peaceful means.111 Parties
have the choice of opting for arbitration under procedures to be adopted by the
COP in an annex as soon as practicable, or in the International Court of Justice,
provided they have given written notice. If the dispute takes more than 12 months
to settle or the Parties have not opted for arbitration, it must be submitted to
conciliation. Arbitration and conciliation procedures are yet to be adopted.112

106

See also UNCCD, Article 4.3.

107

UNCCD, Article 20.

108

UNCCD, Article 5.

109

UNCCD Decision 24/COP.1.

110

UNCCD Decision 9/COP.5.

111

UNCCD, Article 28.

112

COP 7 UNCCD, Items 13(b) and (c) of the provisional agenda, p.14.
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INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR FOOD
AND AGRICULTURE 2001
OVERVIEW

When the text of the CBD was adopted in 1992, member countries also adopted
Resolution 3 of the ‘Nairobi Final Act’, which recognised the need to resolve
issues relating to plant genetic resources under the auspices of the United
Nations Food and Agricultural OrganisationOrganisation.113 The International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture was signed on 3
November 2001 and entered into force on 29 June 2004.
The objectives of the Plant Genetic Resources Treaty are the conservation and
sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA) and
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of their use, in accordance
with the CBD.114 Under Article 5, Parties are required to: survey and inventory
PGRFA; promote the collection of PGRFA and relevant associated information
on those that are under threat or are of potential use; promote or support farmers
and local communities’ efforts to manage and conserve their PGRFA; promote in
situ conservation of wild crop relatives and wild plants for food production; and
monitor the maintenance of the viability, degree of variation, and the genetic
integrity of collections of PGRFA.115 Article 6 obliges Parties to develop and
maintain appropriate policy and legal measures that promote the sustainable use
of PGRFA. Article 10 establishes the Multilateral System to facilitate access to
PGRFA. Multilateral access is limited to the crops and forages listed in Annex I
and is achieved through transfer agreements.116
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
The Plant Genetic Resources Treaty does not require the submission of
performance review reports from the Parties. In respect of verification, the
Secretary has the right to access and inspect all activities that are directly related
to the conservation and exchange of the material covered by Article 15.1. That
provision deals with accessing ex situ collections of PGRFA held in trust by the
International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) of the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).
113

Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/IU.htm>
(8/9/05).
114

PGRFA Treaty, Article 1.

115

PGRFA Treaty, Article 5.1.

116

PGRFA Treaty, Article 12.4.
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To a limited degree, performance review might be constructed by collecting
together the operational information required to be exchanged in the course of
transactions regulated by the Treaty. Parties providing PGRFA under the
Multilateral System must provide all available data and information on the
product being supplied.117 Under Article 5.1(f), Parties are also required to
monitor the maintenance of the viability, degree of variation, and the genetic
integrity of collections of PGRFA. Under Article 17, Parties must cooperate to
establish a global information system (called the Global Information System) to
facilitate the exchange of information on scientific, technical and environmental
matters related to PGRFA. The expectation is that such exchange of information
will assist in benefit sharing, by making information on PGRFA available to all
Parties. In developing the Global Information System, cooperation must be
sought from the Clearing-House Mechanism of the CBD. Parties agree to make
available information through the Global Information System, including
catalogues and inventories, information on technologies, results of technical,
scientific and socio-economic research, including characterization, evaluation
and utilization, regarding PGRFA in Annex I.118
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures
Article 21 requires the Governing Body to, at its first meeting, consider and
approve procedures and operational mechanisms, including monitoring, to
promote compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. The Interim Committee for
the Treaty, the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, has
convened an Open-ended Working Group to consider the issue of noncompliance at COP-1 (2005).119
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
The Plant Genetic Resources Treaty contains extensive assistance provisions
that might be applied as non-compliance response mechanisms.
Technical Assistance
Article 5.1 provides that Parties must, in cooperation
with other Parties where appropriate, promote an integrated approach to the
exploration, conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA while Article 5.1(e)
encourages Parties to cooperate to promote the development of an efficient and
sustainable system of ex situ conservation and the development and transfer of
appropriate technologies for this purpose. The Treaty provides that international
cooperation is to be directed to: assisting developing Parties in their conservation
and sustainable use of PGRFA; promoting conservation, evaluation,
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PGRFA Treaty, Article 12.3(c).
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PGRFA Treaty, Article 13.2(a).
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documentation, genetic enhancement, plant breeding and seed multiplication;
sharing, providing access to and exchanging PGRFA as well as information and
technology in accordance with Part IV; and implementing the funding strategy in
Article 18.120 Under Article 8, Parties agree to promote the provision of technical
assistance to contracting Parties.
Article 13 states that benefits accruing from PGRFA accessed through the
Multilateral System must be shared through the exchange of information, transfer
of technology, capacity building and funding. These benefits should flow to
farmers in developing countries embodying traditional lifestyles.
The provision then expands on each form of assistance. Exchange of information
was dealt with in (a) above. In relation to technology transfer, Parties undertake
to provide and/or facilitate access to technologies for the conservation,
characterisation, evaluation and use of PGRFA that are within the scope of the
Multilateral System.121 Access to technology for developing countries must be
provided on fair and favourable terms, although intellectual property rights are
still protected.122 In relation to capacity building, Parties agree to give priority to:
programmes for scientific and technical education and training in conservation
and sustainable use of PGRFA; strengthening facilities for conservation and
sustainable use of PGRFA; and scientific research.123 Again, the emphasis is on
assisting developing countries. Article 13.3(d) deals with the sharing of
commercial benefits under the Multilateral System. The multilateral transfer
agreements must include a requirement that any recipient who commercialises a
PGRFA product by incorporating material from the Multilateral System must
make a payment to the financial mechanism established under Article 19.3(f).
The details of these terms and conditions are to be ironed out at the first meeting
of the Governing Body.
Financial Assistance
Article 19.3(f) requires the Governing Body to set up a
Trust Fund. Article 18 deals with funding priorities. Developed Parties are
required to provide, and developing Parties to avail themselves of, financial
resources, including through bilateral and multilateral channels and through the
Trust Fund. Funding priorities will be given to the implementation of agreed plans
and programmes for farmers in developing countries who conserve and
sustainably utilize PGRFA.124
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(d) Dispute Resolution
Parties must ensure that opportunities to seek recourse are available under their
legal systems where contractual disputes arising under multilateral transfer
agreements arise.125
In respect of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty,
Parties must firstly opt for negotiation and then, if necessary, mediation by a third
Party. Parties may, at any time, declare that for disputes not resolved through
negotiation or mediation, they accept arbitration in accordance with Part 1 of
Annex II or the International Court of Justice as compulsory means of dispute
resolution. Otherwise, the dispute must be submitted to conciliation in
accordance with Part 2 of Annex II.

125

PGRFA Treaty, Article 12.5.
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2. Hazardous Materials
BASEL CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY
MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL 1989
OVERVIEW

The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (the Basel Convention) entered into force
on 5 May 1992. The Convention regulates the transboundary import and export
of hazardous wastes and obliges Parties to ensure that such wastes are
managed and disposed of in accordance with the principles of environmentally
sound management (ESM).126
Article 2.1 defines wastes as ‘substances or objects that are disposed of or are
intended to be disposed of or are required to be disposed of by the provisions of
national law.’ To ‘dispose of’ a waste means any of the operations set out in
Annex IV. Article 1 defines ‘hazardous wastes’ as those that belong to any of the
waste streams contained in Annex I, unless they do not possess any of the
hazard characteristics in Annex III. The Convention also addresses ‘other
wastes', defined in Annex II as ‘categories of wastes requiring special
consideration’ (i.e. household wastes and their residues). The Convention does
not cover waste that is already covered by other international control systems.127
Parties to the Convention adopted a decision in 1992 to ban the transfer of
hazardous wastes for final disposal from OECD and non-OCED countries. Annex
VII to the Convention was then adopted at COP-3 (1995), listing the countries
from which the export of hazardous wastes to all other Parties to the Convention
is prohibited. Annex VIII, which listed wastes covered by the ban, and Annex IX,
which lists wastes that are not covered, were added in at COP-4 (1998).128 At the
time of writing, the ban has not yet entered into force. However, Annexes VIII and
XI entered into force on 6 November 1998.
The Basel Convention contains 15 operative divisions, which have been grouped
into three categories for the purposes of this Chapter.
1. Waste management. Under Article 4(2)(a)-(d), each Party must take
appropriate measures to: ensure that the generation of hazardous wastes
is reduced to a minimum; ensure the availability of adequate disposal
126

Basel Website, <http://www.basel.int/pub/basics.html> (8/9/05).
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facilities as close as possible to the source of generation of waste; ensure
that persons involved in the management of hazardous wastes take such
steps as are necessary to prevent pollution; and ensure that a
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is reduced to a minimum
and is conducted in a manner that will protect human health and the
environment.
2. Export controls. Under Article 4(5), Parties shall not permit the export of
hazardous wastes to a non-Party, or the import of hazardous waste from a
non-Party. Parties may exercise the right to refuse the import of
hazardous wastes for disposal and must inform other Parties of this
decision.129 Thus, the regulatory system under the Basel Convention is
one of prior informed consent. There is a duty to re-import abortive or
illegal exports.130
3. Import controls and movement management. States are obliged to prevent
the import of wastes if they will not be managed according to ESM
principles.131 Wastes are to be packed and labeled according to
international standards and must be accompanied by a movement
document.132
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Under Article 13(3), Parties must transmit reports to the COP each year. The
reports must provide information on: competent authorities and focal points;
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes; efforts to achieve reductions in
waste; available qualified statistics compiled by them on how the production,
transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes affects human health and the
environment; bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements entered into pursuant
to Article 11 of the Convention; accidents in the transboundary movement or
disposal of waste and measures taken to deal with them; disposal options within
national jurisdictions; measures undertaken to develop technologies to reduce or
eliminate the production of hazardous wastes; and any other matters the COP
deems relevant.
Article 10.2(b) obliges Parties to monitor the effects of the management of
hazardous wastes on human health and the environment, although this does not
constitute third-party monitoring of performance. Article 19 imposes monitoring
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obligations on the Parties.133 The provision states that any Party, which has
reason to believe that another Party has breached the Convention, may inform
the Secretariat and the Party against whom the allegations are made.
(c) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures
In Decision V/16, COP-5 (1999) requested the Legal Working Group to develop a
draft decision for the establishment of a compliance mechanism. A Compliance
Committee was established at COP-6 (2002). Decision VI/12 states that the
Committee shall be ‘non-confrontational, transparent, cost-effective and
preventative in nature, simple, flexible, non-binding and oriented in the direction
of helping Parties to implement the provisions of the Basel Convention’.134 The
Committee receives submissions from the Secretariat or Parties in relation to
non-compliance issues. The Party whose compliance is in question is given the
opportunity to make its own submissions to the Committee. The Committee
investigates the cause of the non-compliance and gives advice or non-binding
recommendations to help the Party achieve compliance.
At COP-7 (2004) Parties approved the 2005-2006 Work Programme for the
Compliance Committee,135 focusing on identifying and analyzing difficulties
relating to: reporting obligations under the Basel Convention; designation and
functioning of national competent authorities and focal points; and development
of national legislation to implement effectively the Basel Convention.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
Measures that may be taken by the COP, additional to the recommendations of
the Compliance Committee, include prioritization of technical assistance,
capacity building and funding, or a cautionary statement and advice regarding
future compliance.136
Technical Assistance
Under Article 10, the Parties must cooperate with
each other to improve and achieve the ESM of hazardous wastes. They must,
upon request, make information available with a view to promoting the ESM of
hazardous and other wastes, and cooperate in monitoring the effects of
managing hazardous wastes on human health and the environment. Parties must
133
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also cooperate in: the development and implementation of environmentally sound
low-waste technologies and the improvement of existing technologies; the
transfer of technology and management systems related to the ESM of
hazardous wastes and other wastes; developing technical capacity among
Parties that need and request assistance in this area; and developing technical
guidelines.137 Regional centres for training and technology transfers have been
established to assist in training and technology transfer.138 The Secretariat has
also produced a Manual for the Implementation of the Basel Convention, which
was approved at COP-3, 139 and organises related training seminars.140
Financial Assistance
Parties are also required to consider the
establishment of a revolving fund to provide assistance in emergency cases and,
indeed, they requested the Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical
Experts to consider the elements that would be required in establishing such a
fund at COP-1 (1992).141 The Basel Convention has established a Trust Fund for
the Implementation of the Convention as well as a Technical Cooperation Trust
Fund to Assist Developing Countries, which was enlarged at COP-6 to address
compliance in cases of emergency.142
Penalties
At COP-5 (1999) the Parties adopted the Basel Protocol on Liability
and Compensation, which establishes a liability and compensation regime for
damage that arises from the movement of transboundary wastes.
Article 8 imposes a duty on exporting Parties to re-import hazardous materials
where the transboundary movement cannot be completed in accordance with the
terms of the contract. Article 9 defines illegal traffic as transboundary movements
that: occur without notification to all States concerned; occur without the consent
of a State concerned; occur where consent was obtained through fraud or
misrepresentation; do not conform in a material way with the documents; or that
contravene the Convention or the principles of international law. Where the
conduct of an exporting Party results in illegal traffic, the exporting Party must reimport the waste and otherwise dispose of it in accordance with the Convention.
Where the conduct of the importing Party is responsible for illegal traffic, the
importer must dispose of the waste in an environmentally sound manner.
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(d) Dispute Resolution
Disputes relating to the interpretation, application or compliance with the
Convention must initially be resolved through negotiation or any other peaceful
means. However, if the Parties concerned cannot settle their dispute, the dispute
must be submitted to the ICJ or to arbitration pursuant to Annex VI on Arbitration,
provided that the Parties to the dispute consent. A Party may declare that it
recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to
any other Party accepting the same obligation the submission of the dispute to
the ICJ and/or to arbitration.143

143
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ROTTERDAM CONVENTION ON THE PRIOR INFORMED CONSENT
PROCEDURE FOR CERTAIN HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS AND PESTICIDES
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
OVERVIEW

The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade (the PIC Convention)
entered into force on 24 February 2004. The aim of the Convention is to promote
shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among Parties in the international
trade of certain hazardous chemicals in order to protect human health and the
environment from potential harm and to contribute to their environmentally sound
use.144 The Convention gives legal force to the implementation of the Prior
Informed Consent procedure (PIC procedure). Through the PIC procedure, the
Secretariat to the PIC Convention acts as a clearing-house through which
decisions of importing countries as to whether they wish to import certain
chemicals are compiled and circulated to other Parties. Parties can also use the
Secretariat to exchange information about characteristics of chemicals to inform
an importing Party about their dangers and use.
The chemicals that are subject to the PIC procedure are listed in Annex III in
accordance with recommendations from the Chemical Review Committee.145
Once a chemical is listed in Annex III, Parties must communicate their import
decisions to the Secretariat.146 The Secretariat then summarises and compiles
the responses and provides them to the other Parties.147 The import decision can
be a final decision to consent, to consent subject to conditions or to not consent.
Otherwise, it can be an interim response or a request for further information.148
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
There are no performance review self-reporting obligations in the PIC
Convention. However, its working provisions entail detailed operational
information exchanges that embody some information relevant to assessment of
144
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performance. For example, when a country takes action to ban or severely
restrict a chemical, its Designated National Authority (DNA) must inform the
Secretariat within 90 days of this action. The Secretariat then informs the other
Parties.149 (Parties must establish DNAs to be the contact points for information
exchange and for communicating consents under the PIC procedure.150) Where
a chemical that is banned or severely restricted by a Party is exported from
another Party’s territory, the exporting Party must provide exporting notification to
the importing Party, in accordance with Annex V.151 If these notifications were
compied into a database, they would go some way towards the formation of a
perspective to the Parties’ performance.
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
Article 17 requires the COP to develop and approve procedures and institutional
mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of the PIC
Convention and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance. At COP-1
(2004), the Parties convened an Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Article
17, with a view to preparing for and carrying forward deliberations on the
issue.152 The Working Group met before and during COP-2 (2005) but failed to
agree on critical issues (i.e. equitable geographical representation; “triggers” that
would lead to NCP; available non-compliance response measures; and handling
of performance information) and, so, will meet and report again to COP-3
(2006).153
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
The implementation support mechanisms of the PIC Convention may be used
targeted to address non-compliance. However, they tend to be bilateral in
operation and are, therefore, not ideally suited to deployment under a multilateral
NCP.
Technical Assistance
Article
10(4)(b)
provides
that
a
Party
may request assistance in evaluating whether an Annex III chemical should be
imported. Article 11(1)(c) provides that each exporting Party shall advise and
assist importing Parties, upon request and as appropriate: to obtain further
149
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information to help them to take action in respect of imports; and to strengthen
their capacities and capabilities to manage chemicals safely during their lifecycle.
Article 14 requires each Party to facilitate: the exchange of scientific, technical,
economic and legal information concerning the chemicals within the scope of the
Convention; the provision of publicly available information on domestic regulatory
actions relevant to the objectives of the Convention; and the provision of
information to other Parties, directly or through the Secretariat, on domestic
regulatory actions that substantially restrict one or more uses of the chemical, as
appropriate.
Article 16 states that the Parties shall cooperate in promoting technical
assistance for the development of the infrastructure and the capacity necessary
to manage chemicals to enable implementation of this Convention. Parties with
more advanced programmes for regulating chemicals should provide technical
assistance, including training, to other Parties in developing their infrastructure
and capacity to manage chemicals throughout their life cycle.
Financial Assistance
At COP-1 (2004), the Parties called upon the
Secretariat to conduct a study into the possible options for financial mechanisms
to enable developing countries to implement adequately the provisions of the
Convention.154 The study was discussed at COP-2 (2005) but the Parties could
not agree on a choice of financial mechanism, instead calling on the Secretariat
to revisit the options in light of discussion at COP-2 and to report on the revised
study at COP-3 (2006).155
(d) Dispute Resolution
Parties must settle disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention through negotiation or other peaceful means of their own choice.
However, a Party may declare in writing that, with respect to any dispute
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention, it recognises
arbitration or the International Court of Justice as a compulsory means of dispute
resolution in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation. Otherwise, if the
Parties to a dispute have not accepted arbitration or the International Court of
Justice, or if they have not been able to settle their dispute within twelve months
following notification by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them,
the dispute must be submitted to a conciliation commission at the request of any
Party to the dispute. The conciliation commission shall render a report with
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recommendations.156 At COP-1 (2004), Resolution 1/11 adopted an arbitration
and conciliation procedure for purposes of Article 20. These can be found in
Annex VI.
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CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY TO THE CBD 2000
OVERVIEW

Article 19(3) of the CBD provides that the Parties shall consider the need for a
Protocol to the Convention, particularly in relation to the safe transfer, handling
and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from biotechnology that
may impact on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. The
First Extraordinary Meeting of the CBD COP adopted the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity on 29 January 2000 in
Montreal, Canada. It entered into force on 11 September 2003.
The Protocol aims to ‘contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the
field of the safe transfer, handling and use of LMOs resulting from modern
biotechnology’ in accordance with the precautionary approach as set out in
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.157 It
applies to the transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of LMOs.158
The Protocol establishes an Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure (i.e.
a prior informed consent procedure), whereby Parties are required to ensure that
their exporters notify the National Authority of the importing Party prior to the
transboundary movement of LMOs that fall within the scope of the Protocol.159
The destination Party must then make a decision, based on a risk assessment,
as to whether to import an LMO.160
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Parties are required to monitor the implementation of their obligations under the
Protocol and to submit reports to the CBD COP (serving as the meeting of the
Parties (MOP) to the Protocol) on their implementation efforts.161 Parties are also
required to nominate a national focal point to liaise with the Secretariat.162
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedures
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Article 34 provides that the COP-MOP must consider and approve at its first
meeting cooperative procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote
compliance and address non-compliance. The COP-MOP established a
Compliance Committee and adopted procedures and mechanisms on
compliance in Protocol Decision I/7.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
The Committee’s rules of procedure were adopted in Protocol Decision II/1.
Under the rules of procedure, the Compliance Committee can take various
measures to promote compliance and address non-compliance including:
providing advice or assistance; making recommendations to the COP-MOP
regarding the provision of financial and technical assistance, technology transfer,
training and other capacity-building measures; request the non-compliant Party
to develop a compliance action plan; invite the Party to submit reports; and report
to the COP-MOP on the non-compliant Party’s efforts to address the issue. The
COP-MOP may, upon the Committee’s recommendation, issue a caution,
request the Executive Secretary to publish cases of non-compliance in the
Biosafety Clearing-House or, in cases of repeated non-compliance, take such
measures as to be decided at COP-MOP-3. Article 27 states that the COP-MOP
will adopt a process in respect of liability and redress for damage resulting from
the movement of LMOs.
Technical Assistance
Article 20 establishes a Biosafety Clearing-House to
facilitate the exchange of scientific, technical, environmental and legal
information on, and experience with LMOs, and to assist Parties to implement the
Protocol. It serves as a means through which information on import bans and
conditions is made available to Parties. Parties are required to make available to
the Clearing-House information on: existing laws and guidelines; bilateral,
regional and multilateral agreements; risk assessments or environmental reviews
of LMOs; decisions about the importation or release of LMOs; and performance
review reports submitted pursuant to Article 33. There are exceptions for
confidential information.163
Article 22 specifically deals with capacity building. It states that Parties shall
cooperate in developing and strengthening human resources and institutional
capacities in biosafety in developing Parties, either through existing organisations
or the involvement of the private sector. Cooperation in capacity building shall
include scientific and technical training in the proper and safe management of
biotechnology, and in the use of risk assessment and risk management for
biosafety, and the enhancement of technological and institutional capacities in
biosafety. Article 11.9 invites Parties to indicate their needs for financial and
technical assistance and capacity building with respect to LMOs intended for
direct use as food or feed or for processing. Parties must cooperate to meet
163
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those needs pursuant to Articles 22 and 28. The COP-MOP must take the needs
of developing Parties into account in providing funding guidance to the financial
mechanism, which is discussed below.164 The guidance to the financial
mechanism of the Convention, as set out in relevant COP decisions, applies to
the provisions of Article 28.
At COP-MOP-1 (2004), the Parties endorsed an Action Plan for Building
Capacities for the Effective Implementation of the Protocol and a Coordination
Mechanism.165
Financial Assistance
The Protocol adopts the financial mechanism created
under Article 21 of the CBD as its own financial mechanism.166 The COP-MOP
prepares draft guidance for financial support for consideration by the CBD COP,
so that such guidance might be included in the latter’s guidance to the financial
mechanism.167 Following COP-MOP-1 (2004), the CBD COP provided detailed
guidance to the funding mechanism in Decision VII/20. In Protocol Decision II/5,
the COP-MOP encouraged the GEF and the Executive Secretary to the CBD to
continue their collaborative support for the Protocol’s implementation. The GEF
has already provided funding to assist countries to prepare for the Protocol’s
entry into force. A UNEP-GEF project provided developing countries with
assistance in developing biosafety frameworks and participating in the Biosafety
Clearing-House.168
Penalties
In accordance with Article 27 of the Biosafety Protocol, COP-1
established a negotiation process to adopt a liability protocol. Negotiations are
currently ongoing.
(d) Dispute Resolution
The Protocol adopts the CBD dispute resolution procedures by virtue of Article
32 of the Protocol (CBD provisions relating to Protocol apply to Protocol) and
Article 27.5 of the CBD, which states that the dispute resolution provisions of the
CBD apply to any Protocol except as otherwise provided in the Protocol
concerned.
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STOCKHOLM CONVENTION ON PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS
2001
OVERVIEW

The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs Convention)
entered into force on 17 May 2004. It aims to protect human health and the
environment from the most dangerous persistent organic pollutants, including the
‘dirty dozen’, by helping PParties to switch to safer alternatives and to clean up
existing stockpiles.169 The Convention divides chemicals in three groups:
intentionally produced chemicals; unintentionally produced chemicals; and
stockpiles. Annexes A and B list intentionally produced chemicals, which are
mainly pesticides. Annex A deals with chemicals which are to be eliminated while
Annex B deals with those which are to be restricted. Parties are required to
prohibit and/or take the necessary measures to eliminate the production, import
and export of Annex A chemicals and to restrict the production and use of Annex
B chemicals.170 In addition, Annex A or B chemicals may only be imported or
exported for their environmentally sound disposal or for a use that is permitted for
that Party under Annexes A or B.171
Annex C lists persistent organic pollutants, which are formed and released
unintentionally from anthropogenic sources. Pursuant to Article 5, Parties must
take measures to reduce the total releases derived from anthropogenic sources
of Annex C chemicals, with the goal of their continuing minimisation and ultimate
elimination. Parties are also obliged to reduce or eliminate releases from
stockpiles and wastes of Annex A, B and C chemicals.172 Wastes containing
POPs are to be handled, collected, transported and stored in an environmentally
sound manner and in accordance with international rules (e.g. the Basel
Convention).173
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Parties must provide the COP with reports on their implementation and on the
effectiveness of their implementation measures in meeting the Convention’s
aims. They must also provide the Secretariat with statistical data on their total
169
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quantities of production, import and export of the listed chemicals or reasonable
estimates and a list of States from which or to which it has imported or exported
each substance.174 This reporting obligation ties in with the Parties’ obligation to
develop and endeavour to implement a plan for the implementation of their
obligations under the Convention, submit that plan to the COP within two years of
the date on which the Convention enters into force for it to review and update the
plan. Interim guidelines have been developed to assist Parties.175
Although primarily related to scientific baseline information, rather than
performance review information, Parties are to undertake appropriate monitoring
of POPs, including monitoring of their sources and releases into the environment;
presence, levels and trends in humans and the environment; environmental
transport, fate and transformation; effects on human health and the environment;
socio-economic and cultural impacts; release reduction and/or elimination and
harmonized methodologies.176
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
The COP is required to develop and approve procedures and institutional
mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of the
Convention and for appropriate penalties.177
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
Although not yet specified under its NCP, the POPs Convention’s provisions that
support implementation are well adapted for use in a targeted fashion as noncompliance response mechanisms.
Technical Assistance
The Convention provides for the provision on
technical assistance to developing Parties.178 Technical assistance includes
technical assistance for capacity-building relating to the implementation of the
obligations under the Convention.179 Under Article 9, Parties must facilitate or
undertake the exchange of information relevant to the reduction or elimination of
the production, use and release of POPs and alternatives to POPs. The
Secretariat serves as a clearing-house mechanism for information on POPs
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including information provided by the Parties, intergovernmental organisations
and NGOs. Parties must encourage and/or undertake appropriate research,
development, monitoring and cooperation pertaining to POPs. In doing so, they
must: support and develop international programmes or organisations aimed at
defining, conducting, assessing and financing research and data collection and
monitoring; support national and international efforts to strengthen scientific and
technical research capabilities; and consider the concerns and needs of
developing Parties with regard to technical and financial resources with a view to
improving their capability to participate in the above mentioned efforts.180
Financial Assistance
Parties undertake to provide financial support to
national activities that are geared towards implementing the Convention.
Developed Parties undertake to provide financial resources to developing Parties
in accordance with the financial mechanism established under Article 13(6) or to
provide financial resources through other bilateral, regional and multilateral
means.181 At their first meeting, Parties must adopt and provide guidance to the
financial mechanism.182 In the interim, the GEF is the principal entity entrusted
with the operations of the financial mechanism.183 The GEF and the Swedish
Government have funded workshops to assist Parties in strengthening their
national chemicals management programs with respect to the implementation
and ratification of this Convention.184 At COP-1 (2005), Parties requested the
GEF to develop a new focal area and operational procedures to support the
implementation of the Convention.185
(d) Dispute settlement
Parties must settle the disputes through negotiation or other peaceful means at
first instance. Parties have the option of accepting arbitration (in accordance with
procedures to be adopted by the COP) or the International Court of Justice as
compulsory means of dispute resolution. These can only be used in relation to
Parties accepting the same obligation. Where Parties do not accept these
means, or if they have not been able to settle the dispute within 12 months
following notification by one Party to another that a dispute exists between them,
the dispute must be submitted to a conciliation commission. Procedures relating
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to the conciliation commission are to be included in an annex to be adopted by
COP-2.186
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3. Atmosphere
VIENNA CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER
1985
OVERVIEW

The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer entered into force
on 22 September 1988. Parties are obliged to take measures to protect human
health and the environment against adverse effects likely to result from human
activities that modify the ozone layer.187 There are no targets or timetables for
action. Instead, there is an outline of general obligations on the Parties, which
focus on obligations to undertake research on the ozone layer, in particular on
the effects of human activities on the ozone layer and how these may be
addressed.188 It establishes a framework for future international legal measures
to protect the ozone layer by providing for future protocols.189
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Parties must transmit to the COP information on the measures adopted by them
in the implementation of the Convention and of protocols to which they are
Party.190 COP-1 (1989) decided that each Party shall submit these reports every
two years and shall include the socio-economic and commercial information on
the substances referred to in Annex I and directed the Secretariat to prepare a
format for reporting.191
Other extensive information collection obligations are related to scientific
observations of various aspects of the ozone layer, human effects upon it and the
impacts of modification of the ozone layer, rather than to performance review.
For example, Parties also agree, under Article 3, to promote or establish joint or
complementary programmes for systematic observation of the ozone layer and in
ensuring the collection, validation and transmission of research and
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observational data through appropriate world data centres.192 At COP-3 (1993),
the Parties decided that for the purposes of Article 3 of the Vienna Convention,
which deals with cooperation for research and systematic observations, it would
be adequate for the Parties to the Convention to report data under the Montreal
Protocol on all substances controlled by the Protocol.193
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
There are no provisions or COP decisions for the adoption of a non-compliance
procedure.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures
In the absence of any NCP, it is noted here that there are mechanisms in place
under the Vienna Convention for the mutual support of Parties in their
implementation efforts. These are in place to assist with the primary task of
implementation and are not in fact utilised non-compliance response
mechanisms. They are noted here merely to indicate that there is assistance
available to Parties for implementation.
COP-2 (1991) noted that the information exchange obligations under Annex II of
the Convention would largely be fulfilled by Parties reporting on data concerning
the handling of ozone depleting substances each calendar year and by
exchanging information and reporting on scientific activities in accordance with
the Montreal Protocol. The COP called on all Parties to the Convention, whether
or not Parties to the amended Protocol, to provide such data and information.194
Financial Assistance
Under Article 4, Parties must facilitate and encourage
the exchange of scientific, technical, socio-economic, commercial and legal
information, which is elaborated in Annex II. Annex II, paragraph 1 states that
Parties recognise that the collection and sharing of information is an important
means of implementing the Convention and that Parties must therefore exchange
scientific, technical, socio-economic, business, commercial and legal information.
Annex II paragraphs 3 to 6 elaborate on the type of scientific, technical, socioeconomic and legal information to be provided. Parties must cooperate in
promoting the development and transfer of technology and knowledge,
particularly though: facilitation of the acquisition of alternative technologies by
other Parties; provision of information on alternative technologies and equipment;

192

Vienna Convention, Article 3.

193

Vienna Convention Decision III/4.

194

Vienna Convention Decision II/2.

71

Compliance Mechanisms
supplying necessary equipment and facilities for research and systematic
observations; and appropriate training of scientific and technical personnel.195
Financial Assistance
COP-1 (1989) established a Trust Fund (later to
become the ‘Multilateral Fund’) and Parties were invited to make voluntary
contributions to it.196 The Parties agreed to cooperate to enhance the capabilities
of developing countries to contribute to ozone science research through the
organisation of workshops and the identification of appropriate institutions for
scientific and financial assistance.197 At COP-4 (1996), the Parties invited the
GEF to support the monitoring of ozone and UV radiation and related research in
developing countries.
(d) Dispute Resolution
Parties are to resolve disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention by negotiation. If negotiations fail, they may jointly request mediation
by a third Party. Parties may declare in writing that, for a dispute not resolved
through negotiation or mediation, they accept arbitration (with procedures that
were adopted by the COP198) or the International Court of Justice as compulsory
means of dispute resolution. Otherwise, the dispute will be submitted to
conciliation. A conciliation commission will be created upon the request of one of
the Parties to the dispute. The commission renders ‘a final and recommendatory
award, which the Parties shall consider in good faith.’199
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MONTREAL PROTOCOL ON SUBSTANCES THAT DEPLETE THE OZONE
LAYER
1987
OVERVIEW

The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (the
Montreal Protocol) entered into force on 1 January 1989. The Protocol lists
controlled substances in Annexes A (CFCs and Halons), B (Other halogenated
CFCs, carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform), C (Hydrochloroflurocarbons
and Hydrobromoflurocarbons) and E (Methyl bromide). Annex D contains a list of
products containing controlled substances specified in Annex A.
Articles 2A to 2I set out the targets that Parties must achieve with respect to each
of these controlled substances and the period of time within which the targets
must be met. Developing Parties are given a grace period, allowing a delay of 10
years before being required to take steps to meet these targets.200 Article 4 bans
the import of the controlled substances listed in the Annexes with non-Parties.
However, Article 4B requires each Party to establish and implement a licensing
system for the import and export of new, used, recycled and reclaimed controlled
substances in the Annexes, by 1 January 2000 or within three months of the date
of entry into force of the Article for it, whichever is the later. Article 4A provides
that where a Party is unable, despite having taken all practicable steps to comply
with its obligations under the Protocol, to cease production of a controlled
substance for domestic consumption by its specified phase-out date, other than
for uses agreed by the Parties to be essential, it must ban the export of used,
recycled and reclaimed quantities of that substance, unless it is being exported
for the purpose of destruction.
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Each Party must provide statistical data to the Secretariat on its annual
production of each of the controlled substances. Data must also be provided on
amounts of each substance used for feedstocks, destroyed by technologies
approved by the Parties, or imported from and exported to Parties and nonParties for the year during which provisions concerning the substances entered
into force for that Party, and for each year thereafter.201 Parties must provide
statistical data on the annual imports and exports of each of the controlled
200
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substances in Group II of Annex A and Group I of Annex C that have been
recycled.202
As well as the annual reports, Parties must submit to the Secretariat every two
years a summary of the research, development, public awareness and exchange
of information activities that they have undertaken pursuant to Article 9.203
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
The Montreal Protocol was the first MEA to design a NCP. Under Article 8,
Parties were obliged to consider and approve procedures and institutional
mechanisms for determining non-compliance. In 1989, Decision I/8 established
an Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal Experts to develop NCPs. The
Parties approved an interim mechanism for determining non-compliance, namely,
an Implementation Committee, and directed the Working Group to elaborate on
these procedures by MOP-4 (1992).204 The interim NCP provided that any Party
and the Secretariat could report a non-compliant Party to the Implementation
Committee. The non-compliant Party would then be given notice of the allegation
and an opportunity to respond. The Committee was to seek an amicable
resolution to the situation and report to the MOP.205 The MOP could decide upon
steps for full compliance or request the Committee to make recommendations.
A permanent non-compliance mechanism was adopted at MOP-4 (1992).206 It
continued the Implementation Committee as the body to receive and consider
reports of non-compliance. As with the interim procedure, non-compliant Parties
are given notice of the allegations and an opportunity to respond and the
Committee must report any recommendations to the MOP.
The permanent non-compliance mechanism was reviewed and amended at
MOP-10. The amendments, inter alia, required the Implementation Committee to
report persistent patterns of non-compliance to the MOP and make appropriate
recommendations in order to maintain the integrity of the Protocol.207
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures
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In response to the recommendations of the Implementation Committee, the MOP
may authorise any of the following: assistance for the collection and reporting of
data; technical assistance; technology transfer and financial assistance;
information transfer and training; the issuing of a caution; or the suspension of
specific rights and privileges under the Protocol.
Technical Assistance
Article 9 states that the Parties shall cooperate in
promoting research, development and the exchange of information on: best
technologies for improving the containment, recovery, recycling or destruction of
controlled substances or reducing their emissions; possible alternatives to
controlled substances, to products containing such substances and to products
manufactured with them; and the costs and benefits of relevant control
strategies. Parties must also cooperate in promoting public awareness of the
environmental effects of the emissions of controlled substances. Article 10A
provides that each Party shall take steps to ensure that the best available
environmentally safe substitutes are transferred to developing Parties and that
the transfers occur under fair and favourable conditions.
Financial Assistance
At MOP-1 (1989), the Parties agreed to consider at
MOP-2 (1990) the development of a programme which would include workshops,
demonstration projects, training courses, the exchange of experts and the
provision of consultants on control options, taking into account the special needs
of developing countries as well as the exploration of ways to promote the
exchange and transfer of environmentally sound substitutes and alternative
technologies.208 This issue was primarily addressed through the amendment of
Article 10.209 Amended Article 10 establishes a financial mechanism. It requires
that Parties shall establish a mechanism for the purposes of financial and
technical cooperation, including the transfer of technologies, to enable
developing Parties to comply with control measures. This financial mechanism
includes a Multilateral Fund, which finances, inter alia, clearing-house functions
to facilitate technical cooperation, distribute information, hold workshops and
training sessions and facilitate and monitor other multilateral, regional and
bilateral cooperation for developing Parties. The Multilateral Fund is financed by
developed Parties and controlled by its own Executive Committee, which is
elected on a geographically representative basis by the MOP. It works in
cooperation and with the assistance of the World Bank, UNEP, UNDP or other
appropriate agencies.
Penalties
The Montreal Protocol was the first MEA to incorporate
multilaterally determined penalties into its range of non-compliance responses.
Under the NCP the MOP can issue warnings, although this has happened only
208
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once. The power to suspend rights and privileges includes those concerning
production, consumption, trade, transfer of technology, assistance for industrial
rationalisation, financial mechanism and institutional arrangements. The
suspension of rights has never been exercised.
(d) Dispute Resolution
The dispute resolution procedure in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention applies
to the Protocol by virtue of Article 11(6) of the Convention, which states that the
provisions of Article 11 apply with respect to any protocol. Article 14 of the
Protocol provides that the provisions of the Convention relating to its protocols
shall apply to the Montreal Protocol.
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UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
1992
OVERVIEW

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
entered into force on 21 March 1994. It aims to achieve stabilisation of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.210 Such a
stabilisation level should be achieved ‘within a time-frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, ensure food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.’211 The level and the timeframe are omitted from the provision.
All Parties have general obligations to develop domestic and, if possible, regional
programmes and measures to mitigate climate change; promote and cooperate
in the development, application and diffusion of technologies, practices and
processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases outside the scope of the Montreal Protocol; promote
conservation and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouses gases
outside the scope of the Montreal Protocol; cooperate in preparing for adaptation
to climate change; and promote scientific and technical cooperation.212
Developed countries are required to lead climate change mitigation by adopting
policies and measures limiting anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Under
Article 4.2, these policies and measures should ‘recognise’ that, a return to
‘earlier emission levels’ by the year 2000 would ‘contribute’ to modification of
longer-term climate change trends.213 The year 2000 passed without any Party
achieving the Convention’s stated aim. However, the Parties were to ‘review the
adequacy’ of the aim under Article 4.2 at their first Conference.214 The result of
that review was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, discussed below.
The guiding legal principles for implementation are set out in Article 3 and
include: inter-generational equity; common but differentiated responsibility
between developed and developing countries; the precautionary principle;
sustainable development; and an open international economic system. Of these
principles, the most clearly reflected in the UNFCCC text is differentiated
210
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responsibility. Differentiated responsibilities for developed Parties are specified in
two matters. Special obligations are imposed upon them to: (1) adopt ‘policies
and measures’ to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions under Article 4.2; and
(2) provide ‘new and additional financial resources’ to developing Parties under
Article 4.3. Annex I contains a list of the developed countries that includes most
‘western’ countries and ex-Soviet bloc countries. Annex II lists from among those
Annex I Parties only the 'western' countries that are obliged to provide financial
and technological assistance.
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Article 12 requires all Parties to submit: a national inventory of anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases (but not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol) using agreed methodologies; a general
description of their steps to implement the aims of the Convention; and any other
relevant information. This obligation falls upon both developed and developing
country Parties but, as indicated below, the former are to assist the latter to meet
their inventory obligations. Developed country Parties must also provide a
detailed description of policies and measures that they have adopted to
implement their commitment under Article 4.2. Developed Parties, particularly
each listed in Annex II, must provide information on measures that they have
taken in accordance with their assistance commitments in Article 4.3, 4.4 and
4.5. At COP-5 (1999), a consultative group of experts was established to assist
developing countries in meeting their reporting obligations.215
Developed Parties must submit information on greenhouse gas emissions and
removals on an annual basis.216 Least-developed countries (LDCs) submit
National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) on their needs and priorities
for adaptation.217 Article 4.9 and decision 5/CP.7 recognised the specific needs
and special situations of the LDCs with regard to funding and transfer of
technology. That decision established an LDC work programme that included the
development of NAPAs. Decision 28/CP.7 sets out the guidelines while decision
29/CP.7 establishes an LDC Expert Group (LEG) to provide guidance and advice
on the preparation and implementation of NAPAs.
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The UNFCCC may authorize verification missions to review implementation.218
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
Article 13 provides that the COP shall consider the establishment of a multilateral
consultative process (MCP) for the resolution of questions regarding
implementation. Decision 10/CP.4 established the multilateral consultative
process in the form of a Multilateral Consultative Committee. Parties may submit
questions concerning their own or another Party’s implementation to the
Committee, which may then provide advice or recommendations on the
procurement of technical and financial resources for the resolution of a Party’s
difficulties or provide advice on the compilation and communication of
information. The conclusions and recommendations must be sent to the Party
concerned for comment. Although COP-5 was supposed to bring the multilateral
consultative process into operation following resolution of outstanding issues
regarding the composition of the MCP, the COP has not yet done so.219
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures
The technical or financial resources in relation to which the MCP is to advise are
well established under the UNFCCC.
Technical Assistance
At COP-7 and, as a part of the Marrakesh Accords,
the Parties agreed to work together on a set of technology transfer activities.
These activities have five main themes: technology needs and needs
assessments; technology information; enabling environments; capacity building;
and mechanisms for technology transfer.220 The Marrakesh Accords also provide
for the establishment of an Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) to
facilitate and advance technology transfer activities.221 Further, the Secretariat
has developed a clearing-house mechanism to facilitate the flow of, and access
to, information on developing and transferring safe technologies.222
Financial Assistance
Developed Parties, specifically those listed in Annex
II, must additionally provide ‘new and additional financial resources’ to
218
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developing countries to meet the full implementation costs of the Convention.223
These concern inventories and any voluntary measures the developing countries
take towards mitigation of the greenhouse gas emissions. Further, they must
take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the
transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to
other Parties, particularly to developing countries to enable them to implement
the provisions of the Convention.224
Article 11 of the Convention establishes a financial mechanism for the provision
of financial resources to developing countries on a grant or concessional basis,
including for the transfer of technology. The operations of the financial
mechanism are entrusted in the COP to develop. The provision also states that
developed Parties may also provide, and developing country Parties avail
themselves of, financial resources related to the implementation of the
Convention through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.
COP-4 designated the GEF as an operating entity of the financial mechanism on
an ongoing basis.225 The Marrakesh Accords adopted at COP-7 expanded the
scope of activities to which the GEF may provide funding to include activities to
adapt to climate change and to build their national capacities to address it.226
COP-4 also established the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed
Countries Fund and the Adaptation Fund, which are separate from the GEF Trust
Fund but managed by the GEF.227
(d) Dispute Resolution
Parties must resolve disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention by negotiation or other peaceful means. They may declare in writing
that they accept the arbitration procedures adopted by COP-1,228 or that they
accept submission to the International Court of Justice as compulsory means of
dispute resolution. Otherwise, the dispute will be submitted to compulsory
conciliation after twelve months following notification by one Party to another that
a dispute exists between them. A conciliation commission will be created to

223

UNFCCC, Article 4.3.

224

UNFCCC, Article 4.5.

225

UNFCCC Decision 3/CP.4.

226

UNFCCC Website, <http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/funding/items/2807.php> (8/9/05).

227

The Adaptation Fund is relevant to the Kyoto Protocol. See UNFCCC Website,

<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/funding/items/2807.php> (8/9/05).
228

Kyoto Protocol Decision I/7.

80

Compliance Mechanisms
render ‘a final and recommendatory award, which the Parties shall consider in
good faith.’229
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KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
1997
OVERVIEW

The third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol
to the Climate Change Convention on 11 December 1997. The Kyoto Protocol
entered into force on 16 February 2005.
The Protocol quantifies emission limitations and reduction commitments of the
greenhouse gases listed in Annex A for the Parties listed in Annex I of the
UNFCCC. While each Annex I Party is assigned an individual target amount, the
aim is that the aggregate Annex I targets will reduce overall emissions of such
gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels by the commitment period of 2008
to 2012.230
Article 2 outlines the policies and measures that may be implemented by each
Party to achieve their commitments, elaborating on UNFCCC Article 4.1. These
include: protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse
gases; promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture; and development of
sources of renewable energy. Although the Protocol was intended to fill in the
regulatory framework of the UNFCCC, it was insufficient of its own and further
regulatory development was required for the Protocol itself once the text had
been adopted. In 1998 UNFCCC COP-4 adopted the ‘Buenos Aires Plan of
Action,’ which sought to operationalize the Protocol.
The Protocol provides for a number of flexibility mechanisms to assist Annex I
Parties to achieve their emission reduction commitments.
Annex I Parties may reach agreement to meet commitments jointly, thus
adjusting their relative emissions commitments between themselves, provided
their total combined emissions do not exceed the sum of the amounts set out for
them in Annex B.231 This mechanism is useful only in the context of a highly
integrated economic bloc such as the European Union, which seeks to protect
industrial development within particular members.
The Protocol provides for joint implementation projects that enhance sinks or
reduce emissions to be undertaken jointly by Annex I Parties. The resultant
‘emission reduction units’ can be transferred from the project’s host country to
benefit the project’s investor country. However, any such project must be
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supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of achieving the commitments
under Article 3.232
The Protocol establishes the Clean Development Mechanism, which allows
Annex I Parties to invest in projects that enhance sinks or reduce emissions in
non-Annex I countries.233 Annex I Parties may use the certified emission
reductions accruing from such projects to contribute to compliance with their
commitments under Article 3.
Annex I Parties are also allowed to trade emissions reductions between them.234
Thus, where a developed country has reduced its emissions beyond its
obligations as set out in Annex B, it is in ‘credit’. It can then sell this credit to a
developed country that would find it more expensive to reduce its emissions.
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Accurate reporting is essential under the Kyoto Protocol, given the quantified
nature of its targets. Its performance review information requirements are the
most robust and sophisticated among all current MEAs.
There are different reporting obligations for Annex I and non-Annex I Parties.
Article 7 provides for regular self-reporting by UNFCCC Annex I Parties. It states
that each Party shall, inter alia, submit the necessary supplementary information
to demonstrate compliance with its commitments in its annual emissions
inventory and its national communication submitted under the UNFCCC.
Reporting guidelines were adopted by the UNFCCC COP.235 The reporting
requirements of the Protocol supersede the reporting requirements under the
UNFCCC for Annex I Parties to both instruments. Closely linked, are the
obligations to establish national systems for estimating emissions and national
registries to track transactions in emissions units.236
In addition, the Marrakesh Accords require Annex I Parties to submit three
additional reports: a report at the beginning of the commitment period to
determine allocated target amounts; a report at the end of the commitment period
to assess compliance with Article 3; and a report on ‘demonstrable progress’
232
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under Article 3.2, which is to be submitted approximately half-way through the
commitment period.237
Article 8 establishes a third-party process for independent review of self-reported
information. This has been mandatory for Annex I Party inventories since
2003.238 The process aims at providing a ‘thorough and comprehensive technical
assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party to this Protocol’ and
should be completed within one year of submission of the national report to the
Secretariat. There are three stages in the review process. First, there is an ‘initial
check’ to verify whether the inventory is complete and properly formatted.239 A
‘synthesis and assessment’ follows, which involves compiling and comparing
inventory information.240 The final stage is individual review, which involves an
inventory review by an expert review team or experts in their home country.241
Expert review teams are led by two experts, one from a non-Annex I Party and
one from an Annex I Party.242 Essentially, the Protocol inherits the UNFCCC’s
monitoring and verification procedures. However, the Protocol makes provision
for the elaboration of such procedures following the first COP-MOP.243
Non-Annex I Parties also have reporting obligations: they must include details
about their programs and activities undertaken pursuant to Article 10 in their
national communications.244 (Annex I Parties also have this obligation.245)
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
The NCP under the Protocol is the most elaborate of those adopted under MEAs
thus far. Article 18 provides that the UNFCCC COP, which serves as the MOP to
the Protocol, shall approve appropriate and effective procedures and
mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the
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Protocol. The NCP was adopted at the UNFCCC COP-7 (2001).246 It entered into
force at the first meeting of the Protocol’s COP-MOP (2005) and its Compliance
Committee will meet for the first time in 2006.
The NCP may be triggered by a Party with respect to itself, or by another Party,
by the Secretariat or by Expert Review Teams under Article 8. Its functional body
is a Compliance Committee consisting of two branches: the Facilitative Branch
and the Enforcement Branch.247
The Facilitative Branch is responsible for facilitating the Protocol’s
implementation and determines whether Annex I Parties are complying with the
following obligations:248
•
•
•

Qualified emissions limitation or reduction commitments under
Article 2;
Reporting requirements and methodologies under Articles 4, 5.1,
5.2 and 7.1; and
Eligibility requirements to access the mechanisms under Articles 6
(emission reduction units), 12 (clean development mechanism) and
17 (emissions trading).

Eligibility to access the mechanism is determined by the following criteria:
whether the Party has ratified the Protocol; its calculated assigned amount of
GHG emissions; whether it has developed a national system for estimating
emissions and removals of GHG within its jurisdiction; whether the Party has
established a national registry to record and monitor the movement of certain
substances; and meeting the annual reporting requirements on emissions and
removals.249
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
The Facilitative Branch may provide advice, facilitate the provision of technical
and financial assistance including technology transfer and capacity building
(having regard to UNFCCC Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5) or provide
recommendations to the non-compliant Party (having regard to Article 4.7 of the
UNFCCC).250
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Technical Assistance
Article 10 reaffirms and expands upon the existing
commitments under UNFCCC Article 4.1. It requires Parties to take into account
UNFCCC Articles 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7 in formulating cost-effective national and
regional programmes to improve the quality of local emission factors and to
mitigate the effects of climate change. Parties must cooperate in the promotion of
effective modalities for the development, promotion, facilitation and financing of
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies pertinent to
climate change.251 Parties must also cooperate in scientific and technical
research and in the development of training and development programmes,
including capacity building.252
Financial Assistance
Article 11 incorporates the financial mechanism under
the UNFCCC to assist developing countries to meet their commitments under
UNFCC Article 4.1. Article 11.2 provides that developed Parties and Annex II
Parties must provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed
full costs incurred by developing Parties in implementing their commitments
under UNFCCC Article 4.1, as now covered by Article 10(a) of the Protocol. The
guidance provided to the financial mechanism (i.e. the GEF) under the UNFCCC,
applies to all relevant respects to Article 11.253 As previously noted, the
Marrakesh Accords established an Adaptation Fund, reflecting the need for
additional funding for the climate change focal area of the GEF.254 The
Adaptation Fund was under the guidance of the UNFCCC COP until the entry
into force of the Protocol.255 The Adaptation Fund is to be operated by the GEF
but is separate from the GET Trust Fund.256
Penalties
The Kyoto Protocol sets out the most prescriptive and
potentially costly penalties for non-compliance under current MEAs. However, to
the extent that they purport to modify the legal rights of the Parties under the
Protocol, there is a legal question hanging as to whether the penalty mechanisms
currently adopted by resolution must be adopted by amendment in order to entail
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binding legal consequences.257 Article 18 of the Protocol specifies that any
mechanisms entailing binding consequences must be adopted by means of an
amendment to the Protocol. UNFCCC Decision 24/CP.7 adopted the procedures
and mechanisms relating to compliance that were negotiated in the Marrakech
Accords, and recommended that COP-MOP-1 adopt those procedures and
mechanisms as well. At COP-MOP-1, the procedures set out in Decision 24/CP.7
were approved and adopted in full, although ‘without prejudice’ to consideration
of the need to amend of the Kyoto Protocol in accordance with Article 18. The
Subsidiary Body on Implementation was tasked with considering the amendment
issue and reporting to COP-MOP-3 (2007).
The NCP provides that the Enforcement Branch may, when a Party is noncompliant, determine whether to adjust or correct a Party’s emission
commitments, where the Party and the expert review team under Article 8
disagree.258 Where any Party breaches Articles 5.1, 5.2, 7.1 or 7.4,259 the
Enforcement Branch may declare that the Party is non-compliant, and request a
compliance action plan.260 Where an Annex I Party does not meet the eligibility
requirements to use the flexibility mechanisms under Articles 6, 12 and 17, the
Enforcement Branch can suspend the Party from accessing the flexibility
mechanisms.261
(d) Dispute Resolution
The Protocol adopts the dispute resolution procedure in the UNFCCC. UNFCC
Article 14.8 provides that the dispute resolution procedures in Article 14 apply to
any related legal instrument that the COP adopts.
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4. Marine
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION OF WHALING
1946
OVERVIEW

The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling entered into force on
10 November 1948. The preamble states that the aim of the Convention is to
‘establish a system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure
proper and effective conservation and development of whale stocks…and thus
make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry.’
Article III establishes the International Whaling Commission. The Commission
may adopt regulations for protected and unprotected species, open and closed
seasons, open and closed waters, size limits, time, methods and intensity of
whaling, types of equipment to be used, methods of measurement and catch
returns and other records.262 Article IX requires Parties to take measures to
implement the Convention and punish infractions.
The Convention lacks provisions for the regular assessment of whale
populations, and whale hunting for the purposes of scientific research is excluded
from the operation of the Convention.263 In 1982, the Convention Schedule was
amended to require a ‘comprehensive assessment’ of whale populations prior to
lifting the ban on commercial whaling that was imposed in that year.264
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
The Whaling Convention does not have in place a system for coherent review of
performance of the Parties in implementing the Convention. It does, however,
require that the Parties submit certain information on some of their activities
under the Convention.
Parties must provide information on all permits issued for the purposes of the
exemption for scientific research to the Commission as well as the results of the
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scientific research.265 Parties are also obliged to report to the Commission on the
details of infractions of the Convention under their jurisdiction, and to provide
information on penalties imposed.266
In addition, the Convention imposes domestic monitoring and verification
obligations on the Parties.267 Initially, Parties were obliged to have two national
observers on each ‘factory ship’ to which the Convention applies and ‘adequate
inspection’ levels at land stations.268 However, this system was open to abuse by
national authorities. The International Observers Scheme was subsequently
adopted in 1972, between the major whaling countries, for the mutual exchange
of observers in the Southern Hemisphere, North Pacific, North Atlantic and
Antarctic. The observers were obliged to submit compliance and non-compliance
reports to the Commission at the end of the season, and report serious
infractions.269 This system was also open to abuse (e.g. many Soviet vessels
simply operated in secret), and it lapsed in 1986 when the last of the bilateral
agreements establishing it lapsed.270 The Scientific Committee has since
embarked upon the task of developing management objectives and procedures
(i.e. the Revised Management Procedure (RMP)) and a new inspection and
observation system, which would involve an international inspection and
observer system.271
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
There is currently no non-compliance procedure.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures
As there is no NCP, there are also no multilateral non-compliance response
measures under the Whaling Convention.
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However, independently from a formal NCP, measures have been taken against
States taking actions that conflict with the aims of the Convention. Due to the
strong political sensitivities associated with commercial whaling, especially in
‘western’ countries, some Parties have resorted unilaterally to political pressure
or sanctions against States offending against Commission resolutions, such as
trade and fisheries access restrictions.272 Parties have adopted measures
against unregulated and unreported ‘pirate whaling’ in a series of resolutions
between 1976 and 1981 to boycott the importation of whaling goods from nonmember countries.273 NGOs have also been relatively effective in their boycott
campaigns in response to whaling operations conducted by Japan and
Norway.274
In addition to the General Fund credited or charged with all income and
expenditure, the Whaling Convention’s Financial Regulations create a Research
Fund and a Voluntary Fund for Small Cetaceans.275 The Research Fund collects
voluntary contributions for research and scientific investigation. The Voluntary
Fund, created at its 46th Annual Meeting, allows developing countries to
participate in future small cetacean work.
(d) Dispute Resolution
There is no formal dispute resolution procedure in the Whaling Convention.
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LONDON CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION
BY DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTER
1972
OVERVIEW

The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter came into force on 30 August 1975. Under Article I, Parties
must promote the effective control of all sources of pollution of the marine
environment. Article II obliges the Parties to take individual and collective
measures to prevent marine pollution caused by dumping. Article IV.1(a)
provides that Parties must prohibit the dumping of the wastes listed in Annex I.276
Generally, the dumping of the wastes listed in Annex II requires a special permit
while the dumping of all other wastes requires a general permit. Permits are only
issued after the Party considers the factors specified in Annex III. The provisions
of Article IV do not apply in certain circumstances, i.e. when it is necessary to
secure human life or vessels in cases of force majeure.277 In 1996, Parties
adopted the Protocol to the London Convention, which will replace the London
Convention when it enters into force.
COMPLIANCE MECHAMISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
Parties are required to designate an appropriate authority to keep records of the
nature and quantity of waste that is dumped, including the location, time and
method of dumping.278 Under Article VI.4, Parties are obliged, either directly or
through a Secretariat established under a regional agreement, to report this
information to the OrganisationOrganisation, i.e. the London Convention
Secretariat, as well as the criteria that they have adopted for the purpose of
issuing permits. The prohibition of dumping for substances not mentioned in
Annex I and dumping in cases of force majeure and emergencies should be
referred to the OrganisationOrganisation.279
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Each national authority is obliged to monitor the condition of the seas either
individually or with other Parties.280 Under Article VII.3, the Parties agree to
cooperate in the development of procedures for the reporting of vessels and
aircraft observed dumping in contravention of the Convention.
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
There is no non-compliance procedure under the London Convention.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures
Technical Assistance
Article IX provides that the Parties must promote,
through collaboration within the Organisation and other international bodies,
support for those Parties that request assistance for the training of scientific and
technical personnel, technology for research, monitoring and the disposal and
treatment of waste. At the consultative meeting in 1996, the Parties voted to
establish a Technical Cooperation Programme as well as a Long-Term Strategy
for Technical Cooperation activities.281
Penalties
Under Article X, Parties undertake to develop procedures for the
assessment of liability and the settlement of disputes regarding dumping, in
accordance with the international legal principles relating to state responsibility
for damage to the environment. There is a similar provision in the London
Protocol under Article 15. In addition, under Article 11, the London Protocol
provides for the development of a NCP within two years of its entry into force.
(d) Dispute Resolution
Under Article XI, Parties must consider procedures for the settlement of disputes
at the First Consultative Meeting. A dispute resolution procedure was adopted at
the Third Consultative Meeting in 1978 as an amendment to the Convention but it
never came into force. The amendment provides that if negotiations fail, the
dispute must be submitted to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration in
accordance with the arbitration procedures in Annex III, if one of the Parties so
requests.282 This amendment instead formed the basis of the Arbitral Procedure
in Annex 3 to the London Protocol.283
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UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982

OVERVIEW

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered into
force on 16 November 1994. The product of nine years of negotiations, UNCLOS
codified customary law and treaty law stemming from the Geneva Conventions
on the Law of the Sea284 into 320 articles and nine annexes. It created new legal
regimes in respect of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone and the 12-mile
territorial sea, exploitation of the deep seabed, transit through international
straits, archipelagic and landlocked States, marine pollution, marine fisheries
management and the continental shelf.285 Part XII of UNCLOS focuses solely on
control of marine pollution and, together with Part XV, which concerns dispute
settlement, is considered here.
Part XII contains provisions on preventing, reducing and controlling marine
pollution. Article 204 obliges Parties to observe, measure, evaluate and analyse,
by recognised scientific methods, the risks or effects of pollution of the marine
environment. In essence, Article 204 imposes impact assessment and monitoring
obligations in respect of the risks or effects of pollution. Article 205 requires
Parties to publish reports on the results obtained pursuant to Article 204 and
provide them to ‘competent international organisations.’ It has been left to
subsequent instruments to flesh out the details of the marine pollution regime.
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
There are no performance review obligations incumbent upon the Parties. The
UN Secretary-General provides an annual report to the General Assembly
concerning the implementation of UNCLOS.
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
UNCLOS and its MOP have not established a multilateral non-compliance
procedure.
(c) Non-Compliance Response Mechanisms
284
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Although UNCLOS does not set out any non-compliance response mechanisms,
it does contain implementation support provisions that promote assistance to
Parties in the discharge of their primary marine environmental obligations. Those
provisions are noted here because they support implementation, not because
they set out non-compliance responses. The provisions relate to technical
assistance and legal liability for breaches causing damage to a Party. There are
no financial assistance provisions and no multilateral processes.
Technical Assistance
UNCLOS contains technical assistance provisions in
relation to marine conservation and pollution, marine research and exploitation of
the deep seabed. In relation to marine conservation and pollution, Article 61.5
states that available scientific information relevant to the conservation of fish
stocks and catch and fishing statistics must be exchanged on a regular basis.
There are provisions for technical assistance to developing Parties.286 Further,
Parties have a duty to cooperate with other States in the conservation and
management of living resources in the high seas.287 States whose nationals
exploit living resources in the same area must enter into negotiations with a view
to conserving the resources so exploited.288 In relation to marine research, Part
XIV provides for the development and transfer of marine technology and calls on
Parties to cooperate and facilitate exchanges through existing bilateral, regional
or multilateral programmes.289
Penalties
Under UNCLOS, Parties are to be mutually liable under
international laws for their failures to fulfil their obligations to protect and
conserve the marine environment.290 They must ensure that recourse to
compensation is available in accordance with their national laws.291 In addition,
Parties are liable for damages caused by failures to ensure that their activities
undertaken in the seabed area comply with Part XI.292 Finally, they are to be
liable in respect of failing to adhere to the Convention’s procedures on the
conduct of marine scientific research.293 In none of these cases, however, does
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UNCLOS go beyond statements of general principles to specify the procedures
for establishing and imposing liability.
(d) Dispute Resolution
The UNCLOS dispute resolution system is extraordinary for its comprehensive,
compulsory and binding nature. The dispute resolution procedure comprises two
parts. Section 1 of Part XV contains general provisions relating to the peaceful
settlement of disputes. Section 2 of Part XV contains provisions concerning
compulsory dispute resolution procedures.
Under Section 1, Article 279 states that the Parties must settle any disputes
between them regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention in
accordance with Article 2(3) of the UN Charter and by any of the means indicated
in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter.294 Article 280 provides that Parties have the
right to settle any dispute between them through peaceful means of their choice,
while Article 283 reiterates this point, stating that, when a dispute arises, the
Parties must ‘proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its
settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means.’ Those ‘other peaceful
means’ may have been agreed to in advance. For example, the European Union
would submit any fisheries dispute arising between members to the European
Court of Justice.295 If they have not been agreed to, Parties can opt for any
judicial or non-judicial procedures.296
If the Parties fail to resolve the dispute once these agreed procedures have been
undertaken, one of the Parties can invite the other to submit to the conciliation
procedure outlined in Article 284 and Annex V. If the invitation is accepted, each
Party can nominate four conciliators from who each must choose two. The four
conciliators then choose a fifth person who acts as the chairman. The conciliators
have one year to make a report and recommendations.
If conciliation fails or the invitation is rejected, Parties then have the right to
invoke the compulsory dispute settlement procedures in Section 2 of Part XV.
The compulsory procedures entail binding decisions. Articles 286 and 287 oblige
the Parties to have recourse to the compulsory procedures if the peaceful means
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that they chose to resolve the matter failed. However, this obligation has
exceptions:
•

•

•

Article 297(1) states that Parties cannot invoke the compulsory procedures for
a dispute concerning the exercise of another Party’s rights or jurisdiction
within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), unless it is alleged that: the State
has contravened the Convention with respect to the freedoms and rights of
navigation, overflight or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, or in
regard to other internationally lawful uses of the sea outlined in Article 58; in
exercising any such freedoms the State has contravened the Convention on
national laws adopted in conformity with the Convention; or the State has
exercised its jurisdiction inconsistently with internationally adopted rules on
marine pollution.
Article 297(2) states that Parties are not obliged to submit disputes
concerning the refusal to give permission to conduct scientific research in
their EEZs or continental shelves. If the dispute is not submitted to the
compulsory procedures, it must be submitted to the conciliation procedure
under Annex V.
The compulsory procedures are not applicable to disputes arising from
failures to determine total allowable catches and coastal harvesting
capacities, allocating surpluses to other States and the terms of conservation
measures. However, where it is alleged that a State has failed to ensure that
its EEZ fish stocks are not seriously endangered, or it has arbitrarily refused
to determine total allowable catches or harvesting capacity or to allocate a
surplus to other States, the ‘compulsory conciliation procedure’ may be
invoked.297

Parties can also opt out of the compulsory dispute resolution procedures for
disputes concerning sea boundary delimitation and claims to historic waters,
military and law enforcement activities and the exercise of Security Council
functions.298 Disputes falling within the first category may be referred to
conciliation at the request of one of the Parties if a resolution is not achieved
within a reasonable period of time through negotiation.299 Article 298 allows
Parties to impose these limitations when signing, ratifying or acceding to the
Convention or anytime thereafter.
Parties are given a choice of forum. They can choose to have the matter heard
before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of
Justice, an arbitral tribunal established in accordance with Annex VII or a special
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arbitral tribunal established in accordance with Annex VIII.300 These bodies apply
the rules of the Convention and the rules of international law, although Article
293 allows the Parties to request a decision that is made on the general
principles of equity and fairness. Parties must declare which of the four bodies
they choose as a dispute resolution mechanism at any time.301 However, where a
Party has not made an election, it is deemed to accept arbitration under Annex
VII.302
The Tribunal was established under Annex VI and has 21 members who are
elected by the Parties.303 However, only 11 members are required at any plenary
session, although the Tribunal has the power to establish smaller ‘chambers’ to
deal with specific issues.304 Thus, the Tribunal has a chamber of summary
procedure and chambers for fisheries, environmental disputes and sea-bed
disputes.305 Disputes concerning the exploration of the international seabed must
be submitted to the SeaBed Disputes Chamber of the Tribunal and not to any
other process.306
An arbitral tribunal under Annex VII may be established for disputes between
States and disputes involving international organisations. Each UNCLOS Party
nominates four people to sit on the panel from the Parties to the dispute must
each choose one person.307 Three members are then chosen jointly.308 The
award is final and without appeal unless the Parties have agreed to an appellate
procedure.309
Disputes concerning fisheries, protecting and preserving the marine environment,
marine scientific research or navigation must be submitted for special arbitration
in accordance with Annex VIII.310 There are four lists dealing with one of the
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above categories and all Parties to the Convention may nominate two experts in
a relevant field to each of these lists.311 Parties may then choose two arbitrators
for each case.312 The special arbitral tribunal can be used as a fact-finding
body.313 The findings are binding and if requested, the tribunal can formulate
non-binding recommendations.314
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AGREEMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 10
DECEMBER 1982 RELATING TO THE CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY
MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS 1995
OVERVIEW

The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks (the Fish Stocks Agreement) entered into force on 11 December
2001. It aims to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of
straddling fish stocks, i.e. stocks that straddle high seas and zones under
national jurisdiction, and of highly migratory species, i.e. as listed in UNCLOS
Annex II. It focuses on areas beyond national jurisdiction although Articles 6 and
7 apply to the conservation and management of such stocks within areas under
national jurisdiction.315
Article 5 outlines general principles. Parties must: adopt measures to ensure
long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks
and to promote the objective of their optimum utilisation; ensure that such
measures are based on the best scientific evidence available and are designed
to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing the maximum
sustainable yield; apply the precautionary approach in Article 6; assess the
impact of fishing and environmental factors on target stocks; adopt conservation
and management measures to maintain or restore such species above
sustainable levels; minimise pollution, waste, catch by lost or abandoned gear or
catch of non-target species; take measures to protect biodiversity in the marine
environment and to eliminate over-fishing; and promote and conduct scientific
research and develop appropriate technologies to support conservation and
management.
Article 9 provides a framework for cooperating in or establishing sub-regional or
regional fisheries management organisations and arrangements while Article 10
sets out their functions. Some of these functions include agreeing on standards
for collection, reporting, verification and exchange of data, compiling and
disseminating accurate and complete statistical information in accordance with
Annex I and establishing cooperative mechanisms for monitoring, control,
surveillance and enforcement.316

315

Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 2 and 3.1.

316

Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 10(e), (f) and (h).

99

Compliance Mechanisms
Under Article 18, a State whose vessels fish in the high seas must take
measures to ensure that vessels flying its flag comply with sub-regional and
regional conservation and management measures and that any such vessels do
not engage in activity which undermine the effectiveness of those measures.
Such measures include national laws and policies, including the establishment of
licensing systems as well as monitoring and inspection schemes.
COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS

(a) Performance Review Information
The Fish Stocks Agreement does not impose requirements upon its Parties to
prepare or submit performance review information. Instead, its information
requirements concern (1) conduct and sharing of relevant scientific research and
(2) review at the internal national level of domestic fishing unit performance.
These two types of information contribute to an informed review of national
performance but, of themselves, do not amount to a performance review.
In relation to information concerning scientific baselines for the design of
sustainable fisheries management measures, Parties must collect and share
complete and accurate data on fishing activities on, inter alia, vessel position,
catch of target and non-target species, and fishing effort, as set out in Annex I.
They must also submit information from national and international research
programs.317 They must develop data collection and research programs to
assess the impact of fishing on non-target and associated or dependent species
and their environment318 and must enhance the monitoring of uncertain stocks in
order to review their status and the efficacy of conservation and management
measures and establish mechanisms for the verification of catch data. States are
also to ensure that fishing vessels flying their flag collect and exchange scientific,
technical and statistical data with respect to fisheries for straddling fish stocks
and highly migratory fish stocks; ensure that data are collected with sufficient
detail to facilitate effective stock assessment; and provide such information to
sub-regional or regional fisheries management organisations or arrangements
and to verify the accuracy of such data.319 Parties must take appropriate
measures to verify the data that is supplied. In addition, Parties must agree,
either directly or through sub-regional or regional fisheries management
organisations or arrangements on data specifications and format and develop
and share analytical techniques and stock assessment methods.
In relation to performance review of the operations of domestic fishing units, the
Parties and regional fishing organisations are required to collect operational
317

Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 5(j).

318

Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 6.2(d).

319

Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 14.
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information to meet their obligations to conduct effective monitoring, control and
surveillance within their jurisdictions.320 Under Article 18.3, Parties are obliged to
monitor vessels flying their flag, their fishing operations and related activities by,
inter alia, implementing national inspection schemes, observer programs and
vessel monitoring systems. They must also verify the catch of target and nontarget species through observer programs, inspection schemes, unloading
reports, supervision of trans-shipment and monitoring of landed catches and
market statistics. Subregional and regional fisheries management organisations
and arrangements must agree on verification standards for fish stocks.321
Further, these subregional and regional fisheries management organisations and
arrangements are required to develop appropriate monitoring, control,
surveillance and enforcement procedures.322 Finally, under Articles 20.1 and 21,
Parties may establish boarding and inspection procedures through regional
bodies for boarding and inspection for the purpose of ensuring compliance with
conservation and management measures.
(b) Multilateral Non-Compliance Procedure
The Fish Stocks Agreement does not institute a NCP. Part VI of the Fish Stocks
Agreement requires the design of compliance and enforcement systems. These
systems do not relate to the compliance of Parties with the Agreement but,
rather, to the compliance of a State’s fishing vessels with sub-regional and
regional conservation management measures.323
(c) Non-Compliance Response Measures
Despite not having a NCP, the Fish Stocks Agreement does set in place certain
technical and financial assistance obligations to help developing country Parties
meet their commitments. They are not responsive to a finding of non-compliance
and, therefore, are not non-compliance response measures. However, they have
been included here to give a full picture of measures available to assist a Party
with its compliance with the Fish Stocks Agreements.
Technical Assistance
Parties acknowledge the special assistance which
developing Parties require in conserving and managing straddling fish stocks.324
Assistance is to be in the form of financial assistance, human resources

320

Article 5(l).

321

Article 10(e).

322

Article 10(h). See also Article 16.1.

323

Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 19-23.

324

Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 24.
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development, technical assistance, transfer of technology and advisory and
consultative services.325
Financial Assistance
Article 26 requires Parties to cooperate to establish
special funds to assist developing The United Nations General Assembly urged
States Parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement to develop terms of reference for a
voluntary trust fund within the United Nations system, which would assist
developing Parties in meeting their obligations.326 At their second informal
consultations, the Parties to the Agreement agreed on the terms of reference for
an Assistance Fund, and recommended that the General Assembly establish
it.327
(d) Dispute Resolution
Like UNCLOS, there is an obligation on Parties to settle disputes peacefully.328
Disputes of a technical nature can be referred to an ad hoc expert panel
established by them.329 However, the compulsory dispute resolution procedure
established in Part XV of UNCLOS applies to any dispute between Parties over
the interpretation of the Fish Stocks Agreement or of any sub-regional, regional
or global fisheries agreement relating to straddling fish stocks or highly migratory
fish stocks to which they are Parties.330 Parties must adopt a procedure pursuant
to Article 287 of UNCLOS.331

325

Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 25.2.

326

Resolution 57/143 (17 December 2002). See also UN Website,

<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/fishstocktrustfund/fishstocktrustfund.htm> (8/9/05).
327

See also UN Website,
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/fishstocktrustfund/fishstocktrustfund.htm> (8/9/05).
328

Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 27.

329

Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 29.

330

Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 30.1 and 30.2.

331

Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 30.3.
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Chapter 3.
Comparative Analysis
Overview
This chapter compares the components of compliance mechanisms by category
across MEAs. Where available, the academic, governmental and intergovernmental literature concerning the operational qualities of particular MEA
compliance mechanisms is surveyed. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are four
categories of components in compliance mechanisms.
(a) Performance review information obligations in MEAs require Parties to report
on their implementation performance and to provide a range of related statistical
data to the Secretariat or COP/MOP. Other compliance-related information
obligations involve third-party verification or monitoring of a Party's performance.
(b) Multilateral non-compliance procedures are institutional mechanisms set up to
examine performance review information and make determinations as to a
Party's compliance status. These procedures may be formal, entailing a special
committee to investigate allegations of non-compliance and make
recommendations. Others, however, are informal and ad hoc.
(c) Once a NCP has made a determination that a Party is substantially noncompliant, it may suggest responses. These outputs may take the form of
recommendations of a Committee to the COP/MOP or the adoption of relevant
resolutions by the COP/MOP. The non-compliance response measures adopted
under a NCP vary. They include a range of incentives and disincentives, or
'carrots and sticks'.
(d) Finally, there are dispute resolution procedures. These are adversarial and
arise between Parties without engaging the COP or Secretariat.
Table 3.1 synthesises some of the information contained in Chapter 2 to provide
a broad overview of the framework for compliance in each MEA. Greater depth
concerning the nature of the occurrence of each component of the compliance
mechanism is provided in the following sections of this chapter.
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TABLE 3.1. OVERVIEW OF MEA COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORKS
Convention

National
Performance
Information

Multilateral
Non-Compliance
Procedures

Non-Compliance
Response
Measures

Ramsar
World Heritage
CITES
CMS
CBD
UNCCD
ITPGRFA

√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

Basel
PIC
Biosafety
POPs

√

Pending
Pending
√

√
√

√
Pending
√
Pending

Vienna Ozone
Montreal Protocol
UNFCCC
Kyoto Protocol

√
√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

Whaling
London
UNCLOS
Fish Stocks

√
√

√

Dispute
Resolution
Procedures

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√

National Performance Information
Information on a Party’s performance is essential to determine whether it is
complying with its obligations. As noted in Chapter 2, the provision of related
information is often also required at other phases in the implementation of an
MEA, i.e. as part of the primary operations requiring information exchange, as
part of the provision of technical assistance, or for overall review and redesign of
the regime. A particular group of data can be used across several phases of the
implementation of the MEA. For example, information on national compliance will
be useful at the MEA regime review stage. Reliable information is central to the
operation of an MEA and this is especially true regarding compliance, as the core
of any compliance mechanism is information on performance.
Self-Reporting
Most MEAs oblige Parties to provide the secretariat with annual reports that the
Parties themselves prepare on their national implementation. These may involve
details on the development of national programs, policies and measures (see:
CITES, CMS, Ramsar Convention, CBD, Biosafety Protocol, Basel Convention,
Vienna Convention, Montreal Protocol, UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, Fish Stocks
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Agreement and Whaling Convention). In particular, UNCCD and the POPs
Convention specifically require the Parties to submit information specifically on
national implementation plans.
Some Conventions require Parties to submit further scientific, technical and
transactional data to the Secretariat. For example, CITES requires Parties to
submit annual import/export statistics, while the Fish Stocks Agreement and the
Whaling Convention require Parties to submit annual catch/permit reports. CMS
obliges Parties to provide data on the numbers of migratory species passing
through their respective jurisdictions. The Montreal Protocol, UNFCCC and Kyoto
Protocol require Parties to submit initial baseline and annual production data for
listed pollutants. While this data can be used to interpret performance
information, in itself it is not performance information.
Only three MEAs do not impose obligations on their Parties to prepare reports on
their respective individual performances. These are the ITPGRFA, the PIC
Convention and UNCLOS. The ITPGRFA obliges Parties to provide only
transactional information to each other on the resources being supplied under its
Multilateral System. Similarly, the PIC Convention obliges Parties to provide the
Secretariat with information on specific import decisions rather than annual
reports. That information is then circulated to the other Parties. In both cases, the
information required is operational data to facilitate transactions regulated under
the treaty, rather than a system of reflective reporting of national performance.
UNCLOS is a framework Convention, leaving reporting requirements to be
developed by other, usually regional, organiations.
Generally, specific instructions on the content and format of national performance
reports are available from the Secretariat or from the MEA Website. Some
Secretariat Websites (e.g. CBD, CITES, Ramsar and Basel) provide report
templates that require Parties to tick boxes in response to specific questions or
require the Parties to otherwise attach information. The majority of MEA websites
have posted guidelines that specify the type of information to be included in
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reports.332 For example, the World Heritage Convention has guidelines that
specify the purpose, format and general requirements of periodic reports.333
Third-party Verification
Verification is the process of testing the accuracy of performance information
provided, usually through on-site inspections. Some MEAs have verification
requirements. For example, the Ramsar and UNFCCC/Kyoto Secretariats
conduct on-site verifications, mainly to obtain performance information.334 The
Whaling Convention is currently in the process of developing a new verification
procedure. The process is undertaken by a third Party, such as the Secretariat or
an NGO, or by them in combination with other Parties to the treaty.
Third-party Monitoring
In contrast to self-reporting, third-party monitoring of performance engages a
non-Party in reporting on national implementation of MEA obligations. In contrast
to verification, performance monitoring may address a Party’s establishment of
systems to implement the MEA but does not involve review of accuracy of
particular information for its own sake. (Third-party monitoring of national
performance must also be distinguished from third-party monitoring of
environmental conditions, which is sometimes undertaken by independent
scientific and technical bodies that work in cooperation with the MEA.) Thirdparty monitoring of performance is uncommon, perhaps because it is resource
intensive. Under CITES, third Parties – TRAFFIC (an NGO affiliated to WWF)
and the WCO – have roles in monitoring compliance. The Ramsar Convention
introduces third-party monitoring of degraded wetlands as a non-compliance
response335, and the Whaling Convention is currently developing a new
monitoring procedure.
332

CMS, <http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop7/list_of_docs/pdf/en/CP7CF7_06_2_national_report.pdf>;
World Heritage, <http://whc.unesco.org/reporting/prexpl.htm>; Ramsar,
<http://www.ramsar.org/cop9_nrform_ready_e.htm>; CBD, <http://www.biodiv.org/world/intro.asp>;
Biosafety, <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/cop-mop/result.aspx?id=8291>; POPs,
<http://www.pops.int/documents/guidance/>; PIC,
<http://www.pic.int/en/viewpage.asp?Id_Cat=104&mTitre=FORMS+%26+GUIDANCE>; Vienna,
<http://hq.unep.org/ozone/Information_for_the_Parties/3A_data_reporting.asp>; Montreal Protocol,
<http://hq.unep.org/ozone/pdfs/Handbook-on-Data-Report-from-UNEP-TIE.pdf>; UNFCCC,
<http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php>; and Kyoto,
<http://unfccc.int/national_reports/accounting_reporting_and_review_under_the_kyoto_protocol/items/102
9.php> (25/10/05).
333

World Heritage, <http://whc.unesco.org/reporting/prexpl.htm>; POPs,
<http://www.pops.int/documents/guidance/> (25/10/05).
334

The Basel Convention provision entitled ‘Verification’ (Art. 19) addresses a trigger mechanism for the
NCP. The Fish Stocks Agreement includes an obligation on Parties to develop their own national
verification procedures with respect to vessels flying their own flags (Art.18.3). This concerns national
implementation rather than performance information.
335

Annex 1 to Recommendation 4.7.
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Non-Compliance Response Information
Failures to comply with obligations concerning submission of national
performance information undermines the regime of an MEA because the
information deficit can conceal national non-performance of primary operational
obligations. Consequently, failure to comply with performance review obligations
is a substantive default that can trigger an MEA’s NCP, as is the case under
CITES and the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols. Upon processing through the
NCPs, a response that imposes further performance information obligations on
the defaulting PParty can result.
The information required under a NCP can be additional to that ordinarily
required, or simply require the original performance information as part of a
package of additional measures. For example, the NCPs of the Biosafety and
Kyoto Protocols require that the defaulting Party submit a compliance action plan
outlining how the non-compliant Party will achieve compliance within a set
timeframe.336 The CITES Secretariat conducts ad hoc verification missions to
assess a Party’s compliance with its obligations, both as a primary
implementation support and as a non-compliance response.337
TABLE 3.2. PERFORMANCE REVIEW INFORMATION
Convention

Review Format
Template Guidelines

Ramsar
World Heritage
CITES
CMS
CBD
UNCCD
ITPGRFA

√

Basel
PIC
Biosafety
POPs

√

Vienna

√
√
√
√
Pending

National Performance Review
Reporting
3rd Party
3rd Party
Verification Monitoring
√
√
√
√
√
√

√

Non-Compliance Response Information
Reporting
3rd Party
3rd Party
Verification
Monitoring

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√
√

√
√

√

√

√

√
√

336

Kyoto Website, <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_mechanisms/compliance/items/3024.php> and Biosafety
Website, <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/issues/compliance2.aspx> (25/10/05).

337

Reeves, R, Policing International Trade in Endangered Species: the CITES Treaty and Compliance,
Earthscan Publications, London, 2002, p.75.
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Montreal Protocol
UNFCCC
Kyoto Protocol
Whaling
London
UNCLOS
Fish Stocks

√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

√
√

√

√

√

√

Table 3.2 focuses on performance information provisions under the headings of
Review Format, Performance Review and Non-Compliance Response
Information. It should be noted that there is a divergence among MEAs that
regulate international transactions. The CITES, Basel Convention and Montreal
Protocol each require the Parties to include information on regulated transactions
in their national performance reports. In contrast, the PIC Convention and
ITPGRFA do not require Parties to include in the details of regulated
transactions. The latter omissions generate significant gaps in the available
performance information for those treaties.
Potential interlinkages in gathering performance review information arise
between MEAs engaged in regulating closely related activities. For example,
where MEAs regulate overlapping sites, species, substances or emissions, there
is heightened potential for coordination. This performance review information will
be most useful across MEAs when review requires the provision of statistical,
transactional or other quantifiable data, rather than qualitative descriptive
evaluations. The latter are typically more related to descriptions of policy
measures that are customised to particular MEAs and may also be less factually
objective.
In relation to self-reporting, the interlinkages may be created in the form of
harmonization of reporting formats and joint MEA reporting by a Party. Extensive
work has been undertaken by the World Conservation Monitoring Centre and the
United Nations University on harmonization of reporting formats. This work is
canvassed in Chapter 4. (It should also be noted that where self-reporting
addresses a transnational ecosystem, joint reports might be appropriate.)
In relation to monitoring and verification, potential interlinkages exist in carrying
out third-party monitoring operations and verification missions. Thus, while on
mission, a verification team might be multi-tasked to assess aspects of
compliance common to several MEAs. For example, world natural heritage sites,
wetlands, migratory species and biodiversity reserves might be inspected on a
single mission. Similarly, customs controls might be inspected in relation to
capacity to comply with MEAs concerning international trade in endangered
species, POPs, PIC chemicals and ODS.
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UNEP might usefully establish a roster of technical experts to conduct monitoring
and verifications for the MEAs that it administers. Analogy can be made with the
peer reviews that are conducted by the OECD Secretariat on progress in all
member countries and three non-member countries.338 These reviews are
conducted cyclically to assess whether the reviewed country is meeting its
domestic environmental regulations and international environmental obligations.
Multi-tasking a monitoring or verification mission across MEA Secretariats would
be little more difficult than bringing together a team of experts for different MEAs
administered by one organisation.

338

OECD Website, <http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,2686,en_2649_34307_1_1_1_1_37465,00.html>
(25/10/05).
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Multilateral Non-Compliance Response Procedures
Non-Compliance Procedures require administration by a body established under
the MEA. That body is usually the COP/MOP but it may be assisted by a
specialised compliance committee that the COP/MOP has established by
resolution for that purpose. The compliance committees consist of one to two
dozen members elected by the COP/MOP according to geographically
representative formulae that are varied or adjusted to meet the MEA concerns
and interests to be represented. Regional groupings sometimes nominate for
election individuals with legal expertise. Although regionally representative, the
members sit in their individual capacities.
MEAs that do not have specialised compliance committees may incorporate a
NCP administered directly by the COP/MOP. Specialised MEA compliance
committees, usually named the Implementation Committee or Compliance
Committee, operate during the meeting of a COP/MOP in most cases. They
consider cases of non-compliance referred to them, reach a determination on the
compliance status of the Party and make a recommendation to the COP/MOP for
appropriate responsive action. Thus, the determination and recommendation of
the non-compliance committee must be approved by the COP/MOP. The
COP/MOPs for CITES, the Biosafety Protocol, the Basel Convention, the
Montreal Protocol, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol all have such
specialised committees.
A suggestion that a Party is non-compliant can come to the attention of a body
administering a NCP in a variety of ways. The Party experiencing compliance
difficulties itself can initiate the procedure. Otherwise, the Party's non-compliance
might come to the attention of any of the other Parties or the Secretariat, which
refer the matter to the NCP. A third-party body performing a monitoring role can
report cases of possible non-compliance to the Secretariat, which may then
invoke the NCP. For example, under CITES, the Secretariat receives and may
pass on information on non-compliance from TRAFFIC and other NGOs and,
under the Kyoto Protocol, expert review teams may trigger the NCP.
Table 3.3 shows the MEAs that have adopted NCPs. It elaborates on how they
are triggered and the body that administers them.
Thirteen of the MEAs have developed, or are in the process of developing, NCPs
to deal with instances of apparent non-compliance. However, potential for
interlinkages between NCPs is slight. Each is specific to the political context of its
MEA, i.e. to the sensitive balance struck during its negotiation processes and to
the composition of its COP/MOP or elected sub-committee membership. Thus, it
would be premature (if not inappropriate) to seek to harmonize NCPs or combine
committees across MEAs. However, two other types of NCP interlinkages might
be possible.
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First, closer coordination between MEA secretariats could enhance their capacity
to trigger NCPs. For example, evidence of corruption of customs authorities
resulting in a Party's non-compliance concerning its trade-related obligations
might implicate that Party in similar non-compliance under more than one MEA.
Protocols for coordination of performance information between secretariats could
enable them to be more effective in triggering their respective NCPs. Such
coordination would be likely to be useful across MEAs within a cluster but could
also be useful across MEAs that regulate related activities, such as international
trade.
TABLE 3.3. MULTILATERAL NON-COMPLIANCE RESPONSE PROCEDURES
Convention

Procedure
Established

Ramsar
World Heritage
CITES
CMS
CBD
UNCCD
ITPGRFA

√
√
√

Basel
PIC
Biosafety
POPs

√

Vienna
Montreal Protocol
UNFCCC
Kyoto Protocol

Pending

Trigger Body

Decision-Making Body

Any Member

Secretariat

Other

COP

Committee

√
√

√
√
√

√
√

√
√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√
√
√

√

Whaling
London
UNCLOS
Fish Stocks

Second, NCP decision-making bodies could coordinate their responses so as to
maximise their effect for the non-compliant Party. Thus, the coordination of
implementation assistance across MEAs to address non-compliance caused by a
systemic lack of environmental capacity would be more effective than piecemeal
or duplicative implementation assistance. Similarly, the coordination of penalties
would have greater impact. Again, such coordination would be likely to be useful
across MEAs within a cluster but could also be useful across MEAs that regulate
related activities. Coordination of non-compliance responses is discussed in
more detail immediately below.
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Non-Compliance Response Measures
Once a determination of non-compliance is made under a NCP, the COP/MOP
formally decides upon or adopts the Committee’s recommended response
measures. These typically take the form of targeted implementation assistance.
Less common are response measures in the form of penalties.
IMPLEMENTATION ASSISTANCE

The forms of implementation assistance are provision of information, technical
support and financial assistance. For the purposes of this study, technical
support is broadly defined to include capacity building and training, cooperation
in scientific endeavours and research, or transfer of technology.
Implementation assistance is usually available under an MEA at earlier stages in
the implementation cycle, as basic implementation assistance, rather than as a
response to non-compliance. All of the MEAs surveyed in this paper provide
some measure of basic implementation assistance to Parties in need at those
earlier stages. Upon a determination of non-compliance, targeted implementation
assistance to a non-compliant Party might be prioritized and made subject to
conditions. Thus, arrangements under an MEA for the provision of basic
implementation assistance can be specifically directed, as the output of a NCP,
to help fix a Party's non-compliance problems.
For the purposes of this study of compliance mechanisms, it is only
implementation assistance that is an output of the NCP that it is addressed.
However, as the NCP’s output typically draws upon general arrangements for
assistance that operate under an MEA at earlier stages of the implementation
cycle, those general arrangements must be noted. Of particular relevance is
implementation assistance to help non-compliant Parties meet their performance
review obligations. For that reason, Table 3.4 identifies assistance to meet
performance review requirements separately from other technical and financial
assistance. It also compares the provision of implementation assistance at the
earlier stages of implementation with assistance that is an output of the NCP.
As can be seen in Table 3.4, every MEA contains implementation support
assistance obligations. All but one MEA has a funding mechanism to provide
financial assistance to Parties for the implementation of approved projects and
programs. Thus, all MEAs that include a NCP can draw upon their existing
technical and financial support arrangements in crafting
non-compliance
response measures.
It follows that, just as Parties to MEAs might coordinate their technical and
financial support arrangements so as to maximise their positive impacts, those
same arrangements could be coordinated in the context of non-compliance
response measures. Where a systemic lack of environmental capacity is
considered to be the cause of non-compliance, coordination of responsive
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assistance across related MEAs would be more effective than piecemeal or
duplicative efforts. In fact, non-compliance measures could be easier to
coordinate across MEAs than general implementation assistance measures. This
is because they are nominated as priorities by NCP determinations and they are
fewer in number than general requests for assistance (because they carry the
stigma of non-compliance).
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TABLE 3.4. IMPLEMENTATION ASSISTANCE
KEY: CHM = clearing-house mechanism; O = operational

Ramsar

Non-Compliance
Response Assistance
Technical
Financial
√

World
Heritage

√

CITES

√

Emergency
Assistance

CMS
CBD

UNCCD

ITPGRFA

Basel

Technical
and
performance
reporting
assistance

√

PIC
Biosafety
Protocol

√

√

POPs
Vienna

Montreal
Protocol

Technical
and
performance
reporting
assistance

√

Primary Implementation Assistance
Technical
Implementation guidelines
developed by Ramsar Bureau;
information exchange and CHM
Technical and scientific
cooperation and capacity building
Capacity building
Capacity building (Global
Information System and Register)
Technical and scientific
cooperation, capacity building,
technology transfer and
development of guidelines; CHM
Technical and scientific
cooperation, capacity building,
technology development and
transfers; coordinate, collect and
exchange data
Technical and scientific
cooperation, capacity building
and technology transfer; Global
Information System

Financial
Ramsar Small Grants Fund

Establishment of regional centres
for training and technology
transfers; information sharing

Trust Fund for the Implementation
of the Convention and Technical
Cooperation Trust Fund to Assist
Developing Countries

Capacity building and information
exchange
Scientific and technical
cooperation and capacity
building; CHM and performance
review reports
Capacity building and information
exchange

Pending

Technical and scientific
cooperation, training and
technology transfers; information
exchange
Technical cooperation and
technology transfers; information
exchange

Trust Fund

World Heritage Fund, Reserve
Fund and Funds in Trust
Trust fund
Trust fund
Global Environment Facility

Global Mechanism

Trust Fund

Global Environment Facility

Global Environment Facility
Interim

Multilateral Fund and Global
Environment Facility
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UNFCCC

√

√

Technology transfers and CHM

Kyoto
Protocol

√

√

Technical and scientific research
and cooperation, technology
transfers and capacity building

Whaling
Convention
London
UNCLOS

Fish
Stocks

Global Environment Facility,
Special Climate Change Fund and
the Least Developed Countries
Fund
Global Environment Facility and
Adaptation Fund
Research, General and Voluntary
Funds

Technical Cooperation
Programme
Technical and scientific
cooperation to developing
Parties, transfer of marine and
deep sea-bed technologies;
information exchange
Human resources development,
technology transfers and
advisory and consultative
services for developing countries;
information exchange

Assistance Fund

NON-COMPLIANCE PENALTIES

MEAs with an established NCP often enable the imposition of penalties on noncompliant Parties. The penalties imposed under these procedures can be
grouped into four categories: Warnings; Suspension of Privileges; Trade
Sanctions; and Liability.
Warnings can be considered as the first along a spectrum of severity in the
penalties that may be applied. As a next step, some MEAs provide for
suspension of Parties’ rights and privileges, notably, participation in voting or
committees (see CITES, World Heritage Convention and the Montreal Protocol).
The imposition of trade sanctions encompasses the suspension of trading
privileges and other economic rights regulated by the MEA.339 Finally, the
imposition of liability requires non-compliant Parties to compensate for their noncompliance. This liability can take two forms: greater burdens in meeting the
MEA obligations (see Kyoto Protocol) or reparations for any damage caused (see
Basel Convention and under liability protocols).

339

It should be noted that the Whaling Convention does not have a multilateral NCP that can apply noncompliance response measures but that Parties tend to use unilateral trade sanctions in conjunction with
diplomatic and/or political pressure to achieve the desired outcomes.
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TABLE 3.5. NON-COMPLIANCE PENALTIES
Convention
Warning
Suspension of Privileges
Ramsar
World
Heritage
CITES

√

Exclusion of membership from
World Heritage Committee
Secretariat takes control of
issuing permits

Trade Sanctions

Liability

Suspension of trade in
CITES-listed species and
imposition of conditions

CMS
CBD
UNCCD
ITPGRFA
Basel

√

Re-import illegal
exports. Liability
Protocol.

PIC
Biosafety

√

Liability Protocol
pending.

POPs
Vienna
Montreal
Protocol

√

UNFCCC
Kyoto
Protocol
Whaling
Convention
London
UNCLOS

Suspension of rights in
institutional arrangements,
financial mechanism and transfer
of technology

Suspension of trade,
production and
consumption rights
Suspending right to trade
in and use flexibility
mechanisms

Diplomatic
pressure.

Carry-over of
obligations

Unilateral fisheries trade
or access restrictions
Liability subject to
further negotiation:
Article X.
Several related
liability treaties.

Fish Stocks

Liability to make reparations for any damage caused is not truly part of a
multilateral NCP in any MEA. Rather it is a responsibility that is articulated in the
MEA or its protocols and that is determined bilaterally, often in an adversarial
process. Thus, determinations of liability are usually outputs of a dispute
resolution process rather than an NCP. However, liability to make reparations is
surveyed here, in the context of non-compliance penalties, because in effect
exposure to liability is a disincentive to non-compliance.
A coordinated approach across MEAs to the imposition of penalties against a
Party that is recurrently non-compliant would have greater impact than ad hoc
penalties. As noted above, coordination would be likely to be useful across MEAs
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within a cluster but could also be useful across MEAs that regulate common
activities, such as international trade or manufacturing.
A coordinated approach to the suspension of privileges, where these are properly
mandated by a COP/MOP, would strengthen the deterrent effect of penalties.
Thus, for MEAs regulating related activities, the respective COP/MOPs might, by
prior agreement, suspend the privileges of a Party under each MEA when that
Party is determined by one of the COP/MOPs to be non-compliant (Such a
coordinated approach to penalties would also strengthen the deterrent impact of
penalties for related regional MEAs that are applicable in one region or across
several regions.)

Dispute Resolution Procedures
Dispute resolution procedures vary in sophistication, from simple provisions that
require Parties to negotiate bilaterally to resolve disputes peacefully, to the
elaborate, compulsory binding third-party dispute resolution procedures that can
be found in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. They are
grouped in three clusters of compulsory procedures: Negotiation, Conciliation
and Arbitration. At one end of the spectrum, CITES and CMS have dispute
settlement provisions that provide that in the event of a dispute, Parties must
submit to negotiation. They may voluntarily submit to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration if negotiations fail. Thus, there is no obligation to pursue binding
arbitration. At the other end of the spectrum is UNCLOS, which has compulsory,
binding arbitration for specific disputes (i.e. disputes concerning the seabed).
Generally, however, the arbitration procedure is invoked if the dispute has not
been resolved through negotiation. Conciliation is an option where negotiations
fail, but is invoked only if one Party requests it and the other accepts the
invitation. Compulsory conciliation has emerged as the preferred compromise
struck by the negotiators of MEAs.
The invocation of compulsory dispute resolution procedures signals a crisis in
environmental diplomacy. In addition, the outcomes of such procedures remain
unpredictable and potentially expensive. Therefore, with few exceptions, the
provisions of MEAs on binding dispute resolution tend to be weak and/or
permissive. States are generally reluctant to formulate legal obligations in MEAs
that might compel them to submit their environmental conflicts to binding dispute
resolution procedures for the reasons stated above. The increasing trend
towards the use of multilateral NCPs, as opposed to adversarial dispute
settlement procedures, seems to herald a new focus in international
environmental law on managing political relationships so as to maintain the
viability and integrity of an MEA.
Table 3.6 summarises dispute resolution procedures.
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TABLE 3.6 DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
Convention

Negotiation
Voluntary Compulsory

Conciliation
Voluntary Compulsory

Binding Arbitration
Voluntary Compulsory

Ramsar
World Heritage
CITES
CMS
CBD
UNCCD
ITPGRFA

√
√
√
√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√

Basel
PIC
Biosafety Protocol
POPs

√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√

Vienna
Montreal Protocol
UNFCCC
Kyoto Protocol

√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√

Whaling Convention
London
UNCLOS
Fish Stocks

√
√

√
√

√
√

As Table 6 illustrates, all but four Conventions have provisions on settling
disputes between Parties. The London Convention has developed a dispute
settlement procedure but it has never entered into force. With the exception of
the dispute resolution procedures under UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks
Agreement, the MEA dispute resolutions procedures are weak and tend to
orientate Parties towards the voluntary, less adversarial methods of negotiation
and conciliation.
Given that dispute resolution procedures tend to comprise mainly compulsory
conciliation and voluntary binding arbitration, potential linkages are feasible in
respect of common dispute resolution bodies. For example, MEAs within each
cluster could specify the same arbitration body within their respective arbitration
annexes. The arbitration body could include the International Court of Justice or
the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The marine environment cluster could utilise
the Law of the Sea Tribunal. However, this may be of little utility as there appears
to be widespread avoidance of binding dispute resolution. Instead, greater
emphasis is placed on non-compliance responses to ensure that Parties comply
with the Convention and that they collectively manage each other’s compliance
efforts.
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Chapter 4.
Synthesis and Analysis of Law and Practice
This chapter examines international practice in interlinking MEAs to achieve
synergies between their approaches to compliance. It does this by surveying
current international institutional efforts to promote interlinkages. These
institutional efforts fall into two categories: those conducted by broad-mandate,
multi-sectoral international organisations, and those conducted by the individual
MEA Secretariats themselves. The chapter also notes examples of national
practice in interlinking domestic compliance activities across MEAs.

International Efforts towards Interlinkages in Compliance
The focus of this report is on interlinkages between MEA compliance systems.
Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter’s survey of international practice in
interlinking MEA compliance systems, a distinction is maintained between
interlinkage of actual MEA compliance systems, as compared to interlinkage of
MEA implementation efforts more generally. Where interlinkages between MEA
information systems have been promoted, these are treated here as related to
compliance information systems, as performance information is a subset of the
wider body of information related to implementation. It must be recognised that
international efforts to interlink MEA compliance systems form a subset of
international efforts to produce synergies in national implementation of MEAs.
Further, as the focus is on interlinkages between MEA compliance systems, we
are concerned with international, rather than domestic sub-national compliance
arrangements. Domestic compliance systems form a part of national
implementation that serves to meet international obligations.

International Organisations
The primary multi-sectoral international organisations engaged in promoting
interlinkages are the United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations
Development Programme, United Nations University, the World Conservation
Monitoring Centre and the World Customs Organisation.
In 1997, UNDP convened an Expert Meeting on Synergies in National
Implementation between the Rio Agreements to seek ways to create synergies
for the implementation of the CBD, UNFCCC, UNCCD and the Forest Principles
at the national level.340 The meeting was based on the key ideas that recognising

340

“Legislative complementarity and harmonization of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental
agreements”, UNEP/UNDP/GEF Biodiversity Planning Support Program, 1 February 2002, pp.49-50,
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synergies is an important part of implementing MEAs and that in-country capacity
building is fundamental to promoting synergies.341 Four workshops covered
topics such as institutional requirements and structures, capacity requirements,
national planning requirements and information and reporting requirements.342
The final workshop, on information and reporting requirements, discussed the
commonalities in the data sets between the Rio agreements and proposed
information system models that would explore synergies during the various steps
in the data collection and dissemination process: data need analysis; crosscomparison to identify synergy; identifying gaps; data integration; creating
information products; policy development; policy implementation; reporting; and
review.343 Overall, the meeting resulted in the proposal of measures to improve
national implementation, reduce duplication and increase harmonisation.344
Following the Expert Meeting, the World Conservation Monitoring Centre
produced the 1997 Feasibility Study for the Information Management

<http://www.unon.org/dgefftp/NCSAResources/Conventions%20Literature/UNCBD/CBD%20Obligations
%20&%20other%20MEAs%20Feb02.pdf> (19/10/05).
341

“Legislative complementarity and harmonization of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental
agreements”, UNEP/UNDP/GEF Biodiversity Planning Support Program, 1 February 2002, pp. 49-50,
<http://www.unon.org/dgefftp/NCSAResources/Conventions%20Literature/UNCBD/CBD%20Obligations
%20&%20other%20MEAs%20Feb02.pdf> (19/10/05).
342

“Synergies in National Implementation of the Rio Agreements”, Sustainable Energy and Environment
Division Website, <http://www.undp.org/seed/guide/synergies/siner3.htm> (19/10/05).

343

“Synergies in National Implementation of the Rio Agreements”, Sustainable Energy and Environment
Division Website, <http://www.undp.org/seed/guide/synergies/siner3.htm> (19/10/05).

344

“Synergies in National Implementation of the Rio Agreements”, Sustainable Energy and Environment
Division Website, <http://www.undp.org/seed/guide/synergies/siner3.htm> (19/10/05). The first workshop
on institutional requirements and structures discussed the potential of creating synergies in the areas of
awareness raising, education, reporting, data gathering and inventories, public participation, research and
training. Mechanisms that were canvassed to facilitate integrated environmental planning included: a crosssectoral national committee; separate institutions conducting joint task forces to avoid duplication; or one
high-level institution that is responsible for all instruments. The second workshop on capacity requirements
discussed capacity building initiatives to assist countries in complying with international obligations
pertaining to monitoring, policy and law reform, impact assessment and research, reporting, education and
public awareness and training. The workshop identified the key indicators of a country’s existing capacity
to plan, implement and monitor implementation initiatives as including: knowledge and technical skills
among decision-makers on the country’s environmental problems; the degree to which existing plans are
participatory and involve stakeholders; familiarity and skill in using existing planning tools; and clearly
defined roles and responsibilities between the public and private sectors and civil society. The workshop
ultimately recommended improving capacity in human resources, infrastructure development and
cooperation and coordination through technical assistance, information exchange and technology transfers.
The third workshop proposed three options on national planning strategies: producing separate plans for
each instrument; developing an umbrella plan encompassing all the Rio agreements; develop a mechanism
to absorb the planning process for each instrument into existing plans and frameworks.
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Infrastructure for biodiversity-related MEAs.345 The study was commissioned by
UNEP and the Secretariats of the CBD, CITES, CMS, Ramsar Convention and
the World Heritage Convention to review the information and reporting
requirements of the Parties under each Convention and propose options for
harmonisation.346 Commonalities in information were noted between CITES and
the CMS with regard to overlapping species and the World Heritage Convention
and the Ramsar Convention in relation to sites.347 The study ultimately
recommended streamlining of national performance reporting under the
conventions by clarifying the reporting requirements of each MEA, developing
and testing an integrated handbook for national reporting and capacity building in
national biodiversity information banks.348 It also recommended the development
of an MEA information resource, covering five priority areas including:
harmonising document cover sheets; adopting standard definitions; harmonising
web sites; developing a meta-database to indicate the information that is
available and its location; and developing an inter-convention website and search
engine.349 Finally, the study proposed developing a lessons-learned network to
encourage the sharing of experience.350
345

“Legislative complementarity and harmonization of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental
agreements”, UNEP/UNDP/GEF Biodiversity Planning Support Program, 1 February 2002, pp. 50-52,
<http://www.unon.org/dgefftp/NCSAResources/Conventions%20Literature/UNCBD/CBD%20Obligations
%20&%20other%20MEAs%20Feb02.pdf> (19/10/05).
346

“Legislative complementarity and harmonization of biodiversity-related multilateral environmental
agreements”, UNEP/UNDP/GEF Biodiversity Planning Support Program, 1 February 2002, pp. 50-52,
<http://www.unon.org/dgefftp/NCSAResources/Conventions%20Literature/UNCBD/CBD%20Obligations
%20&%20other%20MEAs%20Feb02.pdf> (19/10/05).
347

J. Harrison and M. Collins, “Harmonizing the information management infrastructure for biodiversityrelated treaties”, WCMC Website, <http://www.unepwcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf#xml=/cgibin/pdf_hl?STEMMER=en&RGB=ff00ff&WORDS=feasibility+study+&DB=unepwcmc&URL=http://www.unep-wcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf> (19/10/05).
348

J. Harrison and M. Collins, “Harmonizing the information management infrastructure for biodiversityrelated treaties”, WCMC Website, <http://www.unepwcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf#xml=/cgibin/pdf_hl?STEMMER=en&RGB=ff00ff&WORDS=feasibility+study+&DB=unepwcmc&URL=http://www.unep-wcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf> (19/10/05).
349

J. Harrison and M. Collins, “Harmonizing the information management infrastructure for biodiversityrelated treaties”, WCMC Website, <http://www.unepwcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf#xml=/cgibin/pdf_hl?STEMMER=en&RGB=ff00ff&WORDS=feasibility+study+&DB=unepwcmc&URL=http://www.unep-wcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf> (19/10/05).
350

J. Harrison and M. Collins, “Harmonizing the information management infrastructure for biodiversityrelated treaties”, WCMC Website, <http://www.unepwcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf#xml=/cgibin/pdf_hl?STEMMER=en&RGB=ff00ff&WORDS=feasibility+study+&DB=unepwcmc&URL=http://www.unep-wcmc.org/latenews/previous/japanpaper.pdf> (19/10/05).
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The WCMC has since maintained the leading role in developing interlinkages
and synergies for implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs. It provides
support to the biodiversity-related MEAs by exploring ways to harmonize their
information management and national reporting obligations, most notably through
reports and workshops.351 For example, UNEP convened a workshop in 2000
entitled ‘Towards the Harmonization of National Reporting’, which led to the
development of pilot projects in four countries.352 Another workshop was
convened in 2004 to review the conclusions and recommendations of the pilot
projects and to discuss future harmonization priorities.353
In 1997 UNU established the Interlinkages Initiative. In 1999, it held an
International Conference on Synergies and Coordination.354 The objectives of the
Conference were to, inter alia, examine existing initiatives on synergies and
interlinkages and promote discussion on these issues among relevant
stakeholders.355 The conference was divided into four working groups to cover
information systems and exchange, financing, issues management, and scientific
mechanisms, with each working group producing a series of recommendations
on ways forward.356 Since the Conference, UNU has continued with its work on
exploring potential synergies. Other outcomes of the Interlinkages Initiative
include applied research and case studies on identifying constraints and
overcoming challenges in implementing MEAs, holding of workshops, capacitybuilding activities, and engagement in related consultancies and policy design.357
The information systems aspects of this work relates directly to compliance
interlinkages.
The UNEP Division of Environmental Conventions was established in 1999 to
identify synergies between MEAs at the global, national and regional levels, and
to promote increased cooperation between UNEP and MEAs, harmonized
information systems and coordinated approaches to capacity building.358
351

http://www.unep-wcmc.org/ under ‘Harmonization of National Reporting’ (6/11/05)

352

http://www.unep-wcmc.org/ under ‘Harmonization of National Reporting’ (6/11/05)

353

http://www.unep-wcmc.org/ under ‘Harmonization of National Reporting’ (6/11/05)

354

http://www.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/frameset.htm (6/11/05)

355

http://www.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/frameset.htm (6/11/05)

356

Interlinkages: Synergies and Coordination between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, UNU,
Tokyo, Japan, 1999, p.6 at http://www.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/frameset.htm (6/11/05)
357

http://www.unu.edu/inter-linkages/ilink/frameset.htm (6/11/05)

358

http://www.unep.org/dec/support/index.html and http://www.unep.org/dec/support/interlinkages.html
(5/11/05)
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The World Customs Organisation (WCO), an intergovernmental organisation
established in 1952 to improve customs administration,359 signed a Memorandum
of Understanding with UNEP in 2003, that recognised the need for customs
officers around the world to be better equipped at detecting environmental crime.
360
To that end, the Green Customs Project is a joint initiative between the WCO,
Interpol, the CITES and Basel Secretariats and the UNEP Division of
Technology, Industry and Economics and Division of Environmental
Conventions, which aims to train customs officers in identifying and dealing with
illegal trade in wildlife and hazardous substances.361 This national customs
strengthening exercise seeks to develop national implementation capacity but
does not focus on MEA compliance systems at the international level.

MEA Secretariats
In 2001, a Joint Liaison Group (JLG) between the CBD, UNCCD and UNFCCC
was established with the aim of exchanging information as well as exploring
synergies and opportunities for cooperation between the Conventions.362 The
JLG has produced a joint paper entitled ‘Options for Enhanced Cooperation
among the Three Rio Conventions’,363which has recommended, inter alia, the
development of joint working groups and actions plans, cooperation between
national focal points and between scientific subsidiary bodies.364 Biannual
meetings are held between the secretariats of five biodiversity-related MEAS
(CBD, CMS, CITES, World Heritage and Ramsar) that form the Biodiversity
Liaison Group.365 They are considering possible cooperation in harmonization of
national reporting, including performance reporting.
Interlinkages between specific MEA Secretariats are set out below. Information
concerning interlinkages between them to assist general implementation is
provided but is distinguished from compliance interlinkages. Treaty provisions
governing relations with other MEAs are also noted.
359

Fact Sheet – “The World Customs Organisation” at
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/AboutUs/aboutus.html (5/11/05).
360

http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/search/search.html (5/11/05)

361

UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004, p.36.
362

http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/liason.shtml (5/11/05).

363

http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/sbstta/sbstta-10/information/sbstta-10-inf-09-en.pdf

364

http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/liason.shtml

365

Joint Web Site of the Biodiversity Related Conventions
http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/related-conventions/blg.shtml

Biodiversity

Liaison

Group
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1. NATURE CONSERVATION

Among MEAs, the most intense interlinkage activity takes place within the
biodiversity-related cluster.
(a) Ramsar Convention
Compliance Ramsar Convention COP Resolution 7.4 relating to partnerships
and cooperation with other conventions promotes harmonised information
management infrastructures.
Implementation
The Ramsar Bureau has signed MOUs with the following
secretariats: CMS in February 1997; UNCCD in December 1998; and the World
Heritage Center in May 1999. A Memorandum of Cooperation between the
Ramsar Bureau and the CBD Secretariat was signed in January 1996 and a Joint
Work Plan for 1998-1999 was developed and endorsed by COP-4 (1990). COP
Resolution 7.4 endorses the Joint Work Plan with the CBD and requests that the
Bureau give priority in its programme of work for the next triennium to the
development of joint actions with the CMS, and to the implementation of the
MOUs with the Secretariat of the UNCCD and the World Heritage Centre. It also
requests the development of a Memorandum of Cooperation with the UNFCCC.
(b) World Heritage
Implementation The World Heritage Centre has signed MOUs with the Ramsar
Bureau and the CMS Secretariat. An MoU is in development with the CBD
Secretariat.366 Operational Guidelines 42 and 43 of the World Heritage
Committee stress the need for appropriate coordination and information sharing
with other conservation instruments including the Ramsar Convention and
CITES.367 To facilitate coordination, the Committee may invite representatives of
the intergovernmental bodies under such conventions to attend its meetings as
observers and appoints its own representatives to observe at meetings of the
other intergovernmental bodies when invited to do so.
(c) CITES
Compliance CITES COP Decision 13.92 directs the CITES Secretariat to
collaborate with the Secretariats of other biodiversity-related conventions to
ensure the harmonization of information management and reporting.

366

http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/related-conventions/mandates.shtml#

367

UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 95.
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Implementation
The CITES Secretariat cooperates with the Secretariats to
the Basel Convention and Montreal Protocol to combat illegal trade.368 The
CITES Secretariat also cooperates closely with the Ramsar Bureau.369 CITES
COP Resolution 13.3 calls upon the Secretariat to regularly review the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Secretariats of CITES and
the CMS, to seek submissions from CITES Parties on a joint work programme
with the CMS Secretariat and to invite the CMS Secretariat to meetings
pertaining to commonly protected species. In relation to the CBD Secretariat, a
Memorandum of Cooperation with an attached Work Plan for Implementation of
Joint Activities has been adopted.
(d) CMS
Compliance CMS COP-6 (1999) established the CMS Information Management
System, which is maintained by UNEP-WCMC. The Information Management
System collects data and information from expert organisations, CMS national
reports and other biodiversity agreements such as the CBD and CITES and
offers Parties information on: species listed in the Appendices; species groups
and issues relevant to CMS; links to the CBD’s Clearing-House Mechanism; and
information provided by Parties on the implementation of resolutions and
recommendations and the mobilisation of financial and technical resources.370
Implementation
An MOU on co-operation between the CMS and CBD
Secretariats was signed on 13 June 1996. CMS COP Resolution 6.4 requested
the Secretariat to actively ‘foster synergy between global environmental
conventions, giving particular emphasis to the relationship with the Convention
on Biological Diversity.’ CMS COP-7 (2002) invited the CMS Secretariat to
collaborate with the Secretariat of the CBD to integrate migratory species into the
latter’s National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans.371 An MOU between
the CMS and Ramsar Secretariats was signed on 18 February 1997,372 between
368

UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 78.
369

UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 77.
370

UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 87.
371

UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 84.
372

Ramsar Website, <http://www.ramsar.org/key_cms_mou.htm> (8/9/05).
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the CMS and CITES Secretariats on 18 September 2002, and between the CMS
and UNCCD Secretariats on 2 September 2003.373 There is also an MoU
between the CMS Secretariat and World Heritage Committee and there are joint
programmes between the CMS Secretariat and the CBD, CITES and Ramsar
Secretariats.374
(e) CBD
Compliance COP-4 (1998) directed the Executive Secretary to improve
information exchange synergies with other biodiversity-related conventions.375 At
COP-5 (2000), the Informal Advisory Committee was directed to facilitate and
encourage cooperation with other international and regional information networks
and initiatives.376 To this end, UNEP-WCMC has recommended the development
of a biodiversity-related MEA database or clearing-house mechanism to
streamline national reporting.377
Implementation
Given the broad scope of issues that are covered in the
CBD, COP-4 (1998) sought to address its rapidly over-loaded decision-making
process by intensifying relationships with other Conventions.378 There are
Memoranda of Understanding/Cooperation and Joint Programmes between the
CBD Secretariat and the Secretariats to the CITES, CMS, Ramsar Convention,
and World Heritage Convention.379
Decision VI/20 reinforces the need to design and implement mutually supportive
activities with other conventions and international organisations. Those noted
include the: UNFCCC; UNCCD; Ramsar Convention; CMS; and CITES. With
Decision VII/26, the COP extended the mandate of the Working Group on
Review of Implementation of the Convention to examine ways of increasing
cooperation between the biodiversity-related Secretariats.

373

CMS Website, <http://www.cms.int/bodies/ScC/12th_scientific_council/12th_ScC_documents.htm>
(8/9/05).
374

http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/related-conventions/mandates.shtml# (5/11/05)
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CBD Decision IV/2.
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CBD Decision V/14.
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UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 200, p.56.
378

CBD Decision IV/15.
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http://www.biodiv.org/cooperation/related-conventions/mandates.shtml# (5/11/05).
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Legal Article 22 of the CBD provides that its provisions do not affect its Parties’
rights and obligations under other international agreements, unless exercise of
those rights or obligations would cause damage or serious threat to biological
diversity. Its provisions are to be implemented consistently with UNCLOS,
discussed below. In that respect, cooperative arrangements have been
concluded for marine and coastal biodiversity, including a joint study between the
CBD Secretariat and the United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the
Sea on the relationship between the CBD and UNCLOS regarding the
conservation and sustainable use of deep seabed biodiversity.380 Article 28
allows Parties to adopt protocols to the CBD. However, Parties to any protocol
must first be Parties to the CBD.381
(f) UNCCD
Implementation The UNCCD Secretariat has signed MOUs with the Secretariats
to the Ramsar Convention, the UNFCCC, the CBD and the CMS. Parties are
encouraged to coordinate activities under UNCCD with those under other
relevant international agreements, particularly the UNFCCC and CBD.382
(g) ITPGRFA
Implementation
The Treaty states that its objectives will be attained by
closely linking its implementation to the work of the Food and Agriculture
Organisation of the United Nations and to the CBD.383 Article 17.1 ties the Global
Information System for Plant Genetic Resources with the clearing-house
mechanism established under the CBD. Article 19.3 directs the Governing Body
to establish and maintain close links with the CBD COP, take note of relevant
CBD COP decisions and inform the CBD COP of ‘matters regarding the
implementation of this Treaty.’
2. HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES MANAGEMENT

In 2002 the UNEP Governing Council adopted Decision SS.VII/3, which
established a ‘Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management’
(SAICM).384 Paragraph 1 of the Decision states that there is a need to develop a
strategic approach and endorses the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical

380

UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 66.
381

CBD Article 32.

382

UNCCD, Article 8.

383

PGRFA Treaty, Article 1.2.

384

http://www.chem.unep.ch/saicm/ (5/11/05)
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Safety Bahia Declaration and Priorities for Action Beyond 2000 as the foundation
of the approach. The Strategic Approach is to take into account the economic,
social and environmental factors of chemical management as well as sustainable
development.385 In 2003, Decision 22/4 IV called for a draft approach to be
prepared for discussion at preparatory meetings with a view to eventually
convening an international conference.386 An International Conference on
Chemicals Management will take place in Dubai in early 2006.387
(a) Basel
Implementation
The Secretariats to the Basel Convention, CITES and the
Montreal Protocol work together to combat illegal trade and have signed an MOU
to that effect.388 The Basel, POPs Convention and the PIC Convention
Secretariats, discussed below, undertake joint activities including regional and
sub-regional workshops on the integrated implementation of the three
Conventions.389 The Basel Convention Parties have adopted resolutions on
cooperation and coordination with the London Convention, particularly
concerning scrapping of ships, the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention and
the Global Waste Inventory and Database.
Legal Parties may enter into bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements
provided such agreements do not derogate from the ESM principles espoused in
the Basel Convention.390
(b) PIC
Implementation
Coordinated implementation activities have been undertaken
with the Basel and POPs Conventions.391 At COP-1 (2004), the Parties to the
PIC Convention decided to invite other relevant regional entities, in particular the
385

Decision 22/4 IV, paragraph 1.

386

Decision 22/4 IV paragraphs 2 and 3.

387

http://www.chem.unep.ch/saicm/ (5/11/05)

388

UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 78.
389

UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
promoting synergies and cooperation between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular
biodiversity-related conventions, and related mechanisms, May 2004 at 125.
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Basel Article 11
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UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Synergies and Cooperation: A status report on activities
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Basel Convention regional centres and regional coordinating centres,
international organisations and MEAs to participate in a regional delivery
system.392
(c) Biosafety Protocol
Legal The provisions of the CBD relating to its protocols apply to the Biosafety
Protocol.393 Parties may enter into bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements
regarding the trans-boundary movement of LMOs provided they comply with the
Protocol.394
(d) POPs
Implementation
Joint activities are conducted between the Basel, POPs and
395
PIC Conventions.
The POPs Convention Secretariat is directed to cooperate
closely with the Secretariat of the Basel Convention in relation to disposal of
POPs. This includes establishing levels of destruction and irreversible
transformation necessary to ensure that the characteristics of POPs (set out in
Annexes A, B, C and D, paragraph 1 of the POPs Convention) are not exhibited;
to determine criteria for environmentally sound disposal; and to ensure that
Annex A, B and C chemicals are disposed of according to ESM principles.396
3. ATMOSPHERIC EMISSIONS CONTROL

(a) Vienna Convention
Legal Parties may not become a Party to any protocol under the Convention if
they are not Parties to the Convention.397
(b) Montreal Protocol
Implementation
The MOU concerning cooperative capacity building of
customs controls with the Basel Convention and CITES has been previously

392
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393
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394
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397

Vienna Convention, Article 16.

129

Synthesis
noted.398 At MOP-10 (1998), Parties noted that the greenhouse gases included in
Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol include hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and that the Montreal Protocol’s Technology and
Economic Assessment Panel had identified HFCs and PFCs as alternatives to
ozone-depleting substances.399 Decision X/16 requested the relevant Montreal
Protocol committee to assess the implications of the inclusion of HFCs and PFCs
in the Kyoto Protocol for the implementation of the Montreal Protocol and to
continue to cooperate with the relevant bodies under the UNFCCC and Kyoto
Protocol.
(c) UNFCCC
Implementation
Decision 13/CP.8 affirms the need for enhanced cooperation
between the UNFCCC, the CBD and the UNCCD and requests the UNFCCC
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice to continue cooperating with
the equivalent CBD and UNCCD bodies. A Joint Liaison Group has been
established between the CBD, UNFCCC and UNCCD to explore coordination
issues, with the Ramsar Convention having observer status.400
(d) Kyoto Protocol
Legal The legal relationship between the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance
mechanism and the UNFCCC’s Multilateral Consultative Process is unclear, due
to the overlap between the facilitative functions of each. The relationship
between the Protocol’s non-compliance mechanism and the dispute resolution
procedures it inherited from the UNFCCC also remains to be explored.401
However, in terms of function, it can be assumed that the elaborate and
established multilateral institution for the management of compliance operated by
the Kyoto Compliance Committee will be preferred to the vague UNFCCC
Multilateral Consultative Process and to adversarial confrontations under the
UNFCCC dispute resolution procedures.
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4. Marine Environment Protection
(a) Whaling
Implementation
At its meeting in 2000, the Commission noted the
importance of co-operation with other organisations in scientific research and that
the Commission has agreed an MOU with the CMS Secretariat.402
(b) London Convention
Implementation
In 1991, the Parties to the London Convention voted to
request the Basel Secretariat to consider the London Convention when preparing
its technical guidelines.403 They have since cooperated with Basel Convention
particularly concerning the scrapping of ships, the drafting of the 1996 Protocol to
the London Convention and the Global Waste Inventory and Database.
(c) UNCLOS
Implementation
Studies have been conducted into the relationship between
the CBD and the UNCLOS, with specific regard to the conservation of marine
biodiversity.404
(d) Fish Stocks
Legal Article 4 of the Fish Stocks Agreement states that the Agreement must be
interpreted and applied consistently with UNCLOS.
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Table 4.1, above, shows that the greatest concentration of interlinkages between
international compliance systems occurs between the biodiversity-related MEAs,
other than the UNCCD. Those MEAs also enjoy the greatest concentration of
interlinkages for general implementation. Again in relation to general
implementation, the other areas of concentrated MEA interlinkages occur within
clusters, i.e., the hazardous substances and atmosphere clusters, with the
notable exception of the marine cluster. There is also a relatively high level of
implementation interlinkage between the biodiversity-related and atmosphere
clusters, comprising the only significant area of interlinkages that extend across
clusters.
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TABLE 4.1: IMPLEMENTATION COOPERATION BETWEEN MEA SECRETARIATS
KEY: Bold = compliance interlinkages
√ = MOU;
* = Other forms of cooperation (e.g. Joint Working Groups etc.)
- = Cooperation by virtue of Convention/Protocol relationship;

Synthesis

National Efforts Supporting Interlinkages in Compliance
At the national level, interlinkages in domestic compliance systems can be made
to generate synergies across national efforts to implement MEAs. They are to be
contrasted with multilateral compliance mechanisms. Domestic compliance
systems operate at a level below the international personality of the State. They
form a part of national implementation to meet international obligations.
Domestic compliance interlinkages pose a challenge to the national governance
capabilities. This is because national governance structures are traditionally built
upon distributions of responsibilities based on a concept of management sectors
or portfolios. Those sectors or portfolios are usually firmly defined to limit the
mandate of a government institution within its allotted management
responsibilities. Building bridges across these institutional ‘silos’ can be difficult
and resource intensive.
Some international organisations are engaged in national capacity building to
enhance interlinkages in national implementation of MEAs. This capacity building
frequently seeks to enhance general systems for domestic compliance with
MEAs and, to a lesser extent, interlinkages between them. The work of the
UNDP, UNEP and WCO has been mentioned above.
The International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement
(INECE) takes generic action to build national compliance and enforcement
capabilities. It has developed a set of environmental compliance and
enforcement (ECE) indicators for assessing program performance. They are
societal response indicators that describe the “level of activity or commitment
made by Government, and a set of results which contribute to an important social
goal such as reducing or preventing environmental pollution.”405 The INECE has
also developed a guidebook to assist countries in identifying, developing and
testing ECE indicators406 and a guidebook to assist countries in developing and
implementing compliance and enforcement strategies in relation to their own
laws and policies.407 The latter guidebook discusses the key components of a
country’s compliance and enforcement program as: creating requirements that
are enforceable; knowing who is subject to the requirements and setting
priorities; promoting compliance in the regulated community; monitoring
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<http://www.inece.org/indicators/guidance.pdf>, p.2 (19/10/05).
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compliance with the requirements; responding to breaches; identifying roles and
responsibilities; and evaluating the performance of the program.408
The UNU has conducted specific case studies of institutional coordination in
relation to the implementation of MEAs that touch upon domestic compliance
systems in Malaysia and Thailand,409 in the Pacific Islands410 and more broadly in
Asia and the Pacific.411 It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct detailed
national case studies of domestic compliance interlinkages in the implementation
of MEAs. However, a few regional sketches are set out to indicate the nature of
national developments. These suggest that, except for countries in North
America and Europe, domestic interlinkages are at early stages of development
and mostly concern the establishment of integrated environmental monitoring
databases rather than integration of performance information.
(a) Asia and Pacific
Environmental agencies have emerged in South East Asian countries to play a
coordinating role between the various agencies tasked with environmental
responsibilities, develop and implement policies and conduct awareness-raising
activities.412 For example, both Malaysia and Thailand have developed
institutional frameworks to deal with specific environmental issues, although
there is a need for increased cross-sectoral harmonization.413 In Malaysia, the
Inter-Agency Planning Group oversees the implementation of Agenda 21 while
the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment formulates policy and
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deals with inter-ministerial coordination issues for the Rio Conventions.414
Thailand has a National Environmental Board, which oversees the
implementation of MEAs through numerous committees and sub-committees,
including the National Committee on the Convention of Biological Diversity and
the National Committee on Climate Change.415
In South East Asia, national databases on natural resources and environment
are developing, although problems exist in relation to lack of coordination, poor
and uneven reporting, outdated information and lack of standardised
methodologies.416 In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, for example, water,
meteorological, soil and land databases have been streamlined into an integrated
database that is managed by the Division of Inventory and Planning of the
Department of Forestry.417 In Vietnam, the National Information and
Documentation Centre manages two networks of environmental information.418
At the regional level, information and experiences are shared through
organisations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Most countries in South East Asia have monitoring systems for gathering
environmental data. Malaysia routinely monitors air and water quality and has
also developed a system of monitoring oil spills.419 Singapore and Thailand also
have air quality monitoring systems.420 Vietnam has outlined a policy on
environmental assessment in its National Action Plan on Environment and
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Sustainable Development.421 The Philippines has formulated its own Action Plan
following UNCED recommendations.422 The International Environmental Affairs
Staff of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources coordinate
monitoring activities.423
Within South Asia, ministries of environment have been established in
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka to implement
environmental laws and develop and implement policies aimed at environmental
conservation.424 In Bhutan, a National Environment Commission was established
in 1992, which is a high-level cross-sectoral body that is responsible for creating
legislation and ensuring that the Government’s international obligations with
various Conventions are satisfied.425 Similarly, in Nepal, the National Planning
Commission assesses and approves environmental policies, coordinates crosssectoral activities and performs monitoring functions.426 There is regional
progress in the collection and dissemination of environmental information. For
example, India introduced its Environmental Information System in 1984, which
uses a network of databases on ecological and biodiversity research to integrate
national efforts to collect environmental data.427 At the regional level, the South
Asian Cooperative Environment Program, established in 1982 by the
Governments of South Asia, promotes cooperative activities to strengthen
institutions and capacity and provide a forum for information exchange.428 Its
activities are complemented by the activities of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation, which focuses on economic but also covers
environmental cooperation.429
Within the Pacific, the UNU has recently noted significant information
management problems. Databases exist but remain unconnected. No Pacific
421
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Island country has yet developed a standardized format for collecting and storing
data.430 Palau has attempted to address some of these issues, at least in relation
to the atmosphere MEAs, with the creation of the Office of Environmental
Response and Coordination that acts as a national focal point for the
dissemination of information to relevant national agencies.431
(b) Europe
The European Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of
Environmental Law (IMPEL) is a network of regulators that focuses on training
inspectors, exchanging information and experience between Member States and
reviewing EU environmental legislation.432 IMPEL’s role is recognised in the 6th
Environment Action Programme, which was passed by the European Parliament
on 22 July 2002. Article 3.2 provides that the objectives of the Programme shall
be pursued by addressing infringements of environmental legislation, promoting
improved monitoring and inspection standards by Member States, systematically
reviewing the application of environmental legislation across the Community and
improving exchange of information on best practice on implementation including
by IMPEL. Article 9.1 outlines priority international environmental areas and
Article 9.2(j) states that these international objectives shall be achieved by
means of promoting policy coherence. This involves linking the work done within
the framework of different MEAs, including assessing inter-linkages between the
biodiversity and climate change conventions.
(c) North America
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was created by the USA,
Canada and Mexico under the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation to deal with regional environmental issues, trade and environmental
conflicts and to promote environmental law enforcement.433 The CEC has a Law
and Policy program to address compliance with and enforcement of
environmental laws within the region434 and includes an Enforcement and
Compliance Cooperation Program that aims to provide support to the North
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American Working Group on Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation.435 It
focuses on capacity building in areas including CITES tracking and enforcement,
wildlife training exchanges, smuggling ozone depleting substances and
transboundary law enforcement cooperation workshop.436 The Working Group
comprises senior level enforcement officials and members of the North American
Wildlife Enforcement Group (NAWEG), which is a regional network of wildlife
enforcement officials.437 Additionally, the CEC has organised projects on
cooperating on north American air quality that focus on exchanging technical
data and developing strategies to address common concerns.438 There are also
projects dedicated to capacity building for pollution prevention among key
stakeholders.439
In Canada, the position of Commissioner for the Environment and Sustainable
Development was established in 1995 within the Canadian Office of the Auditor
General.440 The Commissioner provides performance audits to the Canadian
Parliament on whether environmental policies are being implemented and
delivering the desired results. The Commissioner has recently reviewed the
Canadian Biodiversity Strategy 1996, ultimately identified a lack of information on
what has been achieved under the policy and on what remains to be achieved.441
The Report noted that responsibility for biodiversity in Canada spans several
departments442 and that there are also issues relating to cooperation between the
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levels of government within the Canadian Federation. Senior officers from across
portfolios and Governmental tiers form a Biodiversity Working Group to develop
and coordinate implementation plans.443 Environment Canada responded by
building biodiversity into a key component in other environmental management
sectors, including the Oceans Action Plan, National Forest Strategy, the
Agricultural Policy Framework and the Invasive Alien Species Strategy.444 In
June 2005, the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Ministers and Deputy Ministers
of wildlife, forestry and fisheries and aquaculture agreed to collaborate on the
implementation framework of the Biodiversity Strategy that focuses on
outcomes.445
(d) South America
The INECE held its Sixth International Conference on Environmental Compliance
and Enforcement in 2002.446 It demonstrated that, although most South American
countries lack ECE indicators, they do have institutional mechanisms to
coordinate environmental activities.447 In Chile, for example, an Environmental
National Commission was established as an inter-ministerial and cross-sectoral
coordination body, consisting of a Council of Ministers with environmental
functions, cross-sectoral Consulting Council and an Executive Direction.448 Brazil
has an Environmental National System, which is composed of different levels of
Government and executive organs at the Federal level.449 The World Bank
Institute Environmental Governance Program has also recently co-hosted
workshops in Brazil to build capacity on compliance and enforcement, including
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compliance indicators.450 In Argentina, a Federal Environmental Council was
created to exchange information and coordinate environmental policies.451
Additionally, Argentinean authorities have signed inter-Governmental
agreements to coordinate environmental compliance across the levels of
Government on the issue of hazardous wastes.452
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Annex 1.
Action Plan
The conclusions reached though comparative analysis of MEA compliance
mechanisms and the synthesis of law and practice form the basis for
recommending the following suggested Action Plan on Building Interlinkages and
Synergies Across Global MEA Compliance Regimes.
1. Consistent Concepts and Terminology
Hold a workshop in 2006 on multilateral non-compliance mechanisms.
The workshop’s objective would be to authoritatively define concepts and
terminology for compliance mechanisms and their sub-components.
Distinctions need to be drawn, inter alia, between: implementation and
compliance; international and domestic compliance mechanisms;
performance information and environmental baseline data, verification and
monitoring missions; primary implementation assistance and noncompliance response assistance; and penalties and compensation
liabilities. The workshop would bring together experts in a consultative
process, rather than national representatives in a negotiation.
The intended output of the workshop would be a publication definitive of
the concepts and terminology.
2. MEA Compliance Regime Manual
Hold a workshop in 2006 with the objective of considering models of
compliance regimes and developing definitions for criteria and indicators
to assess multilateral compliance regime performance. The models need
to describe the varieties of compliance mechanisms and the performance
criteria to include indicators of performance quality.
The intended output of the workshop would be a manual that sets out
considerations and recommendations for non-compliance regime models
and describes interlinkages between compliance regimes that generate
synergies.
3. Harmonisation of Performance Self-Reporting
Continue to support current international efforts of UNEP-WCMC and
others to promote harmonised self-reporting of performance review
information. Currently, these efforts proceed mainly within the biodiversityrelated cluster of MEAs but they should be extended to harmonise selfreporting within other clusters and across clusters. Of particular note are
suggestions that: overlaps, gaps and inconsistencies be identified;
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overlaps be addressed by joint information modules; gaps be addressed
by consolidated national reports across MEA clusters; and reporting
inconsistencies be addressed by harmonising reporting formats and
timetables.
4. Performance Information Exchange and Integration
Continue to support current international efforts of UNEP-WCMC and
others to facilitate exchange between MEAs of performance review
information and the integration of that information. Again, these efforts
currently occur mainly within the biodiversity-related cluster of MEAs but
should be extended to exchange of information on performance review
within other clusters and across clusters. Of particular note are
suggestions that national reports: be available on-line; web-links be
constructed between MEA performance information sites; combined
common portals be built for closely clustered MEAs offering integrated
search functions; and that ‘best practice and lessons learned sites’ be
developed.
5. Model Standards for Inter-Secretariat Cooperation
Develop and adopt in 2006 a model Memorandum of Understanding to
extend MEA inter-secretariat cooperation. That model should include
options for interlinkages relating specifically to compliance, including
exchanges of performance information that address cross-MEA
information integration and alerts for triggering their respective noncompliance procedures (NCPs).
6. Interlinkages Administrative Support
Dedicate adequate administrative resources in 2006 to support regular
biannual meetings and inter-sessional activities of an inter-MEA
secretariat consultative committee. Continue current efforts by UNEP to
strengthen cooperation with MEAs through, in particular, an InterDivisional task force on MEAs and UNEP (Division on Environmental
Conventions) desk officers for major MEAs.
7. Interlinked Verification and Monitoring
Place on the agenda of meetings of joint MEA secretariats in 2006 the
proposal that they promote to their respective COP/MOPs that the latter
consider the introduction of third-party performance review verification and
monitoring. Those COP/MOPs that do not currently provide for such
verification or monitoring could be encouraged to adopt decisions to
facilitate verification or monitoring missions by end 2007. Those missions
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could be tasked to review implementation across designated MEAs and
could be conducted cyclically to review the extent to which a Party is
meeting its implementation commitments.
UNEP to draw up, in 2007, rosters of technical experts, grouped
corresponding to MEA clusters, to conduct monitoring missions and
verifications missions concerning national MEA compliance.
8. Coordinated Non-Compliance Response Measures
Place on the agenda of meetings of joint MEA secretariats in 2006 the
proposal that they communicate to other secretariats and to international
capacity-building bodies information concerning measures adopted in
response to non-compliance under an MEA NCP. Receipt of such
information on Parties’ non-compliance patterns by other NCP decisionmaking bodies and by capacity-building bodies would facilitate improved
coordination and targeting of assistance to countries that are noncompliant with multiple treaties. Conversely, it would facilitate coordination
of penalties so as to maximise their effect for the non-compliant Party.
Such coordination would be useful across MEAs within a cluster but could
also be useful across clusters that regulate related activities.
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